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Abstract
In this thesis we present a minimally specified approach to the lexical entries for
spatial prepositions based on the recognition of the importance of functional
relations. We begin by introducing the problem of separating out senses of a lexeme
from occurrences of a lexeme, and with a consideration of methods of sense
delineation, including ambiguity tests.
We then consider classical approaches to the lexical entries of prepositions which
favour minimal specification of lexical entries, and compare them to cognitive
linguistic accounts which favour full specification of lexical entries. It is argued that
classical accounts have problems with case accountability, while cognitive linguistic
accounts are based on a misinterpretation of prototype theory. We demonstrate that
the accounts are very similar in that they delineate senses in terms of different
geometric relations in the world.
Functional relations are introduced as an alternative way of understanding spatial
relations. It is argued that what is important about objects is how they interact with
each other, that is, the functional relations between objects. The work of Garrod
and Sanford (1989) and Talmy (1988) is considered in this context, and is
developed to deal more adequately with case accountability.
A number of experimental studies are reported which demonstrate the existence of
functional relations, and cast doubt on ambiguity tests as valid methods of sense
delineation. It is proposed that a spatial preposition can be said to have two senses if
a language user has a motivated reason for distinguishing between two types of
relation. Evidence is provided for a distinction between spatial prepositions which
involve functional components, and those that involve purely geometric
components. First language acquisition evidence is reviewed which suggests that
prepositions involving functional relations are learned first.
Finally, the pragmatic principles of Herskovits (1986) are developed and are allied
to minimally specified lexical entries in an analyses of in, on, at, over, under,
above and below which incorporate functional relations.
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1.1 Functional relations and Perception
"As has often been said before, perception is simply one phase of the total process of action, and its biological
role is to initiate and direct the behaviour of man and animals. It not only provides material for their
contemplation, but invites them to action, and allows them, to adjust this action to the world in which they live.
The phenomenal world does not consist of a simple juxtaposition of 'detached pieces', but a group of things which
act upon each other and in relation to each other. Thus the regulation of conduct requires a knowledge of what
things do or can do and what living creatures (and ourselves in particular) can do with them. We need to know
that things can be moved, e.g. by pushing them, causing them to slide, lifting them, or turning them over, by
hurling, breaking, bending or folding them, by leaning on them, and so on. We need to know, too, that certain
gestures, certain looks, or certain words can attract or repel other men and animals, or modify their conduct in
some other way. Similarly, it is necessary to understand the influence that things exert on people - hurting us
when they bump into to us, pricking or cutting us, resisting our efforts, confronting us with shapes that are easy or
difficult to handle, and so on Although these events all have a spatial and a kinematic aspect, the most
important feature about them is that they imply functional relations between objects. These relations are largely
outside the range of the many investigations that have been carried out on the subject of space-perception and the
perception of movement. These functional relations, then, constitute the essential fabric of the phenomenal world:
they must be considered as a highly important factor in the adaption of activities to their environment...It is these
relations which give the things around us their significance since it is by coming to know what things do that we
learn what they are. What they are for us is much more than their shape, their size, and their colour; it is above all
what they are capable of doing, or what can be done by means of them. The study of these relations, however,
has found only a very small place in the work of psychologists of the experimental school."
(A. Michotte. The Perception of Causality. !963, p.3, translation by Miles. Original work, La Perception de la
Causalite, published in 1946, 1954).
The above passage, taken from the 'Perception of Causality', reflects Michotte's
emphasis on the importance of functional relations in perception. For Michotte, one
cannot underestimate the extent to which the essence of things consists in what they
are able to do. For example, the information most pertinent to us about a glass is the
conception of a glass as a container. Furthermore, one associates a glass as a
container of liquids as opposed to gases or solids. This relates to another function of
the glass, which is to drink out of. Hence, the functional information appears to be
the information most useful to us, in this case relating to the function of ingestion.
Later work in perception has also recognised the importance of functional aspects of
perception. Marr (1982), recognising the problems with the work of Barlow (1972)
and others, argued that a proper understanding of the jobs that cells are doing in the
visual pathway requires the consideration of visual perception at a different, more
"computational" level. Much like the point made by Michotte, that the importance of
objects lies in what they are for, Marr (1982) argued that a theory of vision must
begin with the issue of what the visual system is for. Three different levels of theory
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must be distinguished if we are able to understand a complex information-processing
task such as visual perception. The first level, the level of computational theory is
considered by Marr to be the most important. The level of computational theory
specifies the job the visual system must do. This consists of information about what a
device does and why. Thus, for Marr, the nature of the computations that underlie
perception depends more upon the computational problems that have to be solved than
upon the particular hardware in which their solutions are implemented. Although the
idea that the level of functional explanation can operate in total independence of
explanation at the physical level has been harder to maintain recently in cognitive
science, for our purposes Marr's contribution is still highly relevant. As Marr states;
"To phrase the matter another way, an algorithm is likely to be understood
more readily by understanding the nature of the problem being solved than by
examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied" Marr
(1982, p. 27).
Let us consider the case of the visual system of the horseshoe crab (Limulus) as an
example of the importance of function in visual perception (cited in Bruce & Green,
1990). For Limulus, one can consider what sort of information about the environment
will be important for survival. One such piece of information is information
concerning the detection of predators. In the case of Limulus, predators normally
come from above (animals swimming overhead). Indeed, such information appears to
be well catered for in the visual system of Limulus; the visual system is maximally
responsive to rapid spatial changes in light intensity, and to movement. Hence, the
function of the visual system of Limulus filters out the changes in the environment
which are less important while retaining those which are important in the organisation
of the crab's actions (such as defending against a predator).
J. J. Gibson (1966) also acknowledged the importance of functional relations. In
particular he rejected the equation of the eye with the camera, and the consequent
analysis in terms of the processing of static images. For Gibson, the question to be
answered was the one of 'how does one obtain constant perceptions in everyday life
on the basis of constantly changing sensations?' (Marr, 1982, p. 29). The approach of
Gibson involves the incorporation of the time dimension into perception, such that all
perception becomes motion perception. Here Gibson is echoing the viewpoint of
Michotte that we cannot consider the phenomenal world as consisting of a simple
juxtaposition of "detached pieces". Let us now consider these ideas in the linguistic
domain.
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1.2 Functional Relations and Spatial Language
Turning to spatial language, it would not be unreasonable to assume that functional
relations may be important in this domain too, following from the clear evidence that
functional relations are of central importance in perception. When one does turn to
spatial language, however, functional relations have received little attention. As we
shall see, most research into the lexical semantics of spatial terms assumes a view of
the world as a series of 'detached pieces'. The nature of objects and what they are for
is not considered. The objects in the world are merely conceived of in terms of
geometric relations between them, and often these relations are not clearly specified in
geometric terms either. As Crangle and Suppes (1989) comment;
"In spite of the spate of articles in the last decade or so on locative
expressions, spatial prepositions, and the like, detailed attention to the kinds
of geometry needed to give a semantic analysis of the various locative
expressions does not seem to have been [previously] attempted." (Crangle and
Suppes, 1989, p. 399).
The central goal of this thesis is to argue that functional relations play a role at several
levels in the characterisation of the meaning of spatial language, the most relevant one
being the level of lexical semantics. We argue that the function of spatial expressions,
and spatial prepositions in particular, enables us to constrain a theory about what the
conditions for appropriate use are for these words. In particular, spatial language is
used to talk about interactions between objects which are dependent in turn on the
function of the objects (functional relations). This entails how objects relate to each
other over time, and this in turn is dependent on the nature of the objects, what they
are used for, etc. For example, with a simple locative expression, such as 'the cup is
on the table', the location remains constant over time unless the cup is moved
deliberately, or accidentally. Thus, the answer to a question such as , "where is the
cup?" is dependent on the interaction of the objects and the knowledge that the spatial
relations will remain constant over time. That is, the location of the cup will be the
same in 5 minutes, when the person who asked the question goes to find it based on
the reply, "the cup is on the table". It will be demonstrated that lexical semantics, the
"skeleton in the cupboard of cognitive science" (Herskovits, 1986), is made a lot
easier when one pays attention to functional relations. The thesis will provide different
kinds of evidence in support of this case.
Having sketched the background argument for the thesis, for the rest of this chapter
our objective is to make explicit those aspects of a theory of word meaning which will
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be taken as implicit throughout subsequent chapters, and to clearly state the problems
we wish to tackle.
1.3 Decoding and Encoding
The central background issues governing this enquiry revolve round the desire to deal
adequately with questions of decoding and encoding (following Herskovits, 1986).
These involve adequately pairing language with situations in the world. The question
of decoding involves, given a locative expression used in a particular situation,
predicting what it conveys, and how it will be interpreted - assuming that it has been
used appropriately. If the expression has not been used appropriately, one then needs
to explain the inappropriateness. The encoding question is the converse of this: given
a situation with two spatial objects, one wishes to predict the locative expression that
can be used appropriately to describe their spatial relation. These ideas are sketched
out in figure 1.1 below.
Figure 1.1
Figure one has three levels of structure, as opposed to two. One is primarily
interested, as already stated, in the relationship between language and the world. That
is, the first problem is to work out how language and the world covary. The level of
structure on the left hand side of figure 1.1 goes one stage further than this. Given the
relationship between language and the world, one can ask what information users of
language have about the language which they bring to a novel situation. In other
words, how do language users know that a word is appropriate or not in a given
situation (i.e., spatial situation in the world)? Now, the circle on the left hand side
could easily be labelled 'computer'. That is, one may argue that psychological issues
are not of relevance here. This is the position taken by Herskovits (1986). All that
Herskovits (1986) aims to do is to solve the encoding and decoding problems, that is,
without recourse to psychological processes.
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The account we will pursue embraces psychological processes; we hold the position
that to get at what conditions hold for the appropriate use of a word we have to appeal
to systematic observation of language use by language users. In other words, in the
case of spatial language use, how do spatial language and the spatial world covary,
and what information about the spatial world is relevant to users of the language
which may be worth representing in the circle on the left?
In doing this, we are interested in giving an account of the information which is most
likely to be represented in some sort of a mental lexicon during the processing of
spatial information. This goal raises many issues, not least of which is the issue of
whether mental representations can be said to underlie language use, and to represent
the world. Winograd and Flores (1985) represent one extreme here in that they argue
that one cannot assume that a language user has mental representations of the
regularities observed in language use; that language comprehension and production do
not proceed by manipulating representations of such regularities. Following Maturana
(1978) they describe the nervous system as a closed system:
"...the system can do only that which is determined by its own structure and
activity - its action cannot be understood as a reflection of an external world it
perceives".
What can be said in response to this is that language users can have representations of
regularities observed in language use as they have common functional needs
determined by the "closed system" which are reflected in these very regularities.
1.4 Issues in Lexical Semantics
With an interest in how spatial language and the spatial world covary, one must not
neglect the relationship that words have with other words. Addressing this question,
we can begin with the observation that most semantic theories assume that sentence or
utterance meaning is computed by combining the meaning of its parts using some set
procedures. This is the principle of compositionality, often referred to as Frege's
principle. The principle can be stated as follows:
(PC) The Principle of Compositionality: The meaning of a complex
expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and of their syntactic
mode of combination.
The principle is accepted widely as some version of it seems necessary for any
account of the ability to understand the meaning of novel utterances on first hearing.
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In order to make the principle precise, one must give a specification of at least the
following:
(1) The nature of the meaning of the smallest parts - i.e., a theory of lexical
semantics;
(2) The relevant whole-part structure of each complex expression - i.e., a
theory of the semantically relevant level or levels of syntax;
(3) The "functions" in question - i.e., a theory of what combinatorial semantic
operations there are, and how the rules for combining meanings operate on
lexical meanings and syntactic structure to produce the meaning of the whole -
in short, a theory of compositional semantics.
From our point of view we are interested in the first and third enterprises; namely
trying to define the smallest parts giving a viable theory of lexical semantics, and
specifying how these units can be combined to come up with the meaning of an
expression. In particular we focus on the first enterprise; the characterisation of the
smallest parts.
The characterisation of the smallest parts is dependent on the desiderata for theorists
involved with different endeavours. The linguist's concern is with the abstract
linguistic code, and is to characterise acceptable strings of words in a given language.
This entails specifying rules underlying the structure of acceptable strings, and one
part of this system is a lexicon specifying which words can co-occur and which
cannot, leading to semantic or syntactic anomaly. The lexicographer has the task of
defining 'meanings' of words for the compilation of a dictionary. This may involve a
mixture of abstraction over contexts, and may also involve ascribing the same word
different meanings dependent on the context of occurrence. The computational linguist
centres his interest on getting machines to understand language, and modelling
possible grammars to investigate computational properties and tractability in such
systems. The psycholinguist is interested in language as used by language users. In
other words, psycholinguistics is concerned with the mental mechanisms that make it
possible for people to use language. Specifically, the question is one of what in
semantic memory corresponds to the definitions of words in an ordinary dictionary.
As already stated, what all these approaches have in common is the need to specify at
some level what information is represented by the smallest parts. Here the analogy
with dictionaries has been appealing for researchers of all desiderata, and as Clark's
work shows (Clark, 1983; Clark and Gerrig, 1983; Clark, 1989) the analogy has
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often been taken as much more. The basic idea is that words have fixed meanings
which are combined via compositional rules with other words of fixed meanings to
arrive at the meaning of the sentence. For instance, the assumption behind models of
human parsing has been that, at some point during parsing, a "mental lexicon" is
accessed. Entries in the mental lexicon are compared with the input, segmented into
words, in terms of orthographical or phonological properties and, that done, the
"sense" associated with the word is "read off" from the dictionary entry. In cases
where there are multiple senses for a given word, the appropriate sense is selected
from a list of possible senses.
The theory of semantic markers (originating from Katz & Fodor, 1963) is an example
of such a dictionary theory. It is clearly decompositional, with the semantic
interpretation of a sentence obtained by replacing its words with their semantic
representations, and combining these representations according to the underlying
syntactic structure of the sentence. The theory holds that the semantic representation
of a word primarily comprises a structured set of elements, 'semantic markers', which
decompose its meaning into more primitive semantic constituents; ultimately meanings
are decomposable into a set of 'linguistically universal' and innate components. For
example, an analysis of the meaning of man in terms of semantic markers would be
akin to;
MAN (noun) HUMAN, ADULT, MALE.
The theory illustrates the central characteristics of dictionary theories in general.
Firstly, they associate with words some descriptive content. It is assumed that this
content guides linguistic behaviour, that is, it determines the appropriateness or
otherwise of a given word. Secondly, such theories take this content to be mentally
represented in a certain way. Namely, the assumption is that any sense of a given
word is permanently represented, just as in a dictionary, and that parsing constitutes
the selection from such senses.
Johnson-Laird (1983) presents some objections to the Katz and Fodor formulation.
There are numerous studies which have been conducted on-line which seem to
contradict this theory (see Johnson-Laird, 1983, pp. 207-211 for a review). The
theory assumes that comprehension requires the meanings of complex words to be
decomposed into their semantic constituents. However, Kintsch (1974) did not find
any effects of semantic complexity on a number of different measures. He found, for
instance, that the sentence 'A man lifts a boy' was no harder to understand than 'An
adult lifts a child'. However, we have to be aware that the issue of decomposition as a
necessary process in comprehension is a very different matter from the issue of
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whether there are any semantic primitives (cf. Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976,
p.326ff).
More importantly, Johnson-Laird (1987, p. 190) comments that Katz and Postal have:
"elevated this lowly piece of lexicography into linguistic theory".
Here Johnson-Laird is recognising that there is a difference between lexicography and
the concerns of the linguist, psycholinguist (and possibly computational linguist). This
is clear when we examine what a lexicographer does in more detail.
If one is interested in lexicography, then one doesn't have to worry about the number
of senses that are recognised unless there are restrictions on the size of the dictionary
being compiled. This is clear when we examine dictionaries. For example, the
Complete Oxford English Dictionary gives seventeen distinct entries for mother. If
one compares this with the two volume version, only ten entries are given. The
pattern follows with the Concise Oxford English Dictionary which gives six entries.
Another feature is the amount of space given to each entry. In larger dictionaries more
specific occurrences of an entry are given, together with more examples of extended
and idiomatic uses of the word.
Thus, we may distinguish (following Dunbar, 1988) between two meanings that a
word may be said to have. On the one hand, there is the contribution that the word
makes to a perceived meaning or understanding of an utterance. That is, a word plays
a role in the cognitive event of comprehension, and its meaning to the comprehender
is what it adds to the message. On the other hand, there is the meaning which users of
language ascribe to a word through a metalinguistic process of dividing up the overall
meanings of utterances among their constituents. This is lexicography. The difficulty
with a lexicographic approach is precisely that it tends to view the word in isolation
and at leisure, hence omitting from consideration the rapid march of time and the
swift intrusion of other words on the scene. We are primarily interested in the first
enterprise, as already stated. Thus one must be careful not to take the analogy with
the dictionary too far.
Again this difference can be captured with a distinction (following Bennett, 1975)
between 'lexemes', 'senses' and 'occurrences' of a word. We also wish to refine this
with a distinction between 'lexical units' and 'lexemes'. Lexical units are those form-
meaning complexes with (relatively) stable and discrete semantic properties which
stand in meaning relations such as antonymy (e.g., long-short) and hyponymy (e.g.,
dog-animal), and which interact syntagmatically with contexts in various ways. A
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particular lexical unit expresses its semantic identity through such relations, but its
essence cannot be exhaustively characterised in terms of any determinate set of such
relations. The meaning aspect of a lexical unit is termed a sense. Lexemes, on the
other hand, are the items listed in the lexicon, or 'ideal dictionary', of a language.
The distinction between lexical units and lexemes becomes central when one looks at
the constraints on each. Lexical units as Cruse (1986) points out, "need to represent
unitary 'quanta' of meaning, but they do not have to be finite". A lexeme, by contrast
may well be associated with indefinitely many senses, but the set of lexemes must be
finitely enumerable. This of course leads to the conclusion that it is maybe best not to
include all senses in the lexicon as there are in principle an infinite number of senses
(Cruse, 1986: Clark, 1983).
The distinction between lexical unit and lexeme is often not made. For example,
Bennett (1975) associates lexemes with lexical units, and this is, in our view, a
serious error. Our task is to describe the meaning of the set of English lexemes that
are of interest to us. Again, this is different from "occurrences" of a word, which
means exactly what one would expect it to mean. Each sentence involving a particular
lexeme will have an occurrence of that lexeme. Finally, a lexeme may or may not
have the same meaning on two separate occurrences. When it doesn't, the different
meanings are termed senses. The task of describing the meaning of a lexeme becomes
that of describing the meaning of the various senses of the lexeme of interest. Bennett
(1975), for example, does this by assigning each lexeme a different componential
analysis.
Having clearly separated the endeavours of lexicography from theorists with other
desiderata, we arrive at the questions of how many senses one should ascribe to a
lexeme, and how one should go about doing this. It is to this issue we now turn.
1.4.1 Delineation of Senses: Full Versus Minimal Specification of the Lexical
Entry
One of the goals of the thesis is to try to separate out the senses of words from
different isolated occurrences. This is by no means easy. We can turn to some
traditional tests for assistance in order to do this (reviewed below), and we can use
intuitions about different uses in different utterances or sentences. We should point
out, of course, that the combinatorial properties of words in utterances are constrained
not only by their meanings, but also by their grammatical properties. Grammatical
constraints may overlap and reinforce semantic constraints, but they may also be
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semantically arbitrary. In order to be able to use contextual relations for semantic
purposes, therefore, we need to be able to recognise and discount combinatorial
peculiarities which are purely grammatical in nature. In this vein, we will consider the
relationship between prepositions, particles, verb prefixes and adverbs in the second
chapter, where we talk about the domain to be considered in the thesis.
The separation of senses of a lexeme and occurrences of a lexeme can be framed
within the debate between full or minimal specification of a lexical entry. If we begin
with a word, like the word bank, there appears to be no problem. Bank is a
homonym, and thus it is accepted that it has two distinct senses which are unrelated.
The problem arises with the treatment of polysemy, where the occurrences of a
lexeme are related. Now classical approaches to word meaning (which will be
considered in detail in chapter three) favour minimal specification for the lexical entry
of words. In doing this they attempt to find something common to all occurrences of
a lexeme, and make the assumption of 'Gesamtbedeutung' ('general meaning'; cf
Jakobson, 1932, 19361). Lakoff (1987) claims that this does not deal with polysemy;
"The classical theory2 of categories does not do very well on the treatment of
polysemy. In order to have a single lexical item, the classical theory must
treat all of the related senses as having some abstract meaning in common -
usually so abstract that it cannot distinguish among the cases and so devoid of
real meaning that it is not recognisable as what people think of as the meaning
of a word. And where there are a large number of related senses that don't all
share a property, then the classical theory is forced to treat such cases as
homonymy, the same way it treats the case of the two words bank. Moreover,
the classical theory has no adequate means of characterising the situation
where one or more senses are "central" or "most representative".
(Lakoff (1987), p. 416).
For example, if we take the word over, one may assign the core meaning of 'over' as
"at a higher location than, but not in contact with". This can be characterised
componentially as;
1 It should be noted that Jakobson himself did not apply the concept of "Gesamtbedeutung" to lexical
items but to the case inflections of Russian.
2 The classical theory as discussed by Lakoff (1987) in reality may be something of a straw man.
Traditional lexicography was well aware of the problems of homonymy and polysemy, as well as
phenomena such as that of metonymy. We therefore treat the classical theory as an abstract and




This core sense cannot account for occurrences such as "The man lives over the hill".
Brugman (1981) catalogues nearly 100 different kinds of uses of 'over' which would
have to treated as idiomatic under this minimal specification, or alternatively are listed
separately in the lexicon as different senses. Furthermore, the componential analysis
offered here would be the same core meaning that would be presumably required for
'above', but 'over' and 'above' do not have the same distribution. There is only a
partial overlap in the distribution of the two words.
As will be apparent by now, the classical theory favours minimal specification rather
than full specification for lexical entries. Lakoff (1987) and those working within the
framework of cognitive linguistics generally offer what they claim is a different
approach, favouring full specification and recognising extensive polysemy. For
example, Lakoff (1987) and Brugman (1981) offer a fully specified account for the
lexical entry for 'over'. They recognise extensive polysemy, thus treating all of the
senses of 'over' as being related. The polysemy is represented by a radial structure in
the lexicon with two prototypical senses of 'over' recognised, with the other senses
related via chaining rules. This type of approach will be extensively discussed in
chapter four.
Bennett (1975) points out that it seems arbitrary how many senses are recognised for
an individual word as it is always possible to subdivide more finely. A case in point is
that of metonymy. Nunberg (1978) cites a particular case of this:
- One waitress says to another, "The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself."
Here the ham sandwich is standing for the person eating the sandwich. The person has
none of the properties of ham sandwiches which make them ham sandwiches. Now, if
we try to treat ham sandwich as ambiguous we ignore the important relations between
its various uses. Additionally, since we can cite numerous similar examples, to
analyse these in terms of ambiguity would suppose quite a vast, and implausibly vast,
lexicon. Indeed, this is very much the point which Clark (1983) suggests undermines
traditional dictionary theories of word meaning. In a similar vein, Lakoff and Johnson
(1980) argue that such instances of metonymy are instances of general principles; they
do not just occur one by one. This type of problem is also not limited to cases such as
metonymy.
Johnson-Laird (1987), like Bennett (1975) argues that one must not place too much
emphasis on polysemy. The crucial psychological criterion is whether or not it is
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necessary to postulate more than one semantic representation for a word in order to
account for the interpretation of sentences in which it occurs. Instead of asking how
many different meanings can be squeezed out of the word, psycholinguists need to ask
what is the minimum number of senses that are necessary to cope with all of its
different uses or occurrences. If "eat" were truly polysemous then the sentence:
He eats the food
should be highly ambiguous. It should have wholly distinct senses. Yet it remains
unequivocal. Johnson-Laird points out that the indeterminacy of reference is not
sufficient to establish ambiguity because, if it were, open-class words would be
infinitely ambiguous and their meanings could not be contained by a finite brain.
Hence, the sentence above, which truly applies to a number of situations, is
referentially indeterminate, but not ambiguous. Its syntax is unambiguous, and its
words are unambiguous: they each have in ordinary usage a single sense, but these
senses suffice, as do the senses of all words, to embrace many different situations.
The sentence requires only a single representation of its meaning.
Johnson-Laird further remarks that a comparable mistake has been made in the
standard interpretation of instantiation. Context can, of course, pick out the
appropriate sense of a genuinely ambiguous word, for example, "He banked the
cheque." However, the instantiation of an unambiguous word such as "fish" by a
sentential context does not depend on picking out one sense from a long list of
possibilities.
This problem runs further than Johnson-Laird assumes. The problem lies in the
methods used to spot different senses. For example, if we take Brugman's analysis of
"over" (to be discussed in some detail later in chapter four), we find different senses
posited for the preposition in the following sentences:
The bird flew over the field.
The man lives over the hill.
The cow is over the moon.
The problem is that, although the sentences clearly mean different things, it is not
necessarily attributable to different senses of the preposition "over" in each sentence.
The difference in sentence meaning may well be due to the co-occurrence relations,
and the effect that they have on compositionality. Hence, it is all too easy to attribute
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differences in sentence meaning to the word type of interest. Furthermore, most have
gone further and have attributed the difference in sentence meaning to the lexical
entry for the preposition.
All of these examples illustrate what Clark (1983) has called "non-denumerability".
There can be no limit to the number of explanatory scenarios with which we can
furnish a particular contextual expression and so, in principle, there can be no limit to
the number of senses of said expressions. Further, the fact that the senses of
contextual expressions are so dependent on the context in which they are used
suggests that said expressions are akin to indexicals. As Cruse (1986) puts it;
"One of the basic problems of lexical semantics is the multiplicity of semantic
uses of a single word form (without grammatical difference). There seems
little doubt that such variation is the rule rather than the exception: the
meaning of any word form is in some sense different in every distinct context
in which it occurs"
(Cruse, 1986; p.51)
This is what Clark (1983) calls "contextuality".
The options faced here are strong or weak sense selection. The first option is that each
and every sense of a given word is listed in the lexicon under the entry for that word
and that what is required for successful communication is selection of the correct one
in the circumstances in which the word is used. The second option is that few senses
(or one sense) are represented in the lexicon, and the specific occurrence is generated
on the spot. Cruse (1986) puts the argument a different way. He draws a distinction
between two fundamental ways in which the effective semantic contribution of a word
form may vary under the influence of different contexts. The first way, termed
modulation by Cruse, involves the modification of a single sense by different
contexts. For example, a dirty window-pane will allow some parts of the scene
beyond to be seen clearly, and will partly obscure other parts, and a different pane
will effect the same scene differently. Modulation is therefore the variation within a
sense, and is largely continuous and fluid in nature. The other type of variation is that
of contextual selection of senses. As the label suggests, the context picks from among
senses the one which is appropriate to achieve utterance meaning in context.
The relationship between minimal versus full specification and strong and weak sense
selection is not that simple. Although full specification is associated with strong sense
selection and minimal specification with weak sense selection, Clark (1983) advocates
sense creation as a viable complementation of strong sense selection. This basically
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means that the meaning for the word in context is generated with the lexical entry
complemented by the context. Braisby (1990) offers a slight variation of this called
'sense generation'. These ideas, it will be argued, provide a viable alternative to full
specification accounts, and will be considered within our domain of interest in chapter
8.
1.4.2 Ambiguity Tests and Psychological Reality
The issue of full versus minimal specification of the lexical entry for a word can be
made easier if there are valid criteria for sorting out whether a word is ambiguous or
not. Bennett (1975) comments that;
"ultimately one would like a linguistic description to reflect the psychological
facts, but at the present time we have only a rudimentary understanding of the
way in which language is stored and processed in the brain. It would seem, a
priori, that the notion of separate senses of a lexeme might well have
psychological validity, since we presumably do not store every single
occurrence of a given lexeme that we have ever encountered."
Here Bennett comments that he is unaware of any technique in psycholinguistics for
determining how many senses a given lexeme has for a particular speaker, and
therefore he sticks with the methodology of linguistics. One of the aims in this thesis
is to develop valid criteria for separating out senses for spatial prepositions based on
the relationship between language and the spatial world. The techniques we will
discuss (in chapter six) are of a psycholinguistic nature, and offer methodological
alternatives to the linguistic criteria we will shortly discuss.
Taking this point further, we can follow Chomsky in the assumption that regularities
at the linguistic level must arise from regularities at the cognitive level, but that the
relationship between the levels is sufficiently abstract to preclude testing the models
from one with data from the other. Rather, they provide complementary data, with
linguistic evidence establishing the general framework which behavioural evidence can
then refine. From our point of view, we will consider both linguistic and
psychological evidence. In the final analysis, it will be demonstrated that
consideration of language as an abstract code, and processing evidence, necessarily
have to be combined to give a fuller and more accurate account of language. At the
end of the day language cannot be separated from the users of that language as
language is dependent on the users for judgment of the well-formedness of that
language.
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We can turn to a variety of linguistic tests which have been formulated for ambiguity.
However, as we shall see, these are by no means full-proof. The main problem is that
there is not an understanding of why the tests are supposed to work. In the face of
examples where the tests fail, one would expect that a motivated account of how they
work would be forthcoming. It is left to us to evaluate the tests to try to fill this
obvious gap.
Cruse (1986) cites both direct and indirect tests for ambiguity. To take direct criteria
for ambiguity first, three such tests are discussed by Cruse. The first centres on the
argument that the senses of an ambiguous word form should not in every case be
conditioned by their contexts, unlike the interpretations which arise as a result of
contextual modulation. This means that an ambiguous word form set in a
disambiguating context may well carry more information than can be accounted for in
terms of interaction between the context-independent meaning of the word form, and
the semantic properties of the context. On the other hand, in cases of contextual
modulation, all information is derived from these sources. For example, we can
consider the following sentences (from Cruse, 1986, p. 58);
(a) Arthur washed and polished the car.
(b) John lubricated the car.
The most likely interpretation of (a) is that not every part of the car underwent
washing and polishing, but the exterior surface only. The basis for this conclusion is
derived entirely from the general meaning of car, together with the semantic
properties of the context. A similar account can be given of the most likely
interpretation of car in (b).
It is clear that the success or failure of the test is dependent on the choice of
substitution for the word of interest. If the wrong substitution is used, then the word
passes the test and is deemed to have two distinct senses. This test therefore simply
mirrors the problem of minimal specification, in that one has to pick the correct
substitution to avoid the delineation of two or more senses. Cruse indeed comments
on the difficulty of applying the test in practice, although he seems to think that it is
conceptually important.
The second criterion cited by Cruse for ambiguity is that separate senses should be
independently maximisable. Under certain conditions, the application of certain terms
must be maximised within the current universe of discourse, even at the expense of
oddness. This can be illustrated with two independent senses of 'dog', each
independently maximisable, as illustrated below (cited in Cruse, 1986, p. 61);
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A: Is that a dog?
B: (i) Yes, it's a spaniel.
(ii) No, it's a bitch.
In other words, the fact that the question can be answered truthfully, yes or no, is
dependent on the respondent's belief about which sense the questioner is intending.
There are problems with this test also. Kempson (1977) and Lyons (1977) deny that a
successful test for ambiguity can be constructed along these lines.
The third direct test for ambiguity is that of zeugma. This test utilises the fact that
independent senses of a lexical form cannot be brought into play together without
oddness; that is to say two senses of a word are antagonistic to one another. This can
operate by coordination, or by anaphora (cited in Cruse, 1986, p.59-60);
(1) ? John and his driving licence expired last Thursday.
(2) ? John's driving licence expired last Thursday; so did John.
Antagonism of senses also lies behind the so-called identity test for ambiguity.In (3)
below, each part of the sentence contains an occurrence, either direct, or indirect via
anaphora, of the ambiguous adjective 'light', and can therefore in theory be
interpreted in two ways
(3) Mary is wearing a light coat; so is Sue.
However, the whole sentence does not have four (i.e., 2x2) interpretations, but only
two. This is because the same reading of 'light' must be selected in each part: either
both the ladies are wearing "undark" coats, or both are wearing "unheavy" coats.
Cross interpretation is prohibited. This prohibition is not a mysterious property of the
grammatical process of anaphora; it is simply a consequence of the fact that 'light'
resists, as it were, the simultaneous activation of more than one of its senses.
We will discuss some difficulties with zeugma later. In particular, once again no clear
account of why the test works is given. Let us give some examples, which
demonstrate some of the difficulty;
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(i) The flowers and crack are in the vase. The flowers are in the vase : so is
the crack.
(ii) The violets and roses are in the vase. The violets are in the vase: so are the
roses.
(iii) The flowers and water are in the vase. The flowers are in the vase: so is
the water.
(iv) The flowers and lead are in the vase. The flowers are in the vase: so is the
lead.
Here the first sentence, using zeugma, would suggest that there are two different
senses of 'in' being used. By contrast, in (ii) the test suggests that one sense is being
used in both cases. However, things look more tricky when we compare (iii) and (iv).
Also, note the differences in acceptability comparing zeugma with the identity test for
ambiguity.
Cruse (1986, p.66) himself comments that not all sentence ambiguity originates in
lexical ambiguity, and that tests for ambiguity are not capable of discriminating
between lexical and non-lexical varieties of ambiguity. Cruse suggests that one should
adopt a 'default' definition and characterise lexical ambiguities as ambiguities which
do not have a convincing non-lexical explanation. In the case of zeugma, we will
provide a possible explanation without recourse to lexical ambiguity in chapter six.
Let us now turn to indirect tests as described by Cruse. Yet again Cruse cites three
indirect tests, which are less reliable than the direct tests. However, we still wish to
arm ourselves with all the methods available to separate out senses as best as we can.
The tests then merit a brief mention, and are listed below;
(I) If there exists a synonym for one occurrence of a word form which is not a
synonym of a second, syntactically identical occurrence of the same word form in a
different context, then that word form is ambiguous, and two occurrences exemplify
different senses.
(II) If there exists a word or expression standing in a relation of oppositeness to one
occurrence of a word form, which does not stand in relation to a second, syntactically
identical occurrence of the same word form is a different context, then that word form
is ambiguous, and the two occurrences exemplify different senses.
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(Ill) If there exists a word which stands in a paronymic relation to one occurrence of a
word form, but does not stand in the same relation to a second, syntactically identical
occurrence of the same word form in a different context, then that word form is
ambiguous, and the two occurrences exemplify different senses.
Cruse (1986) himself comments that indirect tests are less reliable than direct tests,
and therefore we will follow Cruse and will use only direct tests when appropriate.
However, we proceed with extreme caution; as already stated there is not a clear
account of why the tests appear to work. In particular, it can be argued that the tests
are based on syntactic criteria, namely coordination phenomena where the general
principle holds that only constituents can be conjoined; nonconstituent sequences
cannot be conjoined. Therefore a syntactic test has been applied to a semantic domain.
Furthermore, this type of test has been used to spot homonyms, such as the two
senses of bank mentioned earlier. It is less clear whether this type of test can be used
in the case of polysemy. It will be demonstrated in chapter six that it cannot.
1.5 Preview of the Argument
In this chapter we have introduced the problems we wish to tackle in the thesis.
Namely we wish to address the question of how the spatial world and spatial language
covary. In doing this, we aim to tackle the issue of how many senses one should
ascribe to a spatial preposition. Furthermore, we ask that we give an account of the
information that users of language are likely to mentally represent during language
processing. In other words, what are the conditions for the use of a spatial
preposition, and how does this relate to mental representation?
Before we can proceed any further, we must clearly map out the domain of interest.
Chapter two does precisely that. We narrow down the area of spatial prepositions to a
focus on a few of (what are often regarded as) the simplest, including in, on, at, over,
under, above and below. In doing this, we consider the relationship between this
group and other prepositions, as well as the same words used across syntactic
categories.
In chapter three we consider the classical treatment of the meaning of spatial
prepositions. In particular we focus on the account of Bennett (1975) as an example of
componential analysis, among others. It will be demonstrated that many of the
criticisms made of the classical theory (e.g., Lakoff, 1987) only apply to some aspects
of the theory, and that there may be aspects of the theory which are worth preserving.
In particular, we argue that minimally specified accounts of the lexical entries of
spatial prepositions makes sense. In order to do this, componential analysis isn't an
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option which has to be ruled out. It will be demonstrated that many of the criticisms
reflect the wrong choice of minimal specification for the lexical entry.
In Chapter four we consider approaches which favour full specification. In particular
we examine prototype theory, and the motivation for using the radial structure of
categories directly in the lexical representation for the meaning of each preposition. It
will be argued that prototype effects have been largely misinterpreted, and that they
can easily be seen as by-products of sense generation from a minimally specified
lexical entry, rather than representations of meaning per se. This chapter also presents
in some detail two examples of accounts which employ prototypical structure and full
specification. Firstly we consider the account of over given by Brugman (1981,
1988), Lakoff (1987), and Brugman and Lakoff (1988). It will be argued that the
approach to polysemy is ill-founded in that the criteria used to separate out senses are
a by-product of constraint satisfaction. In particular, it will be argued that it is the
information about the most commonly occurring nouns which leads to prototype
effects. Secondly, we present the theory of Herskovits (1986) and argue against the
notion of ideal meanings and use types. However, her use of pragmatics, it is argued,
should be taken further within a semantic framework. Elements of her theory are
worth preserving, although in a slightly different form.
Chapter five begins with the assertion that all the approaches thus far discussed (i.e.,
in chapters three and four) are incorrect in their assumption that spatial prepositions
refer to geometric relations between objects. It is argued that what is important about
spatial language is how objects interact with each other, and not where they are in
relation to each other in geometric space. In this light, the work of Talmy (1988) and
Garrod and Sanford (1989) is considered, and this leads to a rejection of what we call
(after Michotte), the 'detached pieces approach' to explanatory lexical semantics.
How one can accrue evidence for this will then be discussed. Garrod and Sanford
(1989) argue that geometric descriptions underspecify the conditions when a particular
preposition can and cannot be used. In place of this, they suggest one possible
solution; the notion of situation-specific functional geometries. We unwrap precisely
what Garrod and Sanford mean by this, and present several inconsistencies apparent
within their argument. At the end of the chapter we present a theory of the
relationship between functional relations and geometric relations, which is an
extended version of the Garrod and Sanford analysis, and outline a set of hypotheses
to be tested in the following chapter.
Chapter six sets out to directly test the hypotheses relating to the existence of
functional relations outlined in chapter five. Five experimental studies are presented
which support the existence of functional relations. Importantly, these studies (and in
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particular the main study; study five) examine directly how the spatial world and
spatial language covary by systematically varying spatial scenes presented along two
parameters; geometric positioning, and functional interaction.
Chapter seven considers a second source of evidence for functional relations; evidence
from first language acquisition. We reinterpret developmental work on the first
language acquisition of spatial prepositions, and it is demonstrated that this provides
compelling evidence for the functional relations analysis. In particular, the work of
Stevens and Coventry (in preparation) is discussed at some length. This work provides
clear empirical support that prepositions involving functional relations are learned
first, and that geometric relation prepositions are learned later.
Chapter eight takes functional relations and presents initially a reclassification of the
use types of Herskovits (1986), reducing the number of use types required in the
lexicon. This analysis is then developed, and further reduces the number of senses
required for in, on, at, over, under, below and above. This is a more formal
specification of the lexical semantics for spatial prepositions, and employs the notion
of a semantic field. We also review different ways of dealing with co-occurrence
relations, and provide a formal framework for compositional semantics involving
minimal specifications for the lexical entries of the prepositions.
Finally, chapter nine presents the conclusions of the analysis and the ramifications of




In this chapter we specify the domain of interest and map out the terminology to be
adopted for the rest of the thesis.
2.2 The Domain to be Considered
The thesis deals with spatial prepositions in standard English, which are among the
simplest and shortest words in the English language, and in most languages. In
classifying the functions of prepositions it is customary to distinguish between
'grammatical' uses and 'local' uses (Lyons, 1968; Bennett, 1975). Under the banner
of 'local' uses come spatial and temporal uses of prepositions.
Spatial uses of prepositions may be divided into 'locative' or 'relational' (Clark,
1973) prepositions and 'directional' prepositions (Bennett, 1975). 'Locative' or
'relational' prepositions are used in order to describe the location of one object in
relation to another, for example;
Keith is in his office
'Directional' prepositions are used to describe a change of position. For instance;
Simon went to the eye-tracker room (a few minutes ago).
To give a more complex example (from Bennett, 1975, p. 18);
We went from Waterloo Bridge along the Embankment to Westminster.
can be considered to contain three directional expressions in its semantic
representation: a source expression, a path expression and a goal expression. Hence,
we have a starting point, a change of location, and a description of the path taken on
the way to the change of location.
The division between directional and locative prepositions will be reviewed later in
the thesis. In our analysis directional and locative prepositions are treated as being
linked. A locative preposition such as 'in' involves information about how the objects
interact with each other, and hence how they remain stable over time. A directional
preposition can simply be viewed as the converse of this.
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The present thesis deals with locative prepositions.
Locative prepositions occur within locative expressions. It is therefore essential to
examine differences between locative expressions, of which there are many types. The
simplest form is composed of three constituents: the preposition and two noun-phrases
as in ;
The nail in the board
The nail is the subject of the preposition and the board is the object. The subject
refers to the located entity, and the object to the reference entity. There are many
alternative terms given for subject and object catalogued by research in table 2.1
below. For the rest of the text, we will follow Langacker (1986) in the use of figure
and ground for subject and object. This avoids the syntactic connotations associated
with subject and object; figure and ground are used exclusively in the semantic
domain.
Such expressions can be structured around a copulative verb or an existential
quantifier:
The snail is in the garden
There is a snail in the garden
Locative expressions also exist where the subject of the preposition is a clause:
The snail is chewing lettuce in the garden.
The subject of the expression is the snail is chewing lettuce, as this clause describes
the event that is taking place in the garden.
A spatial prepositional phrase may also fit in the case frame of a verb (Fillmore,
1968). For example,
The dog put the bone in the kennel.
What is being located in the kennel is not any object, state or event, but the
"destination" of the action "to put", that is, in the kennel is the end place of the
trajectory of the bone, which will be considered the located entity.
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Retz-Schmidt (1988) offers a further breakdown of locatives into those such as in, at
and near, which she claims only refer to topological relations between the objects,
and others such as in front of, behind, left of, right of, beside, above and below which
also convey information about the direction in which one object is located with
respect to the other. The latter group are called projective prepositions (Herskovits,
1986) or directional prepositions ((Richtungsprapositionen)(Wunderlich and Herweg,
1988).
Table 2.1 Other terms for Subject. Object, and Point of View (adapted from Retz-
Schmidt. 1988).
Author(s)/Researcher(s) Subject Object Point of View
Bennett, '75, p.83
Buhler, '82, p. 13ff

































































on by the speaker)
Projective prepositions can be used in different ways. Following Wunderlich (1985)
Retz-Schmidt (1988) distinguishes between deictic use, intrinsic use, and extrinsic
use. For example, with the expression "The bike is in front of the lorry" deictic use
would locate the bike in relation to the lorry from the point of view of the speaker,
intrinsic use with respect to the orientation of the lorry itself, and extrinsic use with
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respect to the actual direction of the motion of the lorry1. Thus projective prepositions
rely on different points of view (also termed variously as displayed in table 2.1
above). The duplicity of systems for spatial reference is quite general for other world
languages as well as English, though there are many differences of detail .
Projective prepositions are the only prepositions (in English) which allow deictic,
intrinsic, and extrinsic use. However, there is not complete agreement as to which
prepositions can fall into these categories. Figure 2.1 summarises different viewpoints
on membership of the set of projective prepositions.
Figure 2.1 Membership of the Set of Projective Prepositions by Authorlsl/Researcherls)
UMmer-Ehric/t, '32
As can be seen from the figure, there is complete agreement that in front of, behind,
to the left of, and to the right of belong to this group. However, considerable
disagreement exists with others such as on the top of Of relevance here is the
disagreement over over, under, below and above. As can be seen seen from figure
2.1, these are treated by Talmy (1983) as prepositions which can be used intrinsically,
deictically and extrinsically. This is because they describe relations in the vertical
axis, and thus allow intrinsic and extrinsic uses, but not deictic use. Intrinsic use
involves the intrinsic top and bottom of the reference object (intrinsic verticality;
Clark, 1973), and extrinsic use involves geological or gravitational verticality (Clark,
1973), based on the gravitation of the earth.
1 For a subset of English speakers it should be noted that "The bike is in front of the lorry" does not
have an intrinsic interpretation. For that they require "The bike is at the front of the lorry".
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Levelt (1984) offers a detailed discussion of the deictic and intrinsic systems of
referring to spatial relations. Several important differences emerge from his analysis.
Comparing deictic versus intrinsic use of left and right, converseness holds for the
deictic system but not the intrinsic system. This is clear when we compare the scenes
in figure 2.2 (below);
Figure 2.2
(a) (b)
In (a) if one says that 'A is to the right of B', then it holds that B is to the right of A
for both deictic and intrinsic use. However, this is not true with (b); with deictic use
the converse does hold, but with intrinsic use it does not. With the intrinsic use in (b)
A is to the right of B and B is to the right of A1 .
Similarly, the deictic system is transitive, but the intrinsic system is not. Consider
figure 2.3 (below);
Figure 2.3
Again, from the perspective of the viewer (deictic frame of reference) one can say in
picture (a) that A is to the left of B, and that B is to the left of C, therefore A must
necessarily be to the left of C. Transitivity also holds for picture (b) with deictic use.
However, transitivity for intrinsic use does not hold for picture (b); A is to the left of
1 Hence, with intrinsic use one can say "A is on B's right"
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B, B is to the left of C, but A is not to the left of C. Levelt comments (1984, p.330)
that a consequence of the intrinsic system's local intransitivity is the difficulty with
which one finds reasoning with left and right using the intrinsic system. Indeed, this
has lead Johnson-Laird (1983) to postulate that one must create and manipulate
mental-models of the scenes to cope with the difficulties involved.
Of most relevance for us here is Levelt's discussion of intrinsic and deictic uses of
over and above. These uses, involving the vertical dimension, differ from the in
front/behind and left/right dimensions (see Levelt, 1984, pp. 331 - 347 for extensive
discussion). For deictic use of above and below the point of view of the observer is
irrelevant; that is, the position of the observer with the respect to the scene is of no
importance. Thus converseness and transitivity apply to deictic uses of above and
below. However, the vertical orientation of the speaker's perspective is only one
factor. Levelt argues that a number of cues operate on the perception of a scene from
the viewer's perspective. These are (Levelt, 1984, p.348) verticality perceived in
terms of;
(1) its being aligned with the retina's vertical meridian
(2) its orientation with respect to some visual frame (horizon or whatever), and
(3) its alignment with the vestibular vertical
These variables can be seen to be brought into play in figure 2.4 (below);
Figure 2.4
(a) A M A (C) A
The first type of cue is apparent in (a), but not in (b). The second type of cue comes
into play with (a) and (c). The vestibular cue works in (a) and (b). However, (c)
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represents a case where retinal and vestibular alignment cues are in conflict. It is not
clear in this case whether one would say that 'A is above B' or that 'B is above A'.
Intrinsic uses of above and below are extremely limited due to what Levelt (p. 345)
refers to as the principle ofcanonical orientation. This runs as follows;
"For the intrinsic system to refer to a reference object's intrinsic
dimension, that dimension must be in canonical position with respect to
the reference frame of orientation of the located object."
Hence, in figure 2.5 (below) one cannot say 'chair A is below chair B' but one
can say that 'chair B is below chair A'.
There can only be genuine intrinsic use of over and above for frames of reference
other than the perceived vertical. However, these later cases are quite limited as well;
it is for instance still impossible to violate converseness or transitivity.
This thesis deals with what are generally regarded as the simplest of
relationals/locatives to deal with; what have been termed 'topological' prepositions.
However, the label 'topological' will be brought into question as a suitable label for
these prepositions. Specifically we will deal with in, on, over, under, above, below
and at. This restricted choice is partly reflected by the fact that these prepositions
have been examined most extensively in the past, and thus we have numerous existing
accounts to consider. We will also stick within two grammatical frames;





NP 4- VP(V + PP(P + NP)) as in The turtle is in the aquarium
We will stick mainly to the verb to be in this second grammatical frame, although we
will also consider other verbs. The reason for this is that we wish to separate out the
information the preposition brings to the sentence from effects of constraint
satisfaction, or contextual modulation. For example, let us consider the following
sentences;
Kathryn walks over the hill
Kathryn lives over the hill
In the first case there is a path with the figure in contact with the ground. In the
second case Kathryn lives on the other side of the hill from the viewpoint of the
speakers. Thus the sentences, involving different verbs, depict quite different spatial
relations. It could be that the word over brings different information to each sentence
(as Lakoff, 1987 argues; i.e, it has two distinct, though related, senses), or it could be
the verb adds to the information given by over, thus reaching a different spatial
depiction as a function of the compositionality. Focussing on a neutral verb, namely
to be, we are able to avoid this problem. That is, we can get at the information a
spatial preposition brings to a sentence without modification.
2.3 Relationship Between Types of Preposition and Other Syntactic Categories
The same (realisation of a) phoneme string can be used in many different ways. For
example, in is a preposition in;
In the harbour
which is a prepositional phrase. But a prepositional phrase can occur either as the
complement as a verb, as in;
It sank in the harbour
in which case it plays an adverbial role, or as the complement of a noun, as in;
The channel in the harbour
in which case it plays as adjectival role. Of course, in can also be used intransitively
as well as transitively.
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Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p.379) comment that;
"to assign in (for example) always to its correct syntactic category suggests diversity
where there is considerable semantic uniformity"
Miller (1985) indeed argues that prepositions, adverbs, particles and prefixes should
be treated as belonging to the same semantic categories, categories he terms entity and
relator. In doing this, he has examined the relationship between prepositions,
particles, prefixes and adverbs. Firstly, particles are identical in form with
prepositions. Secondly, some adverbs are identical in form with prepositions or
contain prepositions, as in The children went out or The children went outside.
Thirdly, prepositions, particles and adverbs are all relevant to statements of co¬
occurrence restrictions applying to the same verbs, as in (a) - (d) below (from Miller,
P-59);
(a) Angela put the cat
(b) Angela put the cat in the basket
(c) Angela put the cat out
(d) Angela put the cat outside
PUT takes as complements an object NP and PP, (a) is incomplete syntactically, but
can be completed by the addition of a prepositional phrase (as in (b)), a particle (as in
(c)) or an adverb (as in (d)).
A fourth fact is that prepositional phrases, particles and adverbs can all occur in
sentence-initial position, with transposition of the verb and subject noun (again,
examples from Miller, 1985);
(a) In the door lolloped a friendly ridgeback
(b) In lolloped a friendly ridgeback
(c) Inside lolloped a friendly ridgeback
Jackendoff (1973) concludes that the distinction between prepositions, particles and
locative adverbs is not worth drawing ; particles may be classified as prepositions that
don't take complements (intransitive prepositions). Particles are also often determined
in their respective positions. Miller (1985) additionally presents evidence from other
IndoEuropean languages which supports this unified syntactic treatment, and further
argues that this is paralleled by a unified semantic interpretation, because the concepts
needed for the semantic interpretation of prepositions are also needed for the
interpretation of particles and locative adverbs, and indeed for verb prefixes in other
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languages. Furthermore, these semantic structures (structures under the banner of
localism) are separate from the syntactic structures. The latter show distributional
categories, the dependency relationships between them and groupings of constituents.
The semantic structures show spatial relations between entities.
Another group of uses of prepositions which are important to account for in any
theory are prepositions used in non-spatial contexts such as metaphor. One can't omit
these occurrences from the analysis without giving a principled account of why they
exist at all. Indeed, one may argue that an understanding of non-literal uses may give
great insight into the use of prepositions in more literal contexts. Coventry (1991) and
Coventry and Ludwig (1991) pursue this point. However, the present thesis will only
give this category of uses a fleeting mention.
2.4 Prepositions in English and Other Languages
The thesis deals only with prepositions in English. Ideally one would wish to consider
spatial prepositions in a variety of languages in the hope of the possibility of
discovering (possible) semantic universals. However, it was decided early on to focus
on English to provide a detailed analysis of one language, rather than a less detailed
analysis of several. Again, this is partly as English spatial prepositions have been
studied more extensively than prepositions in other languages. Later in the thesis we
will have something to say about how the current analysis of English prepositions
provided may (or may not) generalise to other languages.
Dialect variations are considered only to the extent to which they are produced by
subjects in the experiments to be reported in chapter six. It is taken largely as a matter
of faith that the use of English prepositions remains invariant throughout areas of use
of standard English. It should be noted that we do acknowledge differences between
standard English and American English, however. All examples have been thus
checked with native British speakers, and therefore there may be apparent differences
with American English.
For study of prepositions in other languages the interested reader should consult, for
example, Vandeloise (1984) for prepositions in French, Janda (1984) for verb
prefixes in Russian (za-, pere-, do-, and or.-), Rudzka-Ostyn (1983) for a comparative
study of Polish yy and Dutch uit, Friedrich(1969) for Tarascan suffices of space,
Bierwisch (1988) for a thorough discussion of German, and Coventry and Ludwig




In this chapter we consider what have been termed 'classical' treatments of the
meaning of spatial prepositions (Lakoff, 1987). It should be mentioned that these
approaches, contrary to the belief of Lakoff (1987), are less prevalent in the history of
lexical semantics than what are now termed 'cognitive linguistic' approaches (see
Geeraerts, 1988 for a discussion). Hence the label 'classical' is slightly misleading.
Nevertheless, they merit close consideration. After a general discussion of classical
approaches, we will consider the work of Bennett (1975), which is an example of the
use of componential analysis. Later in the chapter we will present arguments, largely
lodged from the cognitive linguistic camp, against the classical approach. We will be
concerned in particular with a detailed account of the assumptions made using such an
approach. Lakoff (1987) argues that minimal specification is part and parcel of the
classical approach, and that 'experientialism' (as he calls it) favours full
specification. It will be demonstrated that it does not follow that if one adopts minimal
specification, one must follow the classical framework. Furthermore, it will be
proposed that the classical framework offers some attractive properties which will be
worth preserving in our account. At the end of the chapter we provide a brief
discussion of semantic fields, and conclude with an overview of classical accounts.
At the outset it should be clearly stated that we accept that there is not a clear
boundary, as some would claim (e.g., Langacker, 1988), between so-called 'classical'
and so-called 'cognitive linguistic' accounts. We stick we these labels as useful
structuring tools for our present discussion. The following chapter will begin with an
exposition of exactly how these accounts are supposed to differ.
3.2 Classical Accounts
Classical accounts in lexical semantics favour a clear division between semantics and
pragmatics. Each word in an expression brings a fixed content to the expression which
combines with other word contents. In the case of spatial prepositions, this has
worked in terms of a simple relation, such as;
In(X, Y) iff Located (X, Interior(Y))
This first order logic formula represents the necessary and sufficient conditions for an
expression of that form to be true. For example, if we consider the expression;
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The fish is in the tank
Fish would be substituted for X, tank would be substituted for Y, and the expression
would only be true if the fish is located interior to the tank. Such meanings together
with the compositional rule constitute the model.
Cooper (1968) gives an ideal meaning of in which is almost identical with this;
IN: X in Y: X is located internal to Y, with the constraint that X is smaller than Y.
where X is the figure, and Y is the ground.
Leech (1969) also gives a similar definition, but drops the explicit requirement that
the figure be smaller than the ground;
IN: X in Y: X is "enclosed" or "contained" either in a 2D or 3D place Y.
However, by virtue of the fact that an object must be physically smaller than a
container to fit in a container, this is implicit in Leech's definition.
Now, instantly one can see problems with these 'definitions' of in as there are many
counterexamples where the conditions for use do not hold, but the use of in is still
acceptable. For example, in Figure 3.1(b) (below) the 'pear is in the bowl' is
felicitous, but the condition that the figure is interior to the ground has been flouted.
This is also true of (c), where the light-bulb is not interior to the socket, but in is still
appropriate.
Figure 3.1(d) represents a case which flouts both the requirement that the figure be
smaller than the ground (flowers are normally larger than the vase, certainly in terms
of height), and the requirement that the figure be located internal to the ground
(flowers normally stick out the top of a vase).
There are also cases where the definition of in given does hold, but the use of in is not
appropriate. One such example is figure 3.1(a) where under is the most appropriate
preposition to use although the pear is located internal to the bowl. This situation is




(a) The pear is in the bowl.
(b) The pear is in the bowl.
(c) The light-bulb is in the socket.
(d) The flowers are in the vase.
These examples are not simply isolated counterexamples; one can cite numerous
others such as;
The walking stick in the hand
The nail in the board
A man in a red hat
My son is in college
The supermarket is in the neighbourhood
Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976) recognise the problems that the figure does not
necessarily have to be smaller than the ground, and that the figure may not be
completely contained within the ground. Thus they propose the following definition
for in;
IN(X, Y): A referent X is "in" a relatum Y if:
(i) [PART (X, Z) & INCL (Z, Y)]
where INCL represents 'included spatially in'.
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This definition accounts for some of the cases which the Cooper (1968) and the Leech
(1969) definitions seem to have difficulty with, such as figure 3.1(c) and (d).
However, this definition cannot account for the cases of figure 3.1(b) where the
definition doesn't hold but the use of in is appropriate, and 3.1(a) where the definition
does hold, but the use of in is infelicitous.
This state of affairs, that is, the ease with which one can come up with
counterexamples to the simple definitions given, is not limited to the case of in.
Cooper (1968) gives the following definition of on;
ON: X on Y: A surface X is contiguous with a surface of Y, with
the constraint that Y supports X.
Leech (1969) focuses more on contiguity than Cooper (1968) and offers the following
definition of on;
ON: X on Y: X is contiguous with the place of Y, where Y is conceived
of either as one-dimensional (a line) or two-dimensional (a surface).
For counterexamples to these definitions of on one can consider figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2
(a) The dictionary is on the table
(b) The lid is on the table







The dictionary is on the table in (a), but the lid is not on the table in (b), although it is
nearer the table surface than the dictionary in (a). However, the lid can be said to be
on the table in (c). The definition of on given by Leech (1969) does not cover (a) and
(c) as the dictionary and the book respectively are not contiguous with the table. The
definition given by Cooper (1968) seems to fare better with the recognition of support
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as a factor in the use of on (thus potentially accounting for (a) and (c) on the grounds
that the table is supporting the dictionary and lid (respectively) although the support is
indirect), but still cannot account for the felicitous use of on in (c), though not in (b).
Another problematic case is that in figure 3.3 below.
Figure 3.3 The light is on the ceiling.
This is another example of the flouting of the condition of contiguity which is
required in the definitions given by Cooper (1968) and Leech (1969).
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) improve slightly on the definitions given by Cooper
and Leech. They give the following definition for on;
ON: ON(X, Y): A referent X is "on" a relatum Y if:
(i) (INCL(X,REGION(SURF(Y))) & SUPRT(Y, X)); otherwise go to (ii)
(ii) PATH(Y) & BY(X, Y)
where INCL represents 'included spatially in', SUPRT represents 'supports' and
SURF represents 'has the (total) surface'
This definition recognises cases such as;
The house on the river
where the house is beside the river, but not on top of the river.
They explain the examples in figure 3.2 by treating on as a "transitive relation with
peculiar limitations" (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, p.387). They thus explain the
limitations on transitivity as limitations due to the subdomain of search for "on" which
they claim is the region of interaction with the surface of the relatum, rather than




one can say the following on relations are admissible;
The lamp is on the table
The table is on the rug
The rug is on the floor
The table is on the floor
but the following is not;
*The lamp is on the floor
Miller and Johnson-Laird's explanation of this is that we can say that the table is on
the floor even though it is not touching it because when we search in the region of the
floor we will encounter table legs. We cannot say the lamp is on the floor because
when we search in the region of the floor we will not encounter it. Hence, the limited
transitivity of on as used to describe a pile of objects. Thus Miller and Johnson-Laird
rely on the idea that the purpose of locative expressions is to narrow down the domain
of search for a referent, and take this 'function' to be represented directly at the
perceptual level.
This explanation still fails to account for the examples in figure 3.2 however. As
indicated before, the lid in 3.2(b) is nearer the table than the dictionary in 3.2(a).
Therefore, there must be more to an explanation of this phenomenon than simply a
limited notion of transitivity based on region of interaction.
Thus we have seen, using the examples of in and on, that there appear to be many
cases which simple relations approaches cannot account for. One could easily pick
other prepositions and demonstrate similar counterexamples to such simple
definitions. There are two main classes of these. The first is where the definition
overgenerates cases which should fit; these are decoding overgenerations. The second
involves cases where the simple relations definition does not fit a situation where the
preposition is in fact appropriate; these are encoding inadequacies.
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Before we discuss objections to the classical view in more detail, we will consider one
theory in detail; the work of Bennett (1975). This will obviate the charge that we have
not thus far given classical definitions a thorough enough treatment. Aside from this,
the choice of Bennett's analysis of spatial prepositions is for two reasons. Firstly,
Bennett (1990) argues for a reinterpretation of his theory in terms of prototype theory
(to be considered in the following chapter). Bennett's theory therefore serves as a
vehicle for comparison between different theoretical approaches. Secondly, Bennett's
account will serve as an introduction to semantic fields, which we will consider in a
little more detail at the end of the present chapter.
3.3 Bennett: Componential Analysis and Minimal Specification
Bennett (1975) proposes an account of the meaning of prepositions presented in the
framework of stratificational semantics. He argues for minimal specification of the
meaning/lexical entry of each preposition as a reaction against the approaches of
Lindkvist (1950), Sandhagen (1956) and Wood (1967) which appear arbitrary in the
number of senses which are recognised. Bennett claims that it is, "both unnecessary
and undesirable to postulate as many senses of each preposition as are listed by
Lindkvist, Sandhagen, Wood, and in the larger dictionaries" (Bennett, 1975, p.5). He
undertakes to postulate a set of underlying components of meaning which can fit
together to provide an adequate semantics for all spatial prepositions.
Bennett's motivation for the use of componential analysis is driven by the fact that it
provides a very straightforward means of characterising the semantic relationship
between different vocabulary items. Thus Bennett at the outset is keen to emphasise
the relationship between words in terms of shared meaning, for example. This means
that Bennett can claim that over and above are nearer each other in meaning than
above and in, for instance. The componential analysis used invokes five cases (within
stratificational grammar); locative, source, path, goal and extent. Spatial prepositional
meanings for locative prepositions are characterised in table 3.1 (below).
Here we are primarily interested in Bennett's characterisations for the meanings of in,
on, at, over, under, above and below. To begin with the case of over, we can
consider the occurrences of over in figure 3.5 (below; left hand side). Each sentence
is given a semantic representation by Bennett, based on an assignment of case, and
Bennett then sees the problem as one of deciding how much of these semantic
representations are realised as the preposition over. To put the problem slightly
differently, Bennett has to decide what particular string, or strings of semantic
elements over gets mapped onto.
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behind: 'locative posterior place'
below: 'locative lower'
beyond: 'locative path locative'
by: 'locative proximity'
in: 'locative interior'
in back of: 'locative posterior place'
in front of: 'locative anterior place'
inside: 'locative interior of side'
on: 'locative surface'
outside 'locative exterior of side'
over: 'locative superior'
under: 'locative inferior'
The sentences with occurrences of over in them (in figure 3.5; below, left hand side)
are assigned the following semantic representations Bennett (p.50), displayed on the
right hand side of figure 3.5;
Figure 3.5
(a) My hand is over the table
(b) I removed my hand from over the table
(c) Can you jump over the table ?
(d) Please put the lamp over the table
(e) The post office is over the hill
(f) A car appeared from over the hill
[L [ superior of table] ]
[S [L [superior of table] ] ]
[P [L [superior of table] ] ]
[G [ L [superior of table] ] ]
[L [P [L [superior of hill] ] ] ]
[S [L [P [L [superior of hill] ] ] ] ]
where L=locative, S = source, P^path and G=goal.
The semantic representation of (a) contains a simple locative expression; (b), (c) and
(d) contain directional expressions (source, path and goal respectively); (e) contains a
locative expression of the more complex, deictically interpreted kind; and in (f) the
locative expression of (e) is embedded inside a source expression.
38
This illustrates a positive point with this approach; Bennett recognises the importance
of the full expression in the understanding of the preposition. For example, in (f) a
simple locative expression is embedded inside a path expression which is itself
embedded inside a complex locative expression. Finally, the complex locative
expression is embedded inside a source expression. Thus Bennett is aware that
although over can be said to have difference occurrences in the above sentences, this is
perhaps a result of the modification of a single sense of over by other words in each
sentence.
Bennett distils from this type of semantic analysis the componential representation
'locative superior' for over and the complementary analysis, 'locative inferior', for
under.
The question that one can raise instantly is the one of what these components actually
mean. Now, Bennett (1975, p.4) explicitly states that his interest is on intra-linguistic
semantic relationships, rather than on the relationship between semantic items and the
world. This is what we can view as one of the main problems with most classical
treatments of spatial prepositions; there is almost exclusive focus on the relationship
between words and other words, rather than on the relationship between language and
the world. What Bennett gains mapping out shared components of meaning, he loses
with respects to clarifying exactly what an individual component means. As a result,
the types of meanings given are even less detailed that those considered in the previous
section by Cooper (1968), Leech (1969) and Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976).
In light of the fact that Bennett uses the simplest of simple relations definitions for the
components for spatial prepositions, one has little difficulty coming up with
counterexamples. For example, the definition of in as 'locative interior' raises all the
counterexamples already cited above (figure 3.1).
What Bennett's account does offer is a clear description of the aspects of meaning of
one preposition that are shared by another. Figure 3.6 represents a fragment of a
network grammar which illustrates how components of meaning are shared across
prepositions. Three separate levels of structure are represented : the 'semotactics',
which is a syntax of 'sememes' and specifies possible combinations of elements such
as 'path' and 'interior' ; the 'lexotactics', which is a syntax of 'lexemes' (or lexical
items) and is equivalent to a surface structure syntax ; and the 'realisation structure'
between the semotactics and the lexotactics, which specifies how particular
combinations of sememes are realised as lexemes (the terminology here is not of
relevance; the interested reader should consult the original source).
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Figure 3.6 Fragment of a Network Grammar of English (Bennett, 1975)
At this point we will leave Bennett's (1975) analysis and return to general objections
that can be lodged against accounts within the classical framework. Elowever, we will
reconsider this analysis in the next chapter in light of the revised version of Bennett's
analysis (Bennett, 1990) which was modified to gel with prototype accounts.
40
3.4 Objections to the Classical View
3.4.1 Objections to the Classical View; Case Accountability
We have arrived at what we consider to be the main objections to the simple relations
definitions equated with what Lakoff (1987) has called the 'classical view of
categories'; such definitions yield wrong or insufficient predictions about the set of
situations described by a locative expression. Herskovits (1986, pp. 12 - 17) lists the
phenomena that the model fails to explain;
(1) Contrast between converses, and unacceptabilitv of some converses.
Meanings of the simplest type described do not differentiate between the house in
front of the church, and the church in front of the house, though the two expressions
are clearly not interchangeable. Nor do they explain why one cannot say *the jar in
the lid, but must say instead the jar with a lid on it.
(2) Geometric descriptions
At best, the geometric relations apply in fact not to the objects themselves, but to
various geometric figures (points, surfaces, or volumes) associated with the objects.
For instance, in the bird in the tree, the bird is not in the interior of the reference
object, as in the bird in the oven, but in the interior of the outline of the part of the
tree made of the branches. This point raised by Herskovits (1986) brings up the issue
of whether semantic analysis applies to the objective world directly, or to
perceptions/conceptions of the objective world. Moreover, we will discuss in chapter
five whether one wishes to characterise the meaning of spatial prepositions in terms of
geometric relations at all.
(3) Divergence from the simple relations
The simple geometric relations do not even hold for the geometric descriptions. We
have already considered two cases of this; in figure 3.1(b) where the pear can still be
said to be in the bowl although it in not in the interior of the bowl, and in figure
3.2(a) where the one can say that the dictionary is on the table although the dictionary
is not contiguous with the table.
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£4) Unexpected context dependencies
The best examples of these involve deictic, intrinsic and extrinsic use. Simple relation
meanings do not take account of such context dependency (Fillmore, 1971; Clark,
1973). An example of this is the use of behind, for example, where the position of the
figure in relation to the ground is dependent on the view of the observer, and the
canonical axes of the ground. 'The tree' in the tree is behind the house, therefore, can
be located in either of the positions below (figure 3.7) depending on the existence and
position of the observer.
We have provided a discussion of these different systems of reference in chapter two,
particularly with reference to the work of Levelt (1984).




Herskovits (1986) cites many cases where the simple meanings indicate that an
expression should be acceptable when it is not. For example, one can say;
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Joe is in the field
but not;
*Joe is in the football field.
Again, we can refer back to figure 3.1(a) where we cannot say that the pear is in the
bowl although the criteria for a simple notion of containment appear to be met.
Instead we would say;
The pear is under the bowl.
Figure 3.1(c) provides another by now familiar example. One can say;
The bulb is in the socket.
but not;
The bulb is under the socket.
The simple relations model cannot explain why under is appropriate in one case and
not in another ( and vice versa for in).
(6) Additional constraints
Constraints beyond those implied by the simple relations meanings must be met for a
locative expression to be used appropriately. For example, the use of above
presupposes the existence of a vertical direction, and of gravity, etc. Searle (1979)
gives an example of such 'background conditions' with the expression 'the cat is on
the mat'. Searle (1979) argues that the expression only has meaning relative to the
background condition that that there is a gravitational field. As an example of this,
Searle presents the following scenario (with the cat and mat as depicted in figure 3.8
below);
"
suppose the cat's owner is in the next room, while I unbeknownst to him
have drugged his cat and stiffened his mat with my special stiffening solution.
"Where is the cat?" asks the owner from his position next door. "The cat is on
the mat", I answer. Have I told the truth?" (Searle, 1979, p. 124).
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Figure 3.8
Searle answers his own thought experiment with the argument that the answer is
misleading at best and probably should be described as an ingenious lie. However, if
one considers the situation where the mat is in its stiffened position and is part of a
row of objects similarly sticking up at odd angles, and both speaker and hearer know
these facts, then if the cat is jumping from one object to another, and the question,
"Where is the cat?" is asked, the answer, "The cat is on the mat" is appropriate.
Searle takes this as an argument that the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence
only has application relative to a set of background conditions. The truth conditions of
the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' will vary with variations in these background
assumptions; and given the absence or presence of some background assumptions the
sentence does not have determinate truth conditions.
This type of argument can be pitched in another way; in terms of the effect of context
on truth conditionality. These effects are well documented in psycholinguistics with
many studies which manipulate context and monitor the effect this has on the
understanding of a target sentence. For example, we can consider the sentence (taken
from Bransford and Johnson, 1973);
The haystack compensated for the fact that the cloth tore
This does not have a determinate meaning unless we furnish it with a context. For
example;
The parachutist fell towards the field.
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leads to an interpretation of the above sentence. As there are innumerable different
contexts possible, then to talk about truth conditionality outwith context does not
make much sense.
Aside from this last objection, it will be demonstrated that the criticisms made by
Herskovits (1986) apply to only the simplest 'classical' attempts to come up with
meanings for prepositions. Indeed, we will argue that there are possible solutions to
most of these objections which still retain the features of simple relations accounts. In
particular, our objections to Herskovits's objections reside in the Herskovitsian search
for geometric relations in the world. This information, in many cases, can be viewed
as redundant. This view will be explicated fully in chapter five. We will turn now to
some other criticisms of this type of approach which are lodged at a more fundamental
level.
3.4.2 Objections to the Classical View; The Assault from Cognitive Linguistics
One can address the deeper issue of why the classical account fails to deal adequately
with the encoding and decoding problems. This assumes that there are good reasons
for rejecting the classical account regardless of its success. The area which has been
come to be known as 'cognitive linguistics' (formerly 'space grammar') has provided
what can be viewed as a deep-rooted alternative to the classical view of categories.
George Lakoff, a proponent of the cognitive linguistic approach, has been one of the
most outspoken critics of the classical view of categories. In Women, Fire and
Dangerous Things (1987) he launches a vehement attack on what he calls 'objectivist
semantics'.
Lakoff begins his case with the charge that the classical view of categories is a
philosophical one which was arrived at on the basis of a priori speculation, and
therefore does not take into account the results of empirical study. Many empirical
studies demonstrate that concepts/categories are graded. That is, many categories do
not have fixed boundaries. Furthermore, some exemplars of a concept are more
typical than others. For example, the word dog comes to mind more easily as an
example of the category pet than the word stick insect although both words can be
members of the category pet.1 This theoretical position can be branded as prototype
theory, which we will consider in detail in the next chapter. For now, let us consider
how such effects affect the classical approach.
1 That is, dog and stick insect are words which refer to animals which can be members of the category
denoted by the word pet.
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Prototype effects do not preclude the existence of minimally specified lexical entries.
The effects themselves can be viewed as the result of sense generation (Braisby,
1990), sense creation (Clark, 1983; developed in Clark and Gerrig, 1983), or in terms
of the manipulation of idealised cognitive models (Lakoff, 1987). Thus it is not
necessary to adopt lexical representations which employ prototypical structure.
However, one must give an account as to why such effects exist.
An argument along similar lines in favour of the classical view is that one cannot deny
that there is something simple and basic to the meaning of the word in, for example.
Here when asked the question of what in means, the respondent will frequently
insinuate that there is something basic and simple to the meaning of in. Prototype
accounts need to take this into consideration. However, this again is an effect of
processing; one can say nothing about lexical representation based on this information
alone. We will develop these issues in the next chapter.
More problematic for the classical view is the point that membership of a category is
not all-or-none. This poses problems for simple relations accounts which rely on truth
conditions attached to the simple definitions given. This inflexibility demands a
complex set of pragmatic principles (Herskovits, 1986) allied to the simple
definitions. For example, with the picture in figure 3.9 (below) one cannot say that
the ball is in the bowl, but rather the ball is under the bowl. The classical approach
accounts for this by asserting that the ball is in the bowl is true, but that the statement
is misleading from the point of view of pragmatics. If this was the case, then it can be
argued that both in and under should be possible candidates for the spatial relations
depicted, and that under is only the preference1 . This is not the case. The ball is in
the bowl is viewed as false by most language users.
Again, the defender of the classical view may argue that the example just given
reflects a problem with the semantics and that the problem has nothing to do with
1 A related problem is that of situations where there are perhaps a limited number of prepositions which
have limited application (i.e., do not fit the situation directly), and where the least inappropriate
preposition may be the choice.
Figure 3.9
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pragmatics. Therefore, one can look for a definition of in which would be false in the
case of figure 3.9, but not in the case of the light-bulb is in the socket. This lays down
the gauntlet for the classicist.
One can come up with an attempt to deal with these cases (based on a development of
the Miller and Johnson-Laird definition of in) as follows;
IN(X, Y): A referent is "in" a relatum if:
(i) [PART (X, Z) & INCL (Z, Y)]
and Y is in its canonical orientation.
This at first glance can account for the fact that the use of in is inappropriate in figure
3.9, but appropriate in the case of the light-bulb is in the socket. The bowl in figure
3.9 is not in its canonical orientation, and thus the in relation is not appropriate.
However, if we consider figure 3.10 (below) this revision to the Miller and Johnson-
Laird definition seems less attractive. Here the socket is not in its canonical
orientation, but in is still appropriate. Clearly, then, the addition of a condition to do
with canonical orientation is not a solution.
Searle (1979) may argue that the definition of an expression involving in, for
example, does not have a determinate set of truth conditions unless background
conditions are specified, one of which would involve canonical orientation relating to
how the referent is 'normally' situated in a gravitational field. This does not solve the
problem, as one therefore has to work out a more complex set of background
conditions.
Of course, another solution is to simply list exceptions to a definition in the lexicon.
However, as was intimated in chapter one, the list may become rather long, and this
again contradicts the assumption that has been made by Bennett (1975), for example,
suggesting that there is something basic to the meaning of in.
Figure 3.10
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Zadeh's (1965) fuzzy set theory offers an attempt to adapt the classical account in
order to cope with prototype effects; the idea that a category is graded. Fuzzy set
theory involves grading of members of a category by ascribing members different
degrees of membership. In a classical category, membership is all-or-none, with
members rated with membership value 1 and non-members rated membership 0.
Zadeh (1965) adds additional values between 1 and 0 therefore accounting for the fact
that some men are neither tall or small, for example. It is relatively easy to see how
this approach may work for nouns. If we take the category bird, one can simply
assign more representative members of the category higher truth values. We may
envisage a set as follows (representing the category bird)-,
Figure 3.11
Indeed some authors (notably Osherson and Smith, 1981) have taken such
representations involving fuzzy set theory as a valid method of modeling prototype
effects. However, as we shall see, Lakoff (1987) maintains that fuzzy set theory is in
fact not at all consistent with a valid interpretation of prototype theory.
There are numerous problems with this type of approach. Firstly, it is counterintuitive
to argue that robin is more a bird than say an ostrich. Both are clear members of the
category bird, and thus it appears incorrect to assign different degrees of truth to
each. Secondly (although less crucial for our purposes), fuzzy set theory does not
provide an adequate account of concept combination. Osherson and Smith (1981)
provide the following case where fuzzy set theory clearly makes a wrong prediction.
Consider apples (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 3.12 below.
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Figure 3.12
Picture (a) is a good example of a striped apple, but is not a good example of an apple
since apples are not normally striped. It is also not a good example of a striped thing
since apples are not among things which are generally striped. From this it follows
that the apple in drawing (a) will have a high value in the category striped apple, a
low value in the category apple and a low value in the category striped. However,
fuzzy set theory does not come to this conclusion. The intersection of two categories
in fuzzy set theory is given as the minimum value of the constituent concepts. Since
the minimum of two low values is a low value, it follows from fuzzy set theory that
drawing (a) should have a low value in the category striped apple. As this is not the
case, fuzzy set theory is clearly flawed.
Again such an approach fails to deal adequately with vagueness; the idea that
membership of a category is not an all-or-none thing. There may be some clear
positive cases, some clear negative cases, but there are many unclear cases in
between. Thus there are no sharp lines between the positive and negative cases, and
between the clear and unclear cases. Fuzzy set theory, like standard set theory (and
standard first-order logic) abstracts away from the problem of vagueness and is
applicable only to those predicates that can be regarded as definitely true or definitely
false of any given object.
Now we will leave objections to the classical approach aside for a minute, and focus
on a great virtue of classical accounts in the form of semantic field theory.
3.5 Semantic Fields
Thus far in this chapter we have largely considered attempts to define what a word
means in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. We must not neglect here
another factor which can be considered a feature of the classical view; the way that
words relate to one another. Here the intuition is that some words are more closely
related in meaning than others. This intuition has been developed theoretically such
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that words are organised into "semantic fields." As Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976,
p.237), proponents of this view, comment;
"This approach at least gives the phenomenon a name. It enables us to
rephrase our question; how are words related in semantic fields?"
The origins of the concept can be traced back to Ipsen (1924) who coined the term
"Bedeutungsfeld" (semantic field) to mean a group of words that form some kind of
semantic unity. Trier (1934) offers a more systematic realisation of this idea with the
notion that every word's meaning depends on other words in the language, and that
different languages divide up reality among their words in a different way. Thus the
meaning of each word depends on its position in a conceptual field relative to other
words in that field.
The idea of a semantic field has not been adequately formalised. For more detail see
Lyons (1977, vol. 1, chapter 8). Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) attempt to use these
ideas within the domain of spatial language, but do little more that put spatial terms
partly within a semantic network-type framework. As we have seen, Bennett (1975)
also makes a stab at this notion with the recognition that words can have shared
features, and that words are somehow competing for use.
We will have little more to say about semantic fields again until chapter six. For the
moment we wish simply to recognise that words may be competing for use during the
processing of language, and that words can maybe be defined in terms of other words.
3.6 Summary
We have discussed both merits and problems with classical accounts. In the next
chapter we assess alternative accounts within the framework of cognitive linguistics;
accounts which claim to differ dramatically from the accounts thus far considered
(Lakoff, 1987). We shall see that these accounts are not in fact radically different
from the accounts considered in this chapter.
At the end of chapter four we will compare classical and cognitive linguistic
approaches in some detail. At that time we will provide a recap of the positive and




Prepositions and their meaning have been studied most extensively within the subject
matter of 'cognitive linguistics1. In this chapter we examine approaches to the
meaning of prepositions which fall within this framework. In order to evaluate these
approaches, we must focus on the assumptions made by cognitive linguists, and
therefore we will begin the chapter with an overview of cognitive linguistics, carefully
isolating the assumptions that these approaches make. One of these assumptions will
then be singled out for scrutiny - the nature of prototype effects - which serves as a
structuring tool for the analyses of in, on and at (Herskovits, 1986) and over
(Brugman, 1983, 1988; Lakoff, 1987; Brugman and Lakoff, 1988) to be considered.
We then focus more specifically on the work of Herskovits (1986), Brugman (1981,
1988), Lakoff (1987) and Brugman and Lakoff (1988). Herskovits's (1986) analysis
of in, on, and at is considered first as it provides a half-way-house between classical
and prototypical approaches. Brugman's (1981) analysis of over, developed in Lakoff
(1987) and subsequently developed in Brugman (1988) and Brugman and Lakoff
(1988) is then examined as a direct application of prototype theory. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of cognitive linguistic approaches versus classical
approaches, with a critical assessment of the theoretical constructs which we wish to
preserve for the rest of the thesis.
4.2 Overview of Cognitive Linguistic Approaches
The approach of cognitive linguistics, it is claimed (e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Langacker,
1988), differs markedly from that of the classical view of categories, which was
discussed in the last chapter. While the proponents of this refocussing have
emphasised different linguistic problems, they concur in rejecting two major tenets of
Chomskyan linguistics: the separateness and specialness of language (Chomsky's
hypothesised "innate mental organ") and the modularity of different types of linguistic
information (syntax, semantics, morphology, phonology, etc.). In this framework the
proponents argue that the form or the meaning of expressions cannot be adequately
described without reference to speakers' encyclopedic knowledge, their construction
of mental models, their ability to map concepts from concrete to abstract domains,
and their use of superpositional representations and constraint-satisfaction schemes to
integrate multiple sources of information.
Specifically the clear division between semantics < ... 'icated
in cognitive linguistics, together with the and
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psychological accounts of language. This second unification goes hand-in-hand with
the use of prototype theory as a structuring tool for lexical representation, with the
emphasis on the recognition of extensive polysemy.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Lakoff (1987) rejects what he calls
'objectivism', which is equated with the classical view of categories. Instead Lakoff
advocates 'experientialism', which can be equated with the cognitive linguistic view,
as an alternative philosophical standpoint consisting of the following major points:
Thought is embodied, that is, the structures used to put together our
conceptual systems grow out of bodily experience and make sense in
terms of it; moreover, the core of our conceptual systems is directly
grounded in perception, body movement, and experience of a physical
and social character, (p.xiv)
Thought is imaginative, in that those concepts which are not directly
grounded in experience employ metaphor, metonymy and mental
imagery - all of which go beyond the literal mirroring, or
representation, of external reality. It is this imaginative capacity that
allows for "abstract" thought and takes the mind beyond what we can see
and feel. The imaginative capacity is also embodied - indirectly - since
the metaphors, metonymies, and images are based on experience, often
bodily experience. Thought is also imaginative in a less obvious way:
every time we categorize something in a way that does not mirror
nature, we are using general human imaginative capacities.(p.xiv)
Human reason is not an instantiation of transcendental reason; it grows
out of the nature of the organism and all that contributes to its individual
and collective experience: its genetic inheritance, the nature of the
environment it lives in, the way it functions in that environment, the
nature of social functioning, and the like, (p.xv)
The present purpose is not to provide a discussion of the merits of objectivism or
experientialism as philosophical positions, but instead is to clearly spell out the
ramifications of this approach for a treatment of spatial prepositions. Indeed Lakoff
(1987. p.460), in summarising the similarities in the approaches of Lindner (1981,
1982), Janda (1984), Brugman (1981), Vandeloise (1984), Hawkins (1984) and
Lakoff (1987), does this for us;
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(i) The expressions studied (up, over, za-, etc.) are all polysemous; they
cannot be represented by a single core meaning that accounts for all and
only the various senses.
(ii) Image schemas and metaphorical models are required to represent the
meanings of the expressions.
(iii) The senses of each expression form a radially structured category,
with a central member and links defined by image-schema
transformations and metaphors.
(iv) The noncentral senses cannot be predicted from the central senses,
but are nonetheless not arbitrary. Rather, they are motivated by less
central cases, image-schema transformations, and metaphorical models.
Thus we clearly see that cognitive linguistic accounts favour full specification for the
lexical entry of a word, in contrast to classical accounts which recognise as few senses
as possible. Indeed, as a reaction against the 'core sense' approach, Lakoff proposes
that observations about prototypical uses of lexical items can be united with other data
on natural categorisation by viewing lexical items as constituting natural categories of
senses. This means that some senses of a word may be more representative than other
senses.
We can distil from the above discussion that there are the following corner-stones of
the cognitive linguistic approach. Firstly, the approach relies on prototype effects to
illustrate the graded nature of concepts, and thus focuses on processing effects (which
is reflected in the assumption that the division between semantics and pragmatics is
arbitrary). Following from this, cognitive linguistic approaches to the semantics of
spatial prepositions focus on extensive polysemy, viewing the representation of the
meaning of a word as a 'natural category of senses' rather than a more limited single
(or more) core meaning with exceptions listed in the lexicon.
Secondly, the approach claims (implicitly) that one can best understand a concept with
reference to how that concept has developed. This claim is less clear with respect to
the specific approaches we will consider shortly. However, the evidence for this view
is lodged by Lakoff (1987), who argues that prototype effects relate directly to
'experientialism'. For example, Brown (1965) argues that 'basic-level' concepts have
a special cognitive status. The claim is that categorisation for the child begins at the
level of "distinctive action", the level of flowers and cats and dimes, and then
proceeds upward to superordinate categories (like plant and animal) and downward to
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subordinate categories (like atom). An extrapolation of the claim is that one should
study language acquisition in order to get a handle on word meaning, and how these
meanings are represented. Indeed, we will consider the acquisition of spatial
prepositions in chapter seven to see what can be gleaned in relation to what
information about spatial language is primary, and how one can delineate senses.
However, Lakoff (1987) and the other cognitive linguistic approaches to spatial
prepositions do not adequately consider this type of evidence, which is surprising
given this claim.
As we have seen, the application of prototype theory to linguistic phenomena is a
general trend in the area of cognitive linguistics. Now we will focus more clearly on
prototype effects, and where they come from.
4.3 Prototype Effects Considered
4.3.1 The Nature of Prototypicality
Prototype theory is best seen as a set of approaches rather than one approach.
However, the motivation for prototype effects comes from a common source. Here
we begin by examining the original work on prototypicality.
Wittgenstein can be credited with the observation that categories do not fit the picture
of the classical category. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks
that there are no common properties shared by all members of the category game.
Some involve competition, some involve group participation, some involve luck,
some involve skill, but they all do not share all of these properties. The result of
"look[ing] and see[ing] if there is something common to all" is "a complicated
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
some times similarities of detail" (Wittgenstein, 1953, remark 66). Wittgenstein
coined the term "family resemblances" for the various resemblances between members
of a family, such as game, which resemble each other in various ways, but do not
share common properties with all the other members.
It was Eleanor Rosch who took the notion of family resemblance and allied it to what
she termed 'prototype theory'. The theory of Rosch is based on a multitude of
empirical studies, the majority of which she conducted in the '70s. In a series of
experiments she demonstrated that the central tendency of categories exhibited what
we might think of as enhanced cognition. So for example, subjects' judgement of
whether or not various instances of bird fall under the concept bird are made reliably
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and significantly faster in the cases of typical birds as opposed to atypical birds.
Robins, being fairly typical birds, are judged to be birds faster than, say, an ostrich.
Indeed, on the basis of these reaction time studies, one can deduce an ordering among
exemplars, from those eliciting the shortest response time to those eliciting the
longest. Rosch also gleaned the same goodness-of-fit examples from subjects across a
variety of other experimental paradigms (listed in figure 4.2 below). For example,
Rosch (1973) asked subjects to rate instances drawn from different categories, using a
scale from 1 to 7 to indicate how well each instance corresponded to their idea as a
typical class member, none of her subjects found the request at all unusual and tended
to agree among themselves on the distribution of ratings (shown in Figure 4.1 below).








The results of reaction time experiments and ratings of class instances exhibit,
unsurprisingly, remarkable correlations. Indeed the findings across the variety of
experimental paradigms have been replicated many times, and therefore the effects
can be viewed as robust.
The view that emerges from Rosch's work is that various aspects of our cognizance of
atypical exemplars is dependent on our cognizance of typical ones. More properly,
though, it depends on the similarity between the entity and the central tendency of the
category, what has become known as the prototype. So, prototypes, themselves, are
not necessarily descriptions of any particular exemplar, but they are descriptions
embodying the most typical attributes and values associated with that category.
Rosch's work has assumed a central role in the psychology of concepts but it seems
likely that in a very important sense, it has been misunderstood. The
misunderstanding revolves round the question of what the findings actually mean.
Rosch in the early to mid 1970s made the claim that prototype effects may provide a
characterisation of the internal structure of the category. This lead Rosch (1975) to
claim that the effects do in fact characterise the structure of the category as
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Figure 4.2 Examples of Experimental Paradigms Used by Rosch
(adapted from Lakoff. 1987. p. 41 - 42)
(1) Direct rating: Subjects are asked to rate, say on a scale from one to
seven, how good an example of a category (e.g., BIRD) various members
are (e.g., a robin, a chicken, etc.)
(2) Reaction time: Subjects are asked to press a button to indicate true or
false in response to a statement of the form "An [example] is a [category
name]" (e.g., "A chicken is a bird"). Response times are shorter for
representative examples.
(3) Production of examples: When asked to list or draw examples of
category members, subjects were more likely to list or draw more
representative examples.
(4) Asymmetry in similarity ratings: Less representative examples are
often considered to be more similar to more representative examples than
the converse. Not surprisingly, Americans consider the United States to be
a highly representative example of a country. In experiments where
subjects were asked to give a similarity rating for pairs of countries, the
following asymmetry arose. Subjects considered Mexico to be more
similar to the United States than the United States is to Mexico.
(5) Asymmetry in generalisations: New information about a
representative category member is more likely to be generalised to
nonrepresentative members than the reverse. For example, it was shown
that subjects believed that a disease was more likely to be spread from
robins to ducks on an island than from ducks to robins.
(6) Family resemblances: Rosch showed that what philosophers took as a
matter for a priori speculation could be demonstrated empirically.
Characterising "family resemblances" as perceived similarities between
representative and nonrepresentative members of categories, Rosch showed
that there was a correlation between family resemblances and numerical
ratings of best examples derived from the above experiments.
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represented in the mind, and that the prototypes constitute mental representations.
Indeed, this is the view that the majority of cognitive linguists working with prototype
theory take for granted, and this brand of prototype theory has also been attacked
most vigorously.
Lakoff (1987) distinguishes between the prototype effects which Rosch's experiments
demonstrate, and the claims of representation made on their basis. He distinguishes
two interpretations of prototype effects (Lakoff, 1987, p. 43);
(1) The Effects = Structure interpretation: Goodness-of-example ratings are a direct
reflection of category membership.
(2) The Prototype = Representation Interpretation: Categories are represented in the
mind in terms of prototypes (that is, best examples). Degrees of category membership
for other entities are determined by their degree of similarity to the prototype.
Lakoff recognises that most versions of prototype theory assume one or other, or
sometimes both, interpretations of prototype theory. For example, two versions of
prototype theory which clearly fall under this category are the "Knowledge
Representation Model" of Cohen and Murphy (1984) and the "Selective Modification
Model approach of Smith et al. (1988). More importantly, however, Lakoff
acknowledges that both interpretations are not entailed by the existence of prototype
effects (thus discrediting most versions of prototype theory).
Both points are valid. Prototype effects cannot be directly revealing of mental
representations as interpretation two would have us believe. Similarly, the issues of
goodness-of-example ratings and membership are logically distinct. The work of
Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983), for instance, demonstrates that subjects
will readily order instances according to their perceived typicality, regardless of the
facts of their category membership. In particular, one of Armstrong, Gleitman and
Gleitman's tasks involving asking subjects for typicality judgements for odd numbers.
So, they would be asked to rate various odd numbers for their typicality of the
category of odd numbers. The fact that subjects do this, while knowing full well that
the category has sharp boundaries, that there are clear conditions of membership and
that membership itself is either all or none, indicates the fallacy in assuming that
goodness-of-example ratings directly reflect graded membership.
We can cite other empirical evidence of a different nature, which suggests that
prototypicality is not necessarily fixed for a word/concept, but is affected by context.
For example, Roth and Shoben (1983) base a study on a finding of Garrod and
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Sanford (1977) that the speed of anaphoric resolution depends on the semantic
relatedness of anaphora and antecedent, as if membership involved category
membership verification (when the antecedent is more general than the anaphora).
Roth and Shoben examined whether reading times were affected by a single goodness-
of-exemplar structure in differing contexts, or whether context could affect speed of
resolution by changing goodness-of-exemplar structure. They found that the resolution
for typical exemplars (typical for the category in isolation) was slower when the
context was biased to make that exemplar a bad fit than when the context was neutral.
Thus we can extrapolate from this that robin is a poor example of the category bird in
the context the bird walked across the barn-yard.
A second study by Barsalou and Sewell (1984, reported in Barsalou, 1985) found that
goodness-of-exemplar structure can change dramatically when people take different
perspectives on a concept. Subjects rated exemplars (e.g., robin, ostrich, swan) for
typicality as birds, but assigned them different degrees of centrality according to the
cultural perspective ('American', 'African', or 'Chinese') they had been asked to
assume. These results were found for both taxonomic and goal-derived categories.
Thus one can flexibly generate different concepts in different contexts.
Again, if we assume incorrectly that prototypes are directly mentally represented, then
a third type of problem that arises is that of concept combination. We cited in the last
chapter the evidence from Osherson and Smith (1981) that prototypes cannot be
adequately conceptually combined. In other words, to compose a complex concept
exemplars from the constituent prototypes would have to be combined (Lyon and
Chater, 1990). For example, a representation of the complex concept pet fish would
be composed by the combination of a prototypical exemplar for pet and a prototypical
exemplar for fish. However, if one does this, it is unlikely that the combination of
dog and cod will produce the intended meaning of pet fish. A guppy is a good
example of a pet fish, but it isn't prototypical of either pets or fish. Thus it is
necessary for the exemplar view to stipulate that supposedly complex concepts are
represented independently. This is highly unlikely for two reasons, Firstly, one still
has to understand novel concept combination. This view doesn't give an account of
how this is possible. Secondly, this view seems improbable on grounds of cognitive
economy.
Relevant evidence from yet another angle comes from Sternberg (1966; cited in
Flanagan, 1991). Sternberg sets out to address the question of how recently encoded
memories are retrieved. His experimental procedure involved having subjects
memorise lists containing some subset of the numbers 1 to 10. On each trial the
subject saw a randomly generated list, for example, 4, 7, 2, 8. The list was visually
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displayed for just over one second. After a two-second delay a test digit appeared
(e.g., 2). The subject was to pull lever A if the test digit was on the memorised list,
or lever B if it was not. Sternberg's data consisted of measurements of the time it took
from presentation of the test digit to the pulling of the appropriate lever. The
important point here is that subjects intuitions (reported in Flanagan, 1991, p. 188) of
what they do differs from what they actually do. Sternberg found evidence in the way
of reaction times for exhaustive and serial scanning in memory, but subjects predicted
against this exhaustive serial search model. One therefore cannot place much
reliability on introspective reporting.
There is, then, a considerable body of evidence to suggest that prototypes are not
directly mentally represented (at least, in isolation), and that goodness-of-example
ratings are not a direct reflection of category membership. The real irony with
Lakoff's (1987) objections to fallacious interpretations of Rosch's work is that Lakoff
himself (as we shall see later in this chapter) falls into the trap of using prototype
effects directly as structuring tools in the lexicon with his analysis of 'over' (Lakoff,
1987, pp.416 - 461). This is a serious error.
Although it can be taken as read that prototypes are not direct reflections of lexical
representations, the issue remains as to where prototype effects come from, and how
far they extend. Looking ahead to the experimental work to be considered in chapter
six, it is desirable to know a priori where prototype effects come from, if we are
adequately to develop paradigms which get beneath superficial processing effects. In
other words, in order to distinguish between occurrences and senses of a word, we
must find a reliable way in which to do so. Linguistic intuitions on the part of
researchers or subjects alike reflect similar sorts of data to that apparent with
prototype effects. Thus we need to know when a distinction between two senses of a
word is made by a subject or researcher whether this distinction is based on a
superficial prototype-type (processing) effect which is itself dependent on the task
required of a subject, or whether the distinction does actually reflect a difference in
the mental lexicon. We will therefore spend some time examining possible causes of
prototype effects, and how widely such effects are spread.
4.3.2 Where Do Prototype Effects Come From and How Far Do They Extend?
Geeraerts (1988) proposes several explanations as to why prototypicality exists. He
terms the four hypotheses the physiological, the referential, the statistical, and the
psychological. Let us briefly consider these hypotheses, and then we will add our own
explanation.
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The physiological hypothesis says that prototypicality is a result of the physiological
structure of the perceptual apparatus (Rosch, 1973). This hypothesis falls out of the
work on colour terms. There is evidence that prototypical colour terms have a one-to-
one mapping with the structure of the colour visual system, which is maximally
responsive to red, green and blue. Geeraerts points out that the scope of this
explanation may only be applicable to concepts immediately referring to perceptual
phenomena, or at least to bodily experiences which have a distinct physiological basis.
The referential hypothesis states that prototypicality results from the fact that some
instances of a category share more attributes with other instances of the category than
certain peripheral members of the category (or share attributes with more other
instances than these peripheral cases). This is the family resemblance model of
prototypicality (Rosch & Mervis, 1975); in psychological terms, it states that the
prototypical instances of a category maximise cue validity. By this view,
prototypicality is a secondary phenomenon: it is a side-effect of the mutual attribute
relations among the instances in the referential range of application of the concept.
Statistical explanations of prototypicality state that the most frequently experienced
member of the category is the prototype. This can be combined with the family
resemblance model; the weight of an attribute within a concept is then not only
determined by its role within the family of applications constituting the category, but
also by the relative frequency with which it is experienced (Rosch, 1975).
The psychological hypothesis is a functional one. It states that it is cognitively
advantageous to maximise the conceptual richness of each category through the
incorporation of closely related nuances into a single concept because this makes the
conceptual system more economic. Because of the maximal conceptual density of each
category, the most information can be provided with the least cognitive effort (Rosch,
1977).
Lakoff (1987) offers a different interpretation of prototype theory, and one which is
broadly consistent with the stance we wish to adopt on this matter. The position
maintains that prototype effects can arise as the result of many factors. The basic
claim of Lakoff (1987), Murphy and Medin (1985) and others is that prototype effects
result from the nature of what Lakoff calls 'cognitive models', which can be viewed
as "theories" of some subject matter. Evidence for this position comes from
Barsalou's (1983, 1985) study of what he terms "ad hoc categories" - categories that
are not conventional or fixed, but rather are made up on the spot for some immediate
purpose. Examples of these types of categories are things to take from one's home
during fire, what to get for a birthday present, things to do at a convention, etc. The
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observation made by Barsalou is that such categories have prototypical structure.
Now, these categories did not exist before they were created (i.e., they are
presumably not stored permanently in some sort of mental lexicon), so it follows that
prototype effects can arise as a result of the manipulation of theories, or cognitive
models.
Murphy and Medin (1985) expound the view that representations of concepts are best
thought of as theoretical knowledge that embodies a theory about the world. Lakoff
(1987) proposes the same view, only with reference to what he calls idealised
cognitive models. Fillmore (1982) earlier provides the argument that lexical concepts
are represented in terms of idealised cognitive models. For example, the concept
bachelor can be defined as an unmarried adult male (as it might be with a simple
classical view), in the context of human society in which certain (idealised)
expectations about marriage and marriageable age are realised. The existence of poor
examples of this concept - for example, homosexual men, Catholic priests - does not
mean, Fillmore argued, that the concept itself is ill-defined. Rather the claim is that
the idealised cognitive model does not fit the actual world perfectly. An entity may
deviate from the concept (i.e., may be atypical) either because it fails to satisfy
"unmarried adult male" or because the idealised cognitive model is imperfectly
realised.
With these prototype effects under our belt, we can now examine exactly how these
effects have been used as structuring tools for the lexical representations of spatial
prepositions.
4.4 Herskovits Considered
Annette Herskovits, in 'Language and Spatial Cognition', provides an account of in,
on and at which relies heavily on a set of pragmatic principles which she develops. In
this respect, one can view her account as being similar to classical accounts, only with
a (hitherto undetailed) clear specification of pragmatic principles. However, the
lexical representations adopted bear close resemblance to those of prototype accounts,
and thus we include Herskovits in the present chapter. Indeed, it will be demonstrated
that her account does not differ much from those of Brugman, Lakoff and others,
which will be discussed in the following section. However, Herskovits's account does
represent a considerable development from these accounts. Nevertheless, some
fundamental problems with the account will be brought into focus, together with
suggestions for an improved modified version of her treatment. This modified version
ends up looking very much like the account presented in the thesis, without the use of
functional relations.
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4.4.1 Herskovits : The Case for Ideal Meanings
The starting point for Herskovits (1985, 1986, 1988) is the type of classical 'simple
relations' account which we considered in the last chapter. Herskovits acknowledges
the lack of success of previous semantic accounts which assign meaning to
prepositions as 'simple relations' (see Herskovits 1986, p. 13-16 for a review;
discussed in last chapter). She takes each simple relation to be a geometric ideal (but
as something akin to a prototype, not as a truth-conditional meaning), and her theory
is based on deviations in various ways from such 'ideal meanings'. Word meaning is
defined in an ideal world - in the spatial domain, a world of lines, points, surfaces
and of definite relations of inclusion, contact, intersection, and so forth. These
meanings are bent and stretched to describe and communicate facts about the complex
and imperfect world that surrounds us. Flexibility in the use of the ideal meaning is
apparent and adaptability to expressive needs are manifest in several ways. Deviations
from the ideal meaning lead to polysemy, which Herskovits terms sense shifts.
Additionally, the ideal relation, or the sense-shifted ideal relation can be almost true
by virtue of what she calls tolerance phenomena.
Use ,ypeUse type Use t>,pe use type
Two levels of abstraction are proposed to define lexical meanings (see figure 4.3).
These are the ideal meaning (geometric ideal) and use types. The ideal meaning
abstraction is not sufficient to build truth conditions, but is a necessary anchor,
Herskovits maintains, that organises the overall set of uses of the preposition. The use
type abstraction, with several use types being derived from the same meaning, is
much richer and provides material that arrives nearer a definition of truth conditions.
However, it is possible to break even use type constraints in "out-of-the-ordinary"
circumstances.
According to Herskovits, use types are very different from "senses" particularly as a
use type is not required to bring a constant contribution to the truth conditions of
expressions derived from it. Use types may also be more elaborate than senses, and




statement of the normal conditions under which speakers use a certain locative
expression. The normal interpretation of a use type is different from its geometric
meaning in that it includes contextual constraints of a pragmatic nature and also
depends for its interpretation on the associated expression (thus including unresolved
indexicals). Figure 4.4 lists the use types and ideal meanings proposed by Herskovits
for in, on and at.
A detailed example of the theory in action will help to clarify Herskovits's
framework. Herskovits proposes that the ideal meaning of the preposition "in" is :
in: inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two-, or three dimensional construct.
All uses of in gravitate around this ideal meaning. For example, if we consider the
following sentences (Herskovits, 1986, pp. 41 - 42);
(1) The water is in the vase
(2) The crack is in the vase
(3) The crack is in the surface
(4) The bird is in the tree
(5) The chair is in the corner
(6) The nail is in the box
(7) The muscles in his leg
(8) The pear in the bowl
(9) The block in the box
(10) The block in the rectangular area
(11) The gap in the border
(12) The bird in the field
in conveys an idea of inclusion or surrounding in all these examples. However, in
each case this idea applies to geometric objects in different ways - in some cases,
strictly speaking, it may not apply at all. For Herskovits geometric conceptualisation,
sense shifts, tolerance, and metonymies, allow one and the same lexical item (the
ideal meaning for in) to serve in a variety of ways.
The first five examples illustrate what Herskovits terms "the use of geometric
imagination". In each case the located object is mapped onto the same geometric
description: the place of the object. In each case the mapping is different, however.
The water in example one is within the volume of containment defined by the
concavity of the vase - a volume limited by the inner side of the vase and by a plane
through its rim. The crack in example two, by contrast, is within what Herskovits
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Figure 4,4 Herskovitsian Ideal Meanings and Use Types for In.On and M
Ideal Meaning: In: inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two- or three-
dimensional geometric construct.
Use Types: In:
Spatial entity in container
Gap/object "embedded" in physical object
Physical object "in the air"
Physical object in outline of another, or a group of objects
Spatial entity in part of space or environment
Accident/object part of physical or geometric object
Person in clothing
Spatial entity in area
Physical object in a roadway
Person in institution
Participant in institution
Ideal Meaning: On: for a geometrical construct X to be contiguous with a line
or surface Y; if Y is the surface of an object Oy, and X is the space occupied
by another object Ox, for Oy to support Ox.
Use Types: On:
Spatial entity supported by physical object
Accident/object as part of physical object
Physical object attached to another
Physical object transported by a large vehicle
Physical object contiguous with another
Physical object contiguous with a wall
Physical object on part of itself
Physical object over another
Spatial entity located on geographical location
Physical or geometrical object contiguous with a line
Physical object contiguous with edge of geographical area
Ideal Meaning: At: for a point to coincide with another
Use Types: At:
Spatial entity at location
Spatial entity "at sea"
Spatial entity at generic place
Person at institution
Person using artifact
Spatial entity at landmark in highlighted medium
Physical object on line and indexically defined crosspath
Physical object at a distance from point, line, or plane
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calls the "normal" volume of the vase, that is, within part of the space of the vase that
the vase would occupy if there was no crack. In example four, the bird is in a volume
bounded by the outline of the tree's branches.
Example six illustrates how a phrase can be ambiguous when two different geometric
descriptions of the reference object are equally plausible (lacking further specification
by context). The nail could be embedded into the side of the box (either "normally",
that is, sticking out of the side of the box, or completely embedded into the wall of
the box) or contained within the box.
Example seven illustrates what Herskovits calls a sense shift. The actual relation
between muscles and leg, Herskovits claims, is not one of containment, but is instead
the relation "part of".
Example eight is an example of tolerance. This pragmatic factor is Herskovits's
solution to the case we discussed in figure 3.1(b) above. If we consider the cases in
figure 4.5 (below), one can still say that the pear is in the bowl in (b) and (c) although
the ideal meaning does not hold (at least, not in the case of (c)). If an object is part of
a group of objects supported by the bowl, some of which are strictly in the bowl, then
Figure 4.5
(a) lb) (c)
it can be said to be in the bowl.
Now, allied to ideal meanings is a set of pragmatic "near" principles which provide
constraints on the interpretation of a locative expression.
Salience explains the direction of metonymic shifts; and is formulated thus
(Herskovits, 1986, p.73);
"One can use a noun which basically denotes a whole object to refer to the
region occupied by a part of it that it typically salient."
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For example, in the cat under the table, the cat is under the surface of the table (the
table top), and not under the legs. Table thus stands for the top of the table in this
expression. Salience can be viewed as referring to the types of foregrounding of
objects or object parts that arises in our interactions with and perception of our
environment.
Relevance has to do with communicative goals, with what the speaker wishes to
express or imply in the present context. This pragmatic principle comes into play in
cases such as that depicted in figure 4.6 below. One can use either in or on with (a) or
(b), but the use is dependent on the context; according to whether containment or
contact is most relevant.
Besides motivating the choice between two prepositions, relevance is also involved
when a situation does not fit clearly into the normal situation type associated with an
expression. For example, the expression the cat is on the mat is dependent on whether
the speaker is concerned with getting cat hair on the floor or on the mat. Thus if the
cat was positioned as in figure 4.7 (below), if one was worried about cat hair getting
on the mat, then one could say, Move the cat off the mat (thus implying that the cat is
Figure 4.6
(a) The dust is in/on the bowl
(b) The oil is in/on the pan
Figure 4.7
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on the mat). On the other hand, if one was worried that the floor could get messed up
with cat hair, one could meaningfully say, Move the cat onto the mat (thus implying
that the cat is not on the mat).
These pragmatic near principles in Herskovits's account provide constraints on the
interpretation of a locative expression, but still leave many phenomena unaccounted
for. Thus Herskovits resigns herself to the assertion that some facts of use will remain
a matter of convention (Herskovits, 1986, p. 87);
"....all conventional facts of use - facts that are neither determined by the
ideal meaning of the preposition and the meanings of the subject and object of
the expression, nor pragmatically inferrable - will have to be somehow
specified in the lexicon, as characteristics of additional senses of the
preposition or of idiomatic forms. The kind of lexical representations I
suggest, the use type, preserves the relation of the various senses of the
preposition to the ideal meaning(s)."
This brings Herskovits to address the issue of how many use types to ascribe to a
preposition. Here she fares no better than any approach thus far discussed; she relies
heavily on speaker's intuitions and the occasional mention of identity tests. However,
she does make the point that a locative expression will correspond to two different use
types if some distinction is generally important to a language user. This is a point with
which we concur.
She also relies heavily on the claim that the use types are derived from the ideal
meaning, although she has difficulty in providing an explanation as to how the use
types are derived.
4.4.2 Herskovits Reconsidered; Critique of Ideal Meanings and Use Types
Herskovits's account can be viewed as an improvement on the classical accounts thus
far discussed. She effectively adds to the definitions given in the last chapter with an
extensive discussion of a pragmatics required to approach truth conditionality.
However, there are a number of serious errors with her account.
The notion of ideal meaning lacks justification. The sole motivation for this construct
appears to come from the intuition of language users that in, for example, means
something basic (that is, one has an intuition on introspection initially that in has a
simple definition to cover all cases). Several criticisms can be made of this. Firstly,
although we acknowledge that such intuitions exist, there is no evidence that this is an
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abstract 'ideal' meaning conceptualised in an ideal world of lines, points, etc. Another
plausible explanation is that a basic notion of containment arises as it is most
representative of all uses of in. Again, however, we have discussed the problems with
this kind of statement in section 4.3 above. Herskovits assumes the STRUCTURE =
REPRESENTATION interpretation of prototype effects, where the ideal meaning is a
prototype in the lexicon which structures other exemplars, namely the use types.
Secondly, with the recognition of use types, Herskovits basically divides meaning up
in terms of different geometric relations between objects. It seems that the ideal
meaning therefore is some sort of generalisation across all the possible geometric
relations associated with a word. Why Herskovits begins with an ideal meaning in
light of this is bizarre. She appears to have put the cart before the horse; she ends up
with a set of types of geometric relations starting from an abstraction across geometric
relations. Thirdly, there would appear to be little point in using such an abstract
construct as central in the representation of meaning, particularly as use types vary
often quite considerably from the ideal meaning. Fourthly, as the use types are
lexicalised anyway, the processing of language therefore does not require that the
ideal meaning be lexically represented too.
We find problems too with the use types. At a theoretical level, Herskovits provides
no adequate evidence for distinctions between use types. The main motivation rests on
cutting up the world into different types of geometric relations. One would expect,
then, a detailed discussion of the kinds of geometry involved. Herskovits does not
attempt this.
There are more readily demonstrable problems with the use types. On and in have a
use type that is identical, namely "accident/object part of physical object", but the
prepositions don't have the same distribution :
The freckles on his face
*The freckles in his face
The handle on the basket
'"The handle in the basket
The mark on the scale
*The mark in the scale
Additionally, if one is to postulate a listing of senses in the lexicon, as Herskovits
does, one would expect an account as to how a sense is selected in context. Herskovits
provides no such account.
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Herskovits falls into the trap of postulating many separate use types as she focuses on
the lexical semantics of the preposition (despite her keenness to talk about locative
expressions). Herskovits simply has objectively looked at locative expressions
involving each spatial preposition and has attributed the differences to the meaning of
the preposition.
One can also mention some positive points with the approach of Herskovits. The
emphasis on pragmatics presents a view of meaning as something that is generated in
context. Thus it may be possible to extend the pragmatics of Herskovits to reduce the
amount of information that needs to be represented in the lexicon. The use types of
Herskovits seem to take away much of her good work focussing on how meaning is
stretched and bent in context. The focus on the purpose of language from the point of
view of language users is part and parcel of this approach.
Let us now turn to the Brugman and Lakoff (Brugman, 1981, 1988; Lakoff, 1987;
Brugman and Lakoff, 1988) analysis of over.
4.5 The Approach of Brugman and Lakoff
4.5.1 Brugman and Lakoff : Prototypicality and the Case of Over
The analysis of over provided by Brugman (1981, 1988) and developed by Lakoff
(1987) and Brugman and Lakoff (1988) represents the most direct application of
prototype theory to the domain of spatial language. We will begin with a general
overview of the approach, and will then provide detailed illustration with examples
involving over.
As should be clear by now, Brugman (1981) and Lakoff (1987) reject the "core sense"
approach to polysemy, which frequently resorts to the representation of a matrix of
putatively universal semantic primitives. Taylor (1988) points out that given highly
polysemous lexical items such as prepositions, the core meaning approach breaks
down for failure to meet one (or both) of two conditions. Firstly, the approach
demands that the core meaning of an item is sufficiently general such that all of the
uses of the item are accounted for; at the same time, the core meaning must be
sufficiently specific so as to uniquely distinguish the item from all others. For
instance, if one proposes the core meaning of over as being "at a higher location than,
but not in contact with" (i.e., the features [+ vertical], [- contact]) one is forced to
list many uses as idiomatic (e.g., He lives over the hill). The other problem is that the
same core sense would presumably be required for 'above'. One then has a problem
to explain the only partial overlap in the distribution of the two words.
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As an alternative to the core sense approach, Brugman (1981, 1988), Lakoff (1987)
and Brugman and Lakoff (1988) propose a meaning chain analysis. For each
preposition, a central or prototypical sense is recognised. The prototypical sense,
rather than being highly general, may well profile a very specific configuration.
Polysemy comes about when the preposition is closely related to, but distinct from,
the prototypical instance. For example, a condition which is central to the prototype
may not be met; a feature which is optional to the prototype now assumes central
importance, or vice versa; or some additional feature might be required. By the same
process, this derived meaning may in turn give rise to a further extension, and so on.
The various senses of the word can therefore be thought to be analogous to the spokes
of a wheel radiating out from the hub (the prototypical sense). Senses at the periphery
might well have little in common, either with each other, or with the central sense;
they are merely related by virtue of the intervening members in the meaning chain.
Brugman (1981) catalogues nearly 100 different kinds of uses of over, which gives a
clear idea of the extent to which the account recognises polysemy.
The meaning chain analysis at first sight seems very different from the approach of
Herskovits (1986), and from core sense approaches. Brugman and Lakoff do not wish
to claim that every time one uses a non-primary sense of a polyseme one abstracts
from a primary sense. (Contrast figure 4.8 below, which is an illustration of a
meaning chain analysis, with figure 4.3, illustrating Herskovits's position). Instead
she claims that the processes which lead a word to have synchronically distinct senses
are the same ones which lead to diachronically novel uses. This is important as
one wants to give a motivated account of how new senses are developed, and in the
historical vein, this is a notion of diachronic change.
The link between senses occurs, not only through shared components, but in three
other ways (Lakoff improved on Brugman's account by "showing the
precise relations among the spatial senses", Lakoff, 1987: 418). These are instance
links, similarity links and transformational links. Schema transformations are not
arbitrary, but instead are "direct reflections of our experiences, which may be visual,
or kinesthetic." (Lakoff, 1987:443). Lakoff takes the existence of such links as
evidence for fully specified lexical entries.
Focusing now on over, the discussion presupposes that polysemes have "primary"
senses from which are extended non-primary ones, and that both primary and non-
primary senses exist as categories in the mind of the user. The description for over, is
similar to the elements that have been hypothesised to exist for the semantic category
lie (Coleman and Kay, 1981); not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which
must be met for any grammatical use of over, but defining elements which determine
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Figure 4.8 Representation of the Radial Structure of the category Over
(Brugman, 1981)
©
(where each number indicates a different sense)
the degree to which a configuration can be appropriately described using over. It also
rests more directly on Rosch's work in that the category over contrasts with other
semantic categories (for instance, across and above), whose existence constrains the
range of applicability of over.
Brugman suggests that there is one higher level category over which is comprised of
all senses named by the word over, and each sense is a lower-level category, a few of
which are central members of the higher category, but all of which are nevertheless
full members. This is the result of looking at a polyseme, which is in essence a
category of categories, whereas lie is a category at a single level (i.e., it has only one
sense) and thus deviations from the prototype case will also be deviations from pure
grammaticality.
This description, then, rests heavily on the work done in prototype, semantics
(discussed above). Indeed, Brugman (1988) and Brugman and Lakoff (1988) identify
three main ways in which over indicates a spatial relationship between figure
("trajector", TR) and ground (landmark, LM). These are (visually represented in
figure 4.9);
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(a) The helicopter hovers over the city
(b) The plane flies over the bridge
(c) The line stretches over the wail
(d) The cloth is over the table
7i< io<r.r, ov*r :i* -si:'/
LM
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(1) The above-across schema: The trajector is an object moving on a path above, and
extending beyond, the boundaries of the landmark, as in the plane flies over the
bridge (figure 4.9(b)). Alternatively, the trajector could be a stationary, 1-dimensional
object, as in the line stretches over the wall (figure 4.9(c)). In this schema, contact
between the trajector and the landmark is allowed.
(2) The above schema: The trajector is vertically above, but not touching, the
landmark, as in the helicopter hovers over the city (figure 4.9(a)).
(3) The cover schema: The trajector is an object whose 2-dimensional extent covers
the landmark (extends to the edges of or beyond the landmark). In most cases, the
trajector is construed as being vertically above, and in contact with, the landmark, as
in the cloth is over the table (figure 4.9 (d)).
It is from these prototypical spatial relations that all the other senses of over are
arrived at (albeit indirectly in many cases).
It should be mentioned that spatial uses of prepositions are recognised as being
primary in the Brugman and Lakoff analyses; the primary, prototypical senses of
over, as can be seen from figure 4.9, are purely physical relations. Thus Brugman and
Lakoff, in accordance with the cognitive linguistic view, share the primacy of spatial
concepts over other concepts. However, it is by no means the case that all of the
senses of over are physical ones. Nevertheless, even the abstract or metaphorical cases
like we talked over lunch, Brugman claims, are spatialisations of abstract relations.
Thus Brugman (1981, 1988) proposes that all nonprepositional uses of over are
derived from one or another (spatial) sense of the preposition. This is reflected in the
distinction Brugman (1981) makes between polysemy and functional shift. While
polysemy is a shift of sense within one lexical category, functional shift recognises the
possibility of sense shifts across lexical categories. Brugman sets out to demonstrate
that all nonprepositional uses of over, and other spatial uses, are derived from one or
another sense of the preposition. However, she is not claiming that the language user
goes through a series of image transformations from the central sense each time he
uses the word over in a noncentral sense. Rather, she is trying to explicate what it is
that makes us feel that the senses are related, and to suggest the means by which a
language user abstracts from some already existing schema when he uses over in a
novel sense.
When Brugman speaks of the "word" over she generally refers to the conceptual
category which overrides the several lexical categories utilised. The imaginal
representations of spatial relationships, such as those depicted in figure 4.9, Brugman
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(1981) argues, are necessary for explaining the various senses of a word. These
representations, for Brugman, do bear some resemblance to the corresponding mental
representations, and thus Brugman argues against feature or propositional
representations of semantic concepts in the mind. Her descriptions are;
"not abstractions made for theoretical elegance; rather they are descriptions
reflecting processes which the language user is capable of using" (Brugman,
1981, p. 4).
Casad (1982) has shown how complex the conceptualisations of spatial concepts are in
the language Cora and how necessary imaginal representations are for explicating the
spatial concepts.
The central prototypical meaning of over for Brugman and Lakoff involves the above-
over schema ((1) above). An example of this is the plane flew over the field. Here,
according to Brugman (1981) the trajector is a single point relative to the landmark.
The landmark itself can have any topological characteristics - its shape is not
important in this particular sense. The trajector is in a position vertical to, and not in
contact with, the landmark, and these two elements constitute the core of the category
above. Similarly, the trajectory traced by the trajector corresponds to one dimension
of the landmark: that is, the line segment traced by the trajectory defines one
dimension of the landmark, and canonically crosses one or both boundaries of the
landmark. These elements are exactly those which characterise the category across.
Either above or across can be substituted for over in the sentence above (with
grammatical results), but either across or above provide less information about the
event than over does, since it incorporates both the other concepts.
Figure 4.10 represents the meaning of over according to Brugman and Lakoff.
Now, from this central schema, other more specific schemas are arrived at by further
specifying the nature of the landmark and by specifying whether or not there is
contact. Examples (a) to (i) in figure 4.10 (below) are examples of these more specific
schemas. They also illustrate what is meant by an instance link; that is, an instance
link is a link which relates a schema to a more specific instance of itself. Senses (a),
(b), (c) and (i) involve no contact between trajector and landmark, whereas senses (d)
- (h) involve contact.
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Figure 4,10 Lakoff's (19871 Analysis of Over (adapted from Bennett. 19901
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Lakoff (1987) presents the case that one can make a choice as to whether or not these
more specific schemas should be lexicalised (i.e., full specification of the lexical
entry), or alternatively whether one should adopt a minimally specified entry where
the more specific schemas arise as a result of the addition of information from the
other words in the expression. Lakoff (1987) favours full specification on account of
the chaining analysis he adopts. Only through full specification, Lakoff (1987, p.422-
423) claims, can the links between senses be emphasised.
Example (k) in figure 4.10 is an example of image schema (2), which involves a static
above relationship with no contact between trajector and landmark. This example,
Lakoff (1987) argues, is closely related to example (a), representing image schema
(1), because of a so-called transformational relationship (hence transformational links)
between a one-dimensional trajector and a path over an extended landmark.
The third type of link Lakoff (1987) discusses is a similarity link. This is where two
schemas share a property. For example, (b) and (e) are related via a similarity link as
they both involve the landmark being vertical and extended.
One could similarly give examples of each type of link with image schemas (3) and
(4). However, we will now move to a critique of this approach having outlined its
major features.
4.5.2 Critique of the Brugman and Lakoff Analyses of Over
To begin with, we can consider some relatively trivial problems with the Brugman
and Lakoff analysis of over. One immediate problem with this analysis is the sureness
with which Brugman attributes the across schema to the word over. That is, the
domains of appropriateness for over and across appear to be the same. The use of the
verb flew may have this component associated with it without having it with as a
component in the meaning of over. For example, if we compare the following ;
The plane flew across the field.
The plane flew over the field.
it would appear that with the use of across there was a direct path. With over, the
flight path doesn't have to be a straight direct path. This is a difference which may
have a motivation ifflew involves the notion of a path. Thus over may merely point to
a relationship between the path and a landmark (a functional relation; explanation will
be forthcoming later). Across involves the notion of a path, and hence when put
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together with the verb flew, the path is reinforced (assumed to be a direct, straight
path). Hence the path with the use of across is a straight one, but not necessarily in
the case of over. This example is reinforced if we consider figure 4.11 (below). Here
we are interested in the use of the following sentences;
The plane flew over the (bomb) target
The plane flew above the (bomb) target
The plane flew across the (bomb) target
The plane is over the (bomb) target
The plane is above the (bomb) target




There are even more apparent problems with the case of "the plane flew over the
bomb target". This is an appropriate expression to use in either of the cases in figure
4.11. (a) is acceptable given that that is the correct position for the plane to be in in
order to drop the bomb. Notice that flew above does not capture this point, and flew
across is simply infelicitous in this case. If we remove the verb, we can say that "the
plane is over the bomb target". It is wrong in this case to say that over means above
or across as neither can be substituted appropriately. The sentence can depict the
relations in figure 4.11(a), as already stated, whereby the plane is not directly above
the target, but is in the right position to hit the target with a bomb from the plane.
This suggests that over has something to do with the notion of a path in this case, but
the information from this comes from the nouns in question (i.e., plane and bomb
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target). The explanation of this put forward later in the thesis uses this analysis as a
starting point).
Bennett (1990) argues that Brugman and Lakoff are wrong in the selection of sense
(1), involving a path leading above the landmark, as the central sense of over, rather
than the static locative meaning of sense (2). Lakoff (1987, p.425) claims that sense
(2) is roughly equivalent to above and that there is a requirement of no contact
between landmark and trajector. He points out, for instance, in relation to the
helicopter is hovering over the hill, that if the helicopter lands, it is no longer over the
hill but on the hill. Bennett (1975; cited in Bennett, 1990) considers the same issue in
relation to the examples;
My hand is over the table
My hand is on the table
where the first seems more appropriate if the hand and table are not in contact, but
concluded that the facts do not require us to attribute a component of 'no contact' to
the meaning of over. Instead Bennett invokes pragmatic factors to account for the fact
that on is preferred to over in certain situations. Where a static locative situation
involves both contact and superiority, contact (Bennett argues) normally takes
precedence in commanding the speaker's attention, so that he/she comments on the
former relationship rather than the latter (using on rather than over). This
interpretation is supported by the fact that under certain circumstances the normal
priority of contact over superiority may be reversed. For example, if the issue is
simply whether the hand is over the table or under it (i.e., if the superiority of over is
being contrasted with the inferiority of under) then the fact that the hand happens also
to be in contact with the table would not rule out the possibility of using the hand is
over the table. Here Bennett is invoking the type of pragmatic principles that we can
associate with the account of Herskovits (1986) considered earlier in the chapter.
In defending his choice of the core meaning of over, Lakoff writes (1987, p.425):
"From time to time, linguists have suggested that schema (2) is the core
meaning of the preposition over, that is, that schema (2) is present in all
the uses of over as a preposition. It should be clear from what we have
seen so far that this is false. Since schema (2) requires no contact, it
cannot be present in those cases where contact occurs, for example, in
schema l.X.C exemplified by Sam drove over the bridge."
78
In the light of Bennett's discussion of over and on just cited, it is clear that there is no
objection to taking the (static) relationship of 'superiority', unspecified for 'contact';
or 'no contact', as the core meaning of over.
We can move on to consider some slightly more serious problems with the Brugman
and Lakoff analysis. Bennett (1990) importantly recognises the deficiency of the
Brugman and Lakoff account in that they don't distinguish between those aspects of
the polysemy of over that it shares with other prepositions and those which are
specific to over. In Bennett's analysis those aspects of the meaning of over that are
shared by other prepositions are represented in (what he terms) the semotactics. Thus,
Brugman's (1981) awareness of relatedness stops at the boundary of an individual
phoneme string (that is, the realisation of an individual phoneme string). We feel it
necessary to examine polysemy, functional shift and also relations between words.
Some rather more crucial objections to the Brugman and Lakoff analysis lie in the
charge that their approach is fundamentally flawed in a number of critical ways. As
we have seen earlier in the chapter, the existence of prototype effects does not mean
that the structure of representation in the lexicon is in terms of one (or more)
prototype(s). We have commented already that Lakoff (1987), despite arguing against
such fallacious interpretations of prototype effects early on in 'Women, Fire and
Dangerous Things', uses precisely this interpretation with his analysis of over. Lakoff
(personal communication), in defence of this position, has argued that this analysis
has resorted to prototypical lexical representation and full specification simply because
a minimally specified lexical representation cannot account for the data (what we have
termed earlier case accountability). However, one can adopt full specification
without commiting such an error. Lakoff (personal communication) retorts that the
use of radial structure does highlight the relationship between senses, and thus deals
with polysemy, rather than treating related senses like homonyms.
Related to this objection is the motivation for the choice of central senses in the
analysis. To begin with, one can ask the question of why spatial senses are considered
primary in this analysis. Presumably this is based on the intuition that this type of
sense is primary. Therefore the motivation for the central sense is itself a prototype
effect; the sense that most readily comes to mind. However, it is quite a different
matter to claim that other senses are derived from this central sense given the tenuous
nature of the evidence that the spatial sense is the central one.
Again, related to this problem is the specification of which spatial sense is the central
sense. Bennett (1990), as we have seen, contests the claim that the above-across
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schema is the central sense. However, one can consider the evidence that either sense
is central as ultimately trivial; it is a matter of faith to a large extent in either case1.
For Brugman and Lakoff the issue of which sense of over is most central is perhaps
less important than we are implicitly contending. The important feature of the
Brugman and Lakoff account is the way in which they conduct their analysis, tying
together many disparate senses of over via similarity, instance and transformational
links. However, if one decides to start from a different central sense, the analysis does
look rather different.
What can be seen as the strength of the analysis, however, can be seen as its greatest
weakness. What Brugman and Lakoff have done is to take geometric relationships
between objects in the world and cut them up when there appears to be a reasonable
difference. For example, Lakoff treats contact versus noncontact, and whether the
landmark is extended or not, as two features of the world which characterise different
senses of over. They are thus claiming that there is a one-to-one mapping between
geometric relations in the world and spatial language. The components which are
viewed as distinguishing geometric variables then constitute the different senses of
over. This methodological breakdown of the analysis is beginning to sound very
similar to the classical view, and componential analysis in particular. It is difficult to
discern anything essentially 'experiential' about the account. In fact, considering the
spatial uses in the analysis in isolation, Brugman and Lakoff are advocating a position
of realism, associated with the type of objectivist analysis Lakoff (1987) spends so
much time demolishing.
Furthermore, the use of similarity links, instance links and transformational links is
entirely post hoc. The world is cut up into pieces, mapped directly onto sense
schemas, and then it is claimed that these senses are related to each other via links
which appear arbitrary. The existence of such links seems a necessary thread to justify
the Brugman and Lakoff claim that all senses of over are related, and thus we pinpoint
a degree of circularity in their argument. It is no surprise that, if one cuts up the
spatial world (where use of over is appropriate), then one finds that these geometric
relations are in some ways similar. What one must do is to give an account as to why
these relations are similar. It is not enough to argue that the similarity is reflected by
radial structure in the head.
1 In chapter 6 we consider experimental evidence which, it will be argued, can arbitrate between the
choice of central senses, thus removing the need for a matter of faith with central sense selection.
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4.6 Overview; Classical Versus Cognitive Linguistic Accounts; What We Wish To
Preserve from Each
In this chapter and the last we have provided examples and discussion of theories
which can be said to fall into the classical and the cognitive linguistic moulds. We are
now in a position to compare these two approaches, with a view to isolating the
theoretical constructs worth preserving for the type of analysis we wish to adopt.
The initial observation we wish to make is one of the similarity between all the
approaches that have thus far been considered. The positions outlined above have been
reviewed largely on their own terms in order to give them a fair hearing. They
therefore may appear very varied in their approach. We believe that this is not the
case, and that all the above approaches suffer from fundamental problems which it is
one of our goals to resolve.
The first main problem involves the method of sense delineation used. The classical
approaches, involving minimally specified lexical entries, favour a general meaning in
the form of a definition for the lexical entry of a spatial preposition, and as we have
seen, the motivation for this comes from the intuition that there is something basic to
the meaning of a preposition. Cognitive linguistic accounts also do this, only in this
case as a method of working out what the prototypical representation of a radial
lexical structure should be. We have questioned the reliability of this type of
information on several grounds. Such intuitions are akin to prototype effects
themselves, and the work of Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983), Roth and
Shoben (1983), Barsalou and Sewell (cited in Barsalou, 1985) and Osherson and
Smith (1981) provides conclusive evidence that one cannot assume that prototypes are
directly lexically represented and that the structure of the lexicon is radial. We also,
citing Sternberg (1966), argued from a slightly different angle that introspection is not
to be trusted as a method of getting at mental representation.
Related to this first point is the objection that both types of approach delineate senses
in terms of different geometric relations in the world. That is, a word is said to have
two distinct senses if the geometric relations associated with a spatial expression
differ. This objection at this present time has to be taken as a matter of faith; the next
few chapters present detailed evidence for an alternative approach involving functional
relations. However, for the moment we can still give some reasons for this objection.
One of the problems is the number of senses that one can recognise. It is possible to
cut up the spatial world in a number of different ways, at different levels of detail. In
a sense, the geometric relations between objects vary in every situation with which
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they occur. For example, if we consider the scenes in figure 4.12 (below), we can
readily see this point.
One can readily see that the geometry in each picture is different. The spatial relations
in (a) and (b) seem most related, but (c), (d) and (e) are slightly different. Herskovits
accounts for (c) using pragmatic principles to extend the meaning of (a) and (b).
Brugman and Lakoff, extrapolating from their treatment of over, would recognise (c)
as a different schema for in, with this schema related to the schema for (a) and (b) via
an instance link. The classical view would fare less well as a simple relations
definition in terms of geometric relations cannot account for all cases. Therefore one
has to treat (d) and (e) as separate senses, whether they are treated like polysemes or
homonyms.
Thus we recognise a problem which directly parallels the problem we mentioned
earlier of separating out senses from occurrences of a lexeme. At the level of the
spatial world, one has difficulty working out how to cut up the world into manageable
cognitive slices, which may be represented as senses. At the same time, at the level of
language, one has to separate out the information the spatial preposition brings to a
spatial expression from the occurrence of that preposition in each context. Bennett
(1975) deals most adequately (that is, as compared with other accounts) with this
latter question, although this is very much to the exclusion of focus on how language
and the spatial world covary.
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We are faced, therefore, with the problem issue we have been aware of since chapter
one; that of deciding how many senses a word should have. Theoretically, we can
follow the principle that one should only recognise as few senses as are necessary, as
Johnson-Laird (1987) has argued. The problem is the one recognised by Bennett
(1975), Clark (1983) and Cruse (1986) that in principle there are an infinite number
of senses. If we consider the work of Brugman and Lakoff in light of this, we see just
how arbitrary and post hoc their analysis is. Presumably any new sense is added to the
lexicon in this type of account, although Brugman and Lakoff would argue that the
development of new senses would follow from the radial structure in the lexicon and
the types of links that are possible. There seems no limit to the number of senses that
can be recognised with this type of analysis.
The preference for minimal specification of the lexical entry has to be balanced with
the factor of case accountability. As we suggested in chapter three, the types of
minimal specification that have been proposed for spatial prepositions generate what
we have called decoding and encoding errors. We must be careful that the types of
minimal specification we choose to adopt ultimately account for the facts. If this turns
out not to be the case, then the cognitive linguistic strategy of using (incorrectly)
prototypes as structuring tools for radial lexical representations may be more attractive
than the above critique has cared to assume.
One way in which we can do this is to take the idea from cognitive linguistics that a
represented meaning does not have to be truth conditional. In other words, we do not
want to treat minimal specifications as definitional. The way to bypass this difficulty
is to look for the regularity that a word brings to an expression from the point of view
of the language user. It is only after noting how language and the spatial world covary
can we make claims about the information which remains constantly associated with a
word during language use; i.e., make a transcendental inference that the user has a
representation of information associated with a word which is brought to bear during
processing irrespective of context.
Herskovits (1986) is perhaps the closest to providing a palatable method with which to
distinguish between senses. She claims that a locative expression will correspond to
two different senses (use types) if some distinction is generally important to a
language user. This position is essentially a relativistic one, following in the footsteps
of Sapir and Whorf. The claim is that language structures space, rather than the
spatial world structuring language. This runs contrary to Herskovits's general
approach, which is dependent on cutting up the world in terms of different spatial
relations.
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Following from this, the question that one should ask a priori is the one of what
information about the spatial world is important to the language user. It is only after
this question has been adequately tackled can we address the issue of what information
language users associate with a spatial preposition, which is brought to bear during
language processing. As it happens, the account we will pursue involves the use of
theories (or cognitive models, as cognitive linguists would have it) about objects in
the world, their function, and how they interact with each other.
At this point, we must leave ourselves open to the possibility that, under different
circumstances, the information that a word brings to bear in a sentence may vary.
Again, we can refer to the work of Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) who
demonstrate that the solution to a problem is dependent on the way in which the
question is pitched. More specifically, if one asks someone to make a distinction they
will make it although ordinarily such a distinction may not have much utility. We
make this point with particular reference to empirical attempts to get at information in
the way that we have described.
We also note the importance of semantic-field type effects which any adequate
account of a linguistic domain must provide. For example, one may not use a
particular preposition in a given context, not because it is inappropriate, but because
there is another spatial term which is more appropriate. Additionally, on grounds of
cognitive economy, it would appear to make sense to somehow characterise shared
meaning that some spatial terms may have.
At this point we should say some more about the type of minimal specifications we
choose to adopt. We have intimated that these are not to be definitional meanings, but
instead should be viewed as partial representations which can be built upon in context.
In this respect we espouse an approach akin to that of sense generation (Braisby,
1990) or sense creation (Clark, 1983). We will advocate a minimal specification for
the lexical entry of each preposition to be considered, and from this we will expand
Herskovits's pragmatics factors which take the minimal specifiation via constraint
satisfaction to the level of truth conditionality.
However, before we can develop the analysis we must give an account of the type of
information about the spatial world language users may want to represent. This will
also provide us with some possible theoretical grounds for delineating senses of a
lexeme (therefore providing us with a method to isolate senses from occurrences). We




This chapter introduces functional relations and gives principled reasons why they are
important, and why they should be the choice for what we argue are minimally
specified lexical entries. The chapter begins with a discussion of the types of
geometry that would be required for an adequate semantic treatment of spatial
prepositions with the sort of accounts we have considered thus far. We then introduce
the work of Talmy (1988) and Garrod and Sanford (1989), and will extend and refine
their analysis so as to give a working definition of what functional relations are. This
will lead to a set of hypotheses at the end of the chapter about functional relations,
and their roles, which will be taken into the testing room in the following two
chapters.
5.2 The Importance of Space
As we have seen, the approaches of Lakoff (1987), Herskovits (1986) and others treat
spatial uses of prepositions as primary, and invoke spatial concepts (as does Bennett,
1975, although the concepts used by him are general between space and time). For
example, Bennett (1975), in his componential analysis, labels components such as
interior, superior, anterior, etc. (see above for detailed discussion), and Herskovits
(1986) refers to various geometrical notions such as interior, outline, contiguous, etc..
All these approaches categorise senses in terms of different geometric relations in the
world. Thus, a spatial preposition in all these accounts has more than one sense if the
geometric relations change in the world. For example, if we consider the pictures in
figure 5.1 (below), we may postulate that in (which may be used to describe the
relationship between the objects concerned) means something different in each





Certainly the ball in picture (a) is positioned differently in relation to the bowl as
compared with the nail in relation to the board, and the flowers in relation to the vase.
The question that follows is one of characterising the nature of this difference. If
spatial prepositions really refer to types of geometric relations in the world, then one
should be able to characterise precisely what these different geometric relations are.
However, as Crangle and Suppes (1989) state;
" In spite of the spate of articles in the last decade or so on locative
expressions, spatial prepositions, and the like, detailed attention to the kinds
of geometry needed to give a semantic analysis of the various locative
expressions does not seem to have been previously attempted." (Crangle and
Suppes, 1989, p 399).
One reason they give for this lack of interest in precise geometry is that linguists in
this field have been concerned with the relationship between words and other words,
rather than the relationship between words and the world. Crangle and Suppes argue
that a detailed understanding of geometry is required before an adequate
characterisation of the meaning of spatial language can take place. This position does
not assume that a purely geometric analysis can provide a satisfactory account of the
meaning of spatial prepositions, but only wishes to adequately define the geometric
aspects that are present. Indeed Crangle and Suppes claim that different types of
geometry underlie the basic meaning of different spatial prepositions. It is to a brief
discussion of these geometries that we now turn.
5.2.1 Geometries Classified
The kinds of geometry needed for an adequate semantics of spatial prepositions span
several types, according to Crangle and Suppes (1989) and Suppes (1991). Suppes
(1991) provides a breakdown of these geometries, with examples of prepositional
usage (reproduced in figure 5.2 below). The striking feature here is the level of
complexity required to describe even the most basic of geometric relations, and the
variety of types of geometry that exist. This of course entails that the spatial language
user, dealing with the encoding and decoding problems in a spatial situation (i.e.,
with a spatial scene, or with a spatial expression) has to have a grasp of this kind of
geometry in order to correctly locate or describe locations of objects.
The most basic and familiar of the geometries is Euclidean geometry, or Orthogonal
or Metric geometry, to use alternative titles. The defining characteristic of this
geometry is that metric dimensional properties of figures - size, distance, and angles -
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Figure 5.2 Kinds of Geometry and Examples of Prepositional Usage
Cfrom Suppes. 1991. p.37T
Topology The pencil is the box (Box closed)
One piece of rope goes over and under the
other.
Affine geometry The pencil is in the box (box open)
Mary is sitting between Jose and Maria
Absolute geometry The pencil is near the box
The geometry of oriented
physical space
The book is on the table
Adjust the lamp over the table
Projective geometry The post office is over the hill
The cup is to the left of the plate
Geometries that include
figures and shapes with
orienting axes
The dog is in front of the house
The pencil is behind the chair
Geometry of classical
space-time
She peeled apples in the kitchen
are preserved across the transformations. There are only three possible
transformations in Metric geometry:
1. Translation, which is the displacement of the figure in the plane - up, down or
sideways
2. Rotation, which is the spinning of a figure in a plane around some fixed point
called the centre of rotation
3. Reflection, which is flipping a figure over in a plane through a line or point.
The level of mathematical complexity required suggests that the language user must
have considerable mathematical ability, realised in the ability to apply different
geometries in different situations. The types of mathematical ability required are not
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conscious, that is, one is not aware of going through complex mathematical
computations involving different geometric notions when one uses spatial language.
One then has to postulate that the computations underlying the use of spatial language
are unconscious. The position that one arrives at following this line of reasoning is
that, given a spatial expression such as the cat is on the mat, one linguistuically works
out what the sentence means at a crude level, and then one applies the appropriate
geometry associated with the preposition to the expression to work out the relative
positions of the objects in space.
One can argue, in opposition to Crangle and Suppes (1989) and Suppes (1991) that
one does not need to refer to precise geometry to give an account of the semantics of
spatial prepositions. Following Gibson (1966) we can argue that perception takes
place within a frame of reference. For example, the room in which you are (probably)
currently sitting is moving all the time. However, we need not characterise this
mathematically as it is not relevant from the point of view of the perceiver. In the
same vein, we can view the geometry underlying a frame of reference as being
arbitrary. Frame of reference has as much to do with (as the work of Levelt, 1984
suggests) information concerning canonical orientation associated with the vestibular
organ and the gravitational field. In essence, a frame of reference is rooted in the
experiences of perceivers, and is not simply based on an understanding of spatial
geometry.
5.3 Functional Relations Introduced
Thus far we have only considered spatial relations in terms of geometric relations of
one form or another. It has been shown that, whether we consider prototype
representations, componential analyses, etc. all approaches concerned have relied on
distinguishing between senses of words in terms of different geometric relations in the
world. Furthermore, the opening section of this chapter suggested that the types of
geometry required for such a semantic analysis are more complex and diverse than
these theories care to admit. It was postulated, following Gibson, that we don't in fact
need to refer to this type of complex geometry at all; that is, one doesn't go through a
series of complex computational processes in order to find out what a spatial
preposition refers to in a given context. The ramifications of this have been discussed
for spatial prepositions. We now move to consider a different angle on the problem;
the idea that geometry has less to do with spatial language than has been previously
thought. More radically, we will consider the claim that geometry has nothing to do
with some spatial prepositions.
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5.3.1 Force Dynamics
Talmy (1988) argues for the existence of a semantic category, scarcely previously
recognised, which he terms "force dynamics". This category refers to how entities
interact with respect to force, and includes such concepts as exertion of force,
resistance to such force, the overcoming of such resistance, blockage of the
expression of force, and the removal of such blockage. This suggests the existence of
relations beyond geometric relations. Furthermore, the conceptual system of force
interaction that appears to be built into language structure, Talmy claims, can
permeate other cognitive domains; the linguistic system shows close parallels with the
conceptual systems for force interaction both in naive physics and psychology.
Indeed, Talmy proposes that;
"F[orce] D[ynamics] emerges as a fundamental notional system that
structures conceptual material pertaining to force interaction in a
common way across a linguistic range: the physical, psychological,
social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of reference
and conception" (Talmy, 1988, p.50).
Underlying all force dynamic-patterns is the steady-state opposition of two forces.
These involve different types of interaction between what Talmy terms (1988, p.53)
the agonist (the focal force entity) and the antagonist (the force element that opposes
it). The salient issue in this interaction is whether the agonist is able to manifest its
force tendency, or, on the contrary is overcome. The antagonist is considered for the
effect that it has on the agonist, effectively overcoming it or not. Talmy (p. 54)
outlines what he considers to be the four most basic force dynamic patterns (displayed
in figure 5.3 below).
Figure 5.3(a) involves an agonist with an intrinsic tendency toward rest that is being
opposed from outside by a stronger antagonist, which thus overcomes its resistance
and forces it to move. This pattern is one of those which Talmy classes as 'causative,'
in particular involving the extended causation of motion. The sentence in (a) illustrates
this pattern with a ball that tends toward rest but that is kept in motion by the wind's
greater power. In (b) the agonist still tends toward rest, but now it is stronger than the
force opposing it, so it is able to manifest its tendency and remain in place.This
pattern, Talmy claims, belongs to the 'despite' category, in this case where the
agonist's stability prevails despite the antagonist's force against it. In (c), the agonist's
intrinsic tendency is now toward motion, and although there is an external force
opposing it, the agonist is stronger, so that its tendency becomes realised in resultant
motion. This pattern, too, is of the 'despite' type, according to Talmy, here with the
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antagonist as a hindrance to the agonist's motion. Finally, in (d), while the agonist
again has a tendency toward motion, the antagonist is this time stronger and so
effectively blocks it, rather than merely hindering it: the agonist is kept in place. This
pattern, again represents a causative type, the extended causation of rest.
Of these four basic force-dynamic patterns, each pair has a factor in common. As the
diagrams are arranged in the matrix in figure 5.3, each line captures a commonality.
In the top row, (a,b), the agonist's intrinsic tendency is toward rest, while in the
bottom row (c,d), it is toward action. In the left column, (a,c), the resultant of the
force opposition for the agonist is action, while in the right column, (b,d), it is rest.
Figure 5.3 The Four Basic Steady-State Force-Dynamic Patterns
(a) The ball kept rolling because the wind was blowing on it.
(b) The shed kept standing despite the wind blowing against it.
(c) The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.














• - toward action. - towardrest.
= stronger entity. = notion resu/ting from force
interaction
y
- rest resu/ting from force interaction
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More significantly, the diagonal at top left, (a,d), which represents the cases where
the antagonist is stronger, captures the factor of extended causation. These are the
cases in which the resultant state is contrary to the antagonist's intrinsic tendency,
results because of the presence of the antagonist, and would otherwise not occur. And
the diagonal starting at top right, (b,c), which gives the cases where the agonist is
stronger, captures the 'despite' factor. In fact the very concept of 'despite/although',
Talmy claims, can be characterised in terms of the common factor in this subset of
force-dynamic patterns. Here the resultant state is the same as that toward which the
agonist tends, results despite the presence of the antagonist, and would otherwise also
occur. Thus, the force-dynamic analysis captures certain basic general concepts, for
example, 'despite' as counterposed to 'because of', as well as certain particular
concepts, for example, 'hindering' and 'blocking'. In doing so, an advantage of the
present analysis becomes evident: it provides a framework in which a set of basic
notions not usually considered related are brought together in a natural way that
reveals underlying character and affinity.
Talmy applies the principles of force dynamics to a number of different types of word
classes and domains. The examples in figure 5.3 demonstrate that certain force-
dynamic concepts have grammatical (i.e., closed class) representation. With the
antagonist appearing as subject, the role of the stronger antagonist can be expressed
by the conjuction because or the prepositional expression because of, while the role of
the weaker antagonist can be expressed by the conjunction although or the preposition
despite. Force-dynamic opposition in general can be expressed by the preposition
against, as seen in figure 5.3(b).
Talmy develops the basics of force-dynamics thus far outlined to account for change
through time, and therefore the steady-state force-dynamic patterns introduced above
give rise to a set of change-of-state patterns. Thus Talmy's analysis is extended to
cases such as that represented in figure 5.4 (below).
This case involves a stronger antagonist that comes into position against an agonist
with an intrinsic tendency toward rest, and thus causes it to change from a state of rest
to one of action. Thus, this is another pattern which Talmy classes as causative, only
this time it is the prototypical form associated with this category.
Although less germaine from our point of view, it is interesting that Talmy further
extends his analysis to include non-literal use of language, for example, to the domain
of psychological reference. This can naturally be seen with examples such as he held
himself back from responding. In this case the sense of the expression is that there is
one part of the self that wants to perform a certain act and another part that wants that
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Figure 5.4
The ball's hitting it made the lamp topple from the table
V
+
not to happen, where that second part is stronger and so prevents the act's
performance.
Although Talmy does not deal explicitly with spatial prepositions, one can easily
envisage how force-dynamics may come into play in such contexts. With the
assumption of a gravitional field, one can view an object in a container as an agonist
with a tendency toward motion, and the container as the antagonist with a stronger
force srength required to hold the agonist stationary and in place. Thus one can
represent the relationship between an object and a container as depicted in figure 5.5,
adopting Talmy's diagrammatical representations.
With this type of analysis one can claim that a container is successfully fullfilling its
function if it exerts a strong enough force to constrain the location of the object
concerned.
Figure 5.5
The object is in the container.
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At this point, with will leave force dynamics to consider the work of Garrod and
Sanford (1989). They deal explicity with spatial prepositions, and their analysis is
very similar to that of Talmy (1988), although they do not cite any of Talmy's work.
We will return to consider force dynamics again later in the present chapter in slightly
more detail.
5.3.2 Garrod and Sanford : Discourse Models as Interfaces Between language
and the Spatial World.
Garrod and Sanford (1989) discuss the prepositions in, on and at, following from the
analyses given by Herskovits (1986), and add to the ideal meaning analysis given by
Herskovits in two ways. Firstly, they modify the ideal meanings proposed by
Herskovits through the introduction of what they term functional control relations. It
is this analysis with which we are primarily concerned. Secondly, they argue for a
discourse model as an interface between language (the ideal meaning) and the spatial
world. We will start with an examination of this second claim.
Garrod and Sanford argue that discourse models are used as interfaces between
language and the spatial world. Furthermore they claim that language only relates to
the world in a principled way through the mediation of mental models of that world.
Utterances can only be given precise meanings in relation to models which can then
be variously mapped onto the world to yield a variety of distinct interpretations. To
understand what this means, Garrod and Sanford examine performance on spatial
dialogue maze tasks (cf Garrod and Anderson, 1987).
Garrod and Anderson (1987) presented mazes (of the types in figure 5.6 below) to a
pair of conversants. The task was for one of the pair to describe the location of a
point on the maze to the other. The results are explained with recourse to mental
models. Each description scene exhibited in the spatial dialogue pairs, it is claimed,
is based on a particular mental model of the maze configuration, which in the case of
effective communication would become "agreed upon" by the participants. Thus
subjects were observed to adopt distinct but consistent description schemas which they
readily classified into four basic types : path descriptions, line descriptions, co¬
ordinate descriptions and figural descriptions. Each of these descriptions treats the
maze in a different way, illustrated by the following (taken from Garrod and Sanford,
p.48-49);
Path description - "See the bottom left, go along one and up one, that's where
I am"
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Line description - "I'm on the second level, second from the left"
Co-ordinate description - "I'm at E two"
Figural description - "See the rectangle at the bottom left, well I'm in the
middle box of the bottom of it"
Figure 5.6
Such mental models are defined as consisting of the following;
1) some set of autonomous objects which map onto the situation and give it an
'ontology' (Greeno, 1983), and
2) a tight set of relations between the objects in the domain which capture the
'topology' of the situation and bear a strong structural correspondence to the
actual functional relations between real objects in that situation (de Kleer &
Brown, 1983; Forbus, 1983).
Thus they claim that mental models of space have the effect of breaking down the
scene into significant spatial entities - lines, points, regions, or volumes of space -
associated with the various objects in the scene, and then representing spatial relations
between those entities. In other words, spatial models represent what Garrod and
Sanford call the functional geometry of scenes, that is, the spatial relations by virtue
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of which objects interact with each other. In certain respects this corresponds to the
simple Euclidian geometry, but at the same time it must also capture the
transformational possibilities, the way in which spatial relations may change or remain
stable according to our concept of how the objects in the scene can interact with each
other and we as participant observers can interact with the objects in the scene.
If models underlie the description schemas used in the maze game dialogues, as
Garrod and Anderson claimed, then they should also impose strict constraints on any
description, both in terms of what spatial entities are being talked about and how these
spatial entities might be discriminated from each other within the description. Indeed,
when a pair of conversants adopt some particular model of the maze configuration this
was observed to have the effect of constraining their locative descriptions to the extent
that the 'local' meaning of any expression can only be derived through the model
itself. Such an example would be the sometimes long-winded and bizarre descriptions
resulting from the use of a particular model. With the maze in figure 5.6, for
example, speakers that adopted the path model produced a dialogue to describe point
X thus ;
A : Right, see the bottom left-hand corner.
B : The bottom left.
A : There's a box and then there's a gap.
B : Uh-huh.
A : And there's a box and there's another box.
B : Uh-huh.
A : I'm right here.
Furthermore, it was found that dialogue pairs developed quite specialised description
subschemes based on a single type of model. For example, Garrod and Anderson
found evidence for at least three variants of the basic horizontal line type of model.
Garrod and Sanford argue that analysis of locative descriptions which emerges when
people play the maze game clearly implicates mental models of space in locative
descriptions. Such models, they propose, are not simply perceptual representations but
reflect distinct functional geometries imposed on the maze and come from the players'
joint conception of what they are looking at and interacting with. Such models are
equally important in understanding the use of locative prepositions in more everyday
situations, it is claimed, which leads into a discussion of how these models work for
in, on and at.
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The ideal meanings suggested by Herskovits (1986) are the starting point for Garrod
and Sanford's consideration of spatial prepositions. They begin with the observation
that the ideal meanings provided by Herskovits (1986) do not adequately cover all
cases where use of the prepositions concerned is appropriate. In other words, there is
the claim that the ideal meanings fall down on grounds of case accountability. At the
same time Garrod and Sanford wish to preserve the intuition that in, for example,
expresses some straightforward concept of containment which is either present or
absent in the examples they give. Garrod and Sanford, applying the notions
introduced from the maze games, argue that what is required is a clearer notion of the
functional geometry, in order to elucidate the intuition that the uses of prepositions are
related.
Garrod and Sanford present some examples which they claim are not covered by the
Herskovitsian ideal meaning relevant in each case. If we consider in, to begin with,
four spatial examples are presented which are not adequately dealt with by
Herskovits's ideal meaning for in (reproduced below);
In:inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two-, or three-dimensional
geometric construct.
Three of these cases have been cited earlier in figure 3.1 (p.33, above) in the chapter
discussing classical approaches. These are reproduced below in figure 5.7.
In the first case, the ideal meaning does hold, but in is not the appropriate preposition
to use. In (b) and (c) the ideal meaning does not hold, but the use of in is appropriate.
In fairness to Herskovits (1986), the ideal meaning was not intended to cover all
cases, but serves merely as a prototypical geometric ideal, structuring use types in the
lexicon. Therefore, one may argue that the intuition that all uses of in are related is
preserved in Herskovits's account in the form of the ideal meaning, while specific
cases are covered with the lexicalised use types. Indeed, (c) is covered this way as an
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example of the Accident/object part ofphysical or geometric object use type, (b) is
explicable in terms of the pragmatic factor of tolerance, (a) is the only example which
remains problematic for Herskovits's account as the use type Spatial entity in
container corresponds to the example, but in is still not appropriate. However,
Herskovits (1986, p.77) again provides a pragmatic solution to this problem in the
form of the principle of relevance;
"The [pear] is under, not in the bowl, because in is typically associated with
the bowl functioning as a container. If it is important for the addressee to
know that the bowl is not in a position to function as a container (i.e., if its
function is most relevant), then one must not use a preposition that will
suggest that it does. Note that two facts condition the choice of under: first,
function is important to the addressee; second, in is closely associated with
the bowl's normal function, where the bowl faces upwards."
Thus Garrod and Sanford are incorrect to criticise Herskovits's account in terms of
case accountability. What they should have argued is that one can provide an
alternative ideal meaning for in, for example, which covers more cases without
recourse to representation of use types in the lexicon, or a complex set of pragmatic
principles to bail the ideal meaning and use types out of case accountability
difficulties.
In fact the modifications to the ideal meanings suggested by Garrod and Sanford bear
a close resemblance, not only the the force dynamics of Talmy (1988), but to the
explanation Herskovits provides for the case in figure 5.7(a) (provided above). The
key to finding a common meaning to the types of examples discussed is functional
geometry. For example, one can say that the bulb is in the socket in figure 5.7(c) if
one considers a functional geometric relationship whereby the socket (the controller)
functionally controls the location of the bulb (the controlled object). Thus in signifies
a causal relationship such that a controller functionally contains a controlled/contained
object.
To give another example, one can say that;
The light is on the ceiling.
Here appropriate use can be explained by again evoking the notion of a controller and
a controlled object. In the case of on there is the causal relation of functional support
such that the controller (the ceiling) is functionally supporting the light (the
controlled, supported object). Hence, one can say meaningfully that the light is on the
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ceiling without requiring a different sense of the preposition from cases such as the
table is on the floor.
Garrod and Sanford do not modify the ideal meaning for on provided by Herskovits
(1986) as this already has a geometric component - contiguity - and an interactional
component - support;
On: For a geometric construct X to be contiguous with a line or surface Y. If
Y is the surface of an object Oy, and X is the space occupied by another
object Ox, for Oy to support Ox.
The only caveat they add is that the notion of support is situation-relative.
The Herskovitsian ideal meaning for at, like that for in, does require modification in
the Garrod and Sanford analysis, again simply with the introduction of a functional
component. The modified ideal meaning for at is thus;
At: For a point to functionally coincide with another
This modification covers cases such as;
The pupil at the desk
which expresses more that just a geometric relation. The important point here is the
functional coincidence such that the pupil is interacting with the desk; he is using the
desk. This meaning is not conveyed with the use of the word by or near, which do not
imply such interaction.
To return to the cases cited above in figure 5.7, the following ideal meaning of in
presented by Garrod and Sanford, they propose, covers all these cases;
In: inclusion of a geometric construct in a one-, two- or three-dimensional
functionally controlling space.
Thus in figure 5.7 (b) one does not need to resort to the pragmatic factor of tolerance
to bend or stretch the ideal meaning into a use type as the bowl is functionally
controlling the location of the pear, such that if the bowl moves the pear moves with
it.
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Causal relations are central to the notion of functional geometry and control. This
means that changes in state have a lot to do with our attribution and understanding of
locatives. Furthermore, this undoubtedly leaves the question of the importance of the
involvement of a temporal factor. Inferences about causal relations bear a strong
relationship with time as one may have to distinguish between immediate changes in a
state of affairs and more gradual changes. One may then want to introduce ideas such
as the likelihood of change occurring in situations and the types of changes that may
occur (i.e., qualitative and quantitative change).
Garrod and Sanford argue that one can retain the notion that the meaning of a
preposition are related and still account for the wide range of applications by "taking
such spatial terms as denoting relations within mental models of space which capture
the functional geometry of the scenes being described" (Garrod and Sanford, 1989,
p. 154). Hence, any adequate characterisation of the use of the terms will depend upon
a clear account of the variety of models which can be constructed of any scene and the
way in which the spatial terms can be directly related to the entities or relations within
such models.
According to this account, then, the effective use of a locative involves both the
particular model that is being imposed on the scene and also the appropriateness of the
functional geometric relation expressed by the preposition. These factors are not,
despite their separability, wholly independent in practice. Garrod and Sanford contend
that one of the main advantages of putting models between the language and the
spatial world is to allow for the multiplicity of interpretations that may be imposed on
the same scene.
It is important that the meaning of the preposition remains the same, although
different perspectives on the same scene may or may not affect the attribution of a
preposition. An example Garrod and Sanford give is of a pear suspended from a
frame by a piece of string such that the pear is only just located within the
circumference of the bowl when viewed from above (see figure 5.8(a)). Ordinarily,
Garrod and Sanford contend, one would not say that the pear is in the bowl.
However, if one was playing a game which involved manipulation of the frame such
that one had to place the pear within the circumference of the bowl then one could
meaningfully say that the pear is in the bowl as the imposition of this perspective on
the scene allows the functional containment relation to hold as one has to move the





This is a rather unfortunate example as one may say for figure 5.8(a) that the pear is
hanging in the bowl. Figure 5.8(b) is a better example where one certainly cannot say
that in is appropriate. Perhaps a better example still comes from Stevens and Coventry
(forthcoming). One can imagine the situation where a crane-driver is moving a load so
that it can then be dropped into a container; a foreman down below by the container
shouts up "It's in now!" The position of the load is controlled by that of the container.
The notion of functional geometry, as already has been suggested above, can be
broken down into two components; a purely spatial component and a more general
interactional one. For example, with in the geometric relation is the spatial realisation
of one's object's inclusion within the space of another object and the interactional
state is that the space is being controlled in some sense by the controller. In is seen as
asserting a particular kind of direct control of some controller over appropriate entities
in its control space, with the idea of control space being entirely dependent on the
mental model of the situation adopted. Thus it is not the meaning of in which varies
over situations, but the notion of functional control.
Garrod and Sanford suggest that the notion of functional control may itself suggest a
spatial model. This is an important point. For example, the expression the pear is in
the bowl may suggest a particular relationship whereby the bowl functionally controls
the position of the pear. Similarly, (although Garrod and Sanford do not mention this
possibility) the influence of prevalent or previously highly occurring spatial models
may suggest the attribution of a particular preposition.
One final point about the work of Garrod and Sanford is worthy of mention. Like
Talmy (1988) Garrod and Sanford argue that functional control relations can explain
the use of prepositions in more extended cases, such as;
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John is in a bad mood
Paddy is in good health
These cases can be explained as they both depict states which directly control what a
person can do, and hence the preposition exhibits the control relation content in each
sentence.
5.3.3 Critique of Garrod and Sanford
As we have seen, Garrod and Sanford make two claims. The first is that mental
models are used as interfaces between language and the spatial world. The evidence
presented for this comes initially in the form of a discussion of subject pairs'
performance on the Garrod and Anderson (1987) maze task. The first question we
need to ask is whether this provides evidence for the existence of mental models.
A first criticism involves the maze task cited as evidence for the existence of mental
models. It is relatively obvious that one can talk about the mazes used in different
ways as the task is a novel one. Hence it is a sensible strategy for pairs of conversants
to decide upon a mutual way of seeing and talking about the maze. This was indeed
found to be the case. The fact that subjects developed quite distinct maze descriptions
and reverted to long-winded and sometimes bizarre descriptions merely suggests that
subjects define what they see in such tasks individually (or of course mutually in
pairs) and are reluctant to redefine the terms half-way through the experiment. The
reluctance to change the mode of description doesn't mean that conversants are not
capable of changing their conception of the maze half-way through. Furthermore,
Garrod and Sanford do not say whether or not subjects were given feedback about the
tasks in that feedback may induce changes of strategy. Similarly, it is not specified
how many difficult mazes were given in sequence. One would maybe predict that if a
sequence of difficult mazes were presented, then subjects may change description
schemas quite easily.
If the term mental models is used in the sense just described, then one can view them
as temporary structures in working memory which serve as surrogate representations
between language and the world, and nothing more. Subjects in the task agreed on a
particular way of talking about mazes, and therefore it seems sensible to infer that
such agreed schemas are kept in working memory during the duration of the
communication. Of course, if subjects have difficulty using this temporary schema,
then they can simply switch schema by bringing a new one into working memory,
replacing the old.
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Such models should be viewed in the same way as theories are viewed in science. One
clear example of this comes from Gentner and Gentner (1983). It was found that
subjects used different analogies to understand and reason about problems concerning
resistance and current in simple electrical circuits. The answers to the problems were
found to be different depending on the analogies that were used by the students. The
difference here is that in the Gentner and Gentner task subjects did not have an
alternative schema to bring to bear in the task, and therefore exhibited systematic
errors. Additionally, there was no feedback given to let subjects know when they had
given the wrong solution to a problem. This illustrates that a different perspective, or
model adopted on a problem or situation leads to a different answer to the problem.
What needs to be done is to examine just what different models are.
Garrod and Sanford (1989) do not clearly specify what role mental models play in
relation to spatial prepositions and spatial scenes. They state that spatial terms denote
relations within mental models of space which capture the functional geometry of the
scenes being described. The implication here is that the spatial preposition is applied
according to the representation given in figure 5.9 (below).
Figure 5.9
Mental Models
This diagram is similar to that presented in figure 1.1 (chapter one, p. 4), with the
addition that language use relates to the middle layer of mental models, rather than
directly to the world. If we take the encoding problem, we have a spatial scene in the
world from which a variety of mental models can be derived (denoted by the bold
arrows). The appropriatness or not of the spatial preposition is then dependent on the
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appropriate mental model adopted. With the decoding problem, the language itself can
suggest a particular model of a scene. The mental model constructed can then be
imposed on an actual given scene in the world, at which point the visual scene in the
world can be said to be a valid, or invalid, visual representation of the language used.
We can take an example as further illustration of our interpretation of Garrod and
Sanford's claim. The situation involving the crane-driver and foreman depicted above
can be put into this framework. If we consider the scene in figure 5.10, one can ask if
the sentence the crate is in the skip appropriately describes the spatial relations
concerned.
Figure 5.10
There is no doubt that it does not. This, according to this account, entails that no
model can be constructed, based on the information given, in which the meaning of
the preposition holds. However, given further information relating to the achievement
of a goal, a different mental model of the situation may provide an appropriate
mapping relation for the preposition, in this case an extended notion of functional
containment. The issue remains as to how such a model is constructed to make this
possible (assuming that in is appropriate to language users in even the contextual case;
we indeed show that this is the case in the following chapter).
If we take mental models as meaning what we have described above, then they appear
to be a useful and necessary interface between language and the spatial world.
However, what has been described thus far is purely descriptive; Garrod and Sanford
do not explain how mental models are constructed, or how prepositional meaning is to
be mapped onto such representations. We must consider the ideal meanings provided
to get a handle on these problems, and hence we will now consider their second
claim.
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Turning to the modified ideal meanings analysis provided by Garrod and Sanford, an
important question to address is whether it actually deals more adequately with case
accountability than other theories which we have considered. One can question that
this is the case. If we consider the example cited in figure 5.7(a). Garrod and Sanford
suggest that if the bowl is moved that the pear will not move with it, and therefore in
is not appropriate. This is not necessarily the case. The pear may well move with the
bowl if the bowl was pushed, remaining in contact with the surface on which it rests.




In (a) the pear is glued to the bowl, and thus when the bowl moves the pear will move
with it. According to the Garrod and Sanford analysis in should then be appropriate as
the bowl is controlling the location of the pear. However, in this case the use of under
is more appropriate, rather than the use of in. In (b) the pear is part of the edge of the
bowl, in the same way that a crack is in the bowl. Again the pear will move with the
bowl if the bowl moves, but use of in is not appropriate.
Cases of transitivity provide another problem for the Garrod and Sanford analysis,
only this time with the case of on. We can refer back to the example we gave in
figure 3.4 (reproduced below in figure 5.12).
If one moves the table in (a), (b) and (c) the book, lid and lid respectively will move
with the table. If one has to assign a degree of probability as to which of the figures
will fall off the table if the table is moved, then the position of the figures in (a) and
(c) is more precarious. Therefore, one would expect that on should be more
appropriate in case (b) than in (a) or (c).
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Figure 5.12
(a) The dictionary is on the table
(b) *The lid is on the table






One way round these problems is to argue that the mental model in each case would
be different. In the case of (b), somehow in the model the fact that the lid is being
functionally controlled immediately by the jar may be represented. However, this
does not make much sense as this is also true for (a) and (c). Another option is to
argue that a stronger functional relation in present in (b) as compared with (a) and (c).
The lid in (b) is wrapped round the jar, whereas the relation of support, a weaker
relation, is present in (a) and (c). Following from this, one can argue that on may be
used transitively in relation to a figure and ground unless there is a stronger functional
relation present between the figure and another potential reference object. One can see
in figure 5.13 that this explanation is still not adequate. The lid in 5.13(b) is wrapped
Figure 5.13
round the brick in exactly the same way that the lid is in 5.13(a). Use of the lid is on
the table in (b) is still felicitous, thus rendering this explanation inadequate.
The examples which we have cited are counterexamples to the following claims,
which are explicit in the Garrod and Sanford account;
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(1) A figure is said to be in a ground if the ground functionally contains the
figure, such that if the ground moves there is (or will be) contiguity of
movement of figure with ground.
(2) A figure is said to be on a ground if the ground functionally supports the
figure, such that if the ground moves there is (or will be) contiguity of
movement of figure with ground.
The examples we have discussed are also counterexamples to an explanation residing
in force dynamics, which would rely on forces in opposition, with the container and
supporting surface supplying the greatest force.
The examples have demonstrated that notions of functionality are not enough to tackle
case accountability. However, Garrod and Sanford, as we have seen, argue that there
is a geometric meaning to in, on and at as well. Therefore, it could be that with cases
where (1) and (2) do not hold, that the geometry is the reason for appropriate use.
This cannot solve the problems with transitive uses of on. The geometric criterion of
(direct) support is flouted in each case, which only leaves the functional control
component left. Similarly, figure 5.11(a) illustrates a case where both the criteria of
containment and functional control are met, but in is still inappropriate.
More problems exist for Garrod and Sanford with their treatment of at as functional
coincidence. Here the geometric and functional components are together in the ideal
meaning, just as they are for the ideal meanings of in and on. The problem is that the
functional component often is not apparent with use of at. If we consider the
following;
The snail is at the stone
The man is at the piano
then it is clear that there is a functional component with the second sentence such that
the man is playing the piano (usually), but no such inference is apparent with the first
sentence. In fact it is difficult to discern any kind of functional component for the
snail is at the stone. Instead this relation seems to be purely geometric, where the
snail is near or by the stone. The fact that by or near cannot be substituted in the first
sentence without a clear loss of information provides some support for this.
We are faced with two choices for at. We can recognise two different senses of at,
one which has a functional component and one which does not. Alternatively we can
stick with the ideal meaning provided by Garrod and Sanford and argue that some
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uses of at realise the functional component and some do not dependent on the mental
model of the situation. In the next chapter we provide evidence to suggest that the
first interpretation is the correct one.
Clearly, then, it appears that Garrod and Sanford's analysis still has problems on
grounds of case accountability. In the next section we will address these problems
directly, offering a possible solution. However, Garrod and Sanford (directly) and
Talmy (indirectly), provide ample evidence to suggest that spatial prepositions cannot
be defined solely in terms of geometric relations.
To end this section we can mention some other problems with the Garrod and Sanford
analysis. The approach is based on;
"the intuition that in [for example] expresses some straightforward concept of
containment which is either present or absent in these various examples."
(Garrod and Sanford, 1989, pp. 153-154).
In the last chapter we discussed at length the problems with this kind of evidence and
drew a tie between prototype effects and this kind of introspective observation. In this
case, we can question even the observation. As with all our examples cited in this
thesis, we checked introspective claims against a sample of at least five subjects on
each occasion. In this case not all subjects, when asked what they thought in meant,
came up with this intuition. The majority initially came up with examples involving
containment, but, after a few seconds (and a few examples later) decided that the
concept was not so straightforward. It should be obvious by now that to distinguish
between senses and occurrences of a lexeme, we need a more reliable method. We
also wish to explain where the kind of intuition Garrod and Sanford refer to comes
from.
A final problem, with the Garrod and Sanford analysis is that the functional control
analysis does not, contrary to their claims, explain prepositional usage in more
extended cases. As this is a peripheral issue here, the interested reader should consult
Coventry and Ludwig (1991) for discussion of this point.
5.4 Functional Relations Revisited
Functional relations, in the sense used by Garrod and Sanford (1989) and Michotte
(1963; see chapter one for a discussion), involve how objects interact with each other
over time, and place spatial language in a world where speakers interact with objects,
and objects interact with other objects. This approach highlights dynamics in a world
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of action, and is removed from the static 'time-slice' prepositional analyses involving
abstract geometric relations discussed in previous chapters. However, Garrod and
Sanford miss one element of functional relations which Michotte (1963) emphasised,
and is illustrated with the following quotation;
"It is by coming to know what things do that we learn what they are. What
they are for is much more than their shape, their size, and their colour; it is
above all what they are capable of doing, or what can be done with them."
(Michotte, 1963.)
It is this sense of functionalism, what Sober (1991) calls teleological functionalism,
that we can consider to be the most important. For example, the heart is best defined
in terms of its function - to pump blood around the body. Similarly, (to regurgitate an
example from chapter one), the function of a glass is to contain things, namely liquids
(as opposed to gases or solids). This relates to another function of a glass, which is to
drink out of, which again relates to the function of ingestion (which is necessary for
survival).
The inference we wish to make here is that functional relations between objects are
dependent on the functions that the objects have. Following from this we can view in
for example as relating to the function of the ground. We propose that an figure can
be said to be in a ground if the ground is fullfilling its function. That is, the purpose
of a container is to control the location of objects it contains. If it does this
successfully, then it is a good example of a container. Furthermore, containers may
have specific functions; that is, their purpose may be to contain specific types of
objects. This does not mean to say that a container can be said to only contain certain
types of objects, but simply that containers can (and do) have specific functions.
Labov (1972; cited in Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976) provides direct evidence for
these claims with his study of containers (examples of which are presented in figure
5.14 (below).
The first part of his study demonstrated that the labelling of containers is not all-or-
none. There are cases of containers which can be labelled either a vase or a bowl, for
example. However, when the ratio of width to height is about 1:1, people use cup;
when the width is much greater than the height, they use bowl; when the height is
much greater than the width, they use vase. The proportion of judgements in each
category varied as a function of the height: width ratio, with cup and bowl being
about equally probable when the ratio was 1:2, and cup and vase being about equally
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Figure 5.14 Examples of Containers Used By Labov (1972)
probable when the ratio was 2.5:1. The 'best' cups in the series were around 1:1 to
1.2:1, which are presumably closest to the prototypical cup. In the second part of the
study, Labov asked his judges to imagine that the same pictures they had labelled in a
neutral context were now used in various ways. For example, they were asked to
imagine they saw someone holding the object, stirring in sugar with a spoon, and
drinking coffee from it. Or they might be asked to imagine that it was on the dinner
table filled with mashed potatoes, or sitting in a shelf with cut flowers in it. Labov
reports that imaginary contexts (in addition to the presence or absence of a handle)
had strong effects on category boundaries. Imagining that a container was functioning
as a vase significantly increased the probability that it would be labeled vase. What an
object is used for has measurable effects on what peopie are likely to call it. Hence
this study provides evidence that information about function helps separate out one
container from another.
A second example to support our analysis is provided in figure 5.15.
109
Figure 5.15
Here one would not say the box of chocolates is in the table although the conditions of
containment and functional control are met. This information appears to be secondary
to the fact that the function of table is to support objects, and therefore on is the
appropriate preposition to use. This is also evidence against the hypothesis that one
will use the strongest control relation preposition whenever possible in preference to
weaker control relation prepositions.
To return to our proposed definition for in, several factors follow naturally from this
ideal meaning. Of most importance is the fact that the functional control relations
follow naturally from this sense of functionality we are espousing. Contiguity of
movement is a clear demonstration that a container is fulfilling its function. Similarly,
geometric relations fall out of this analysis too. If we consider the scenes in figure
5.16, then we see that the use of in is appropriate in (a) and (c) but not in (b). The
black ball is geometrically in the same position in each scene, but the use of in is
clearly infringed in (b). In (a) the bowl is fulfilling its function in the sense that
Garrod and Sanford describe. If one was to move the bowl, then the black ball would
move with it. In (c) the black ball is outside an imaginary extended control space for
the bowl. However, use of in is still felicitous under normal circumstances.
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The above examples demonstrate that geometry falls out of the sphere of functional
control that a container can be said to have. In (b) above the black ball is not in
contact via other balls in order to suggest that the bowl is fullfilling its function. In (c)
this possible position of the ball again is dependent on the assumption that the bowl is
fullfilling its function. Hence, geometric relations associated with in are dependent on
the criteria that are adopted to demonstrate that the container is fullfilling its function.
The kind of account we are introducing here is perfectly compatible with the
experientialism of cognitive linguistic accounts, and with prototype effects. Before we
develop this analysis any further, we will test some of the claims that have been made
thus far. We therefore move to consider sense delineation in light of the present
discussion using a variety of experimental paradigms.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Evidence for Functional Relations and Minimal Specification
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we involve ourselves with empirical investigation of some of the claims
that were made in the last chapter, which suggested the validity of the claim that a
minimally specified account of the lexical entries for spatial prepositions based on the
recognition of the importance of functional relations is preferable to fully specified
lexical entries based on geometric relations. However, the acid test of this analysis
lies in correct predictions concerning the use of the prepositions being considered. In
other words, we wish to be able to solve the encoding and decoding problems to a
satisfactory degree.
This chapter presents some experimental evidence which, it will be demonstrated,
supports the introduction of functional relations into the lexical semantics for spatial
prepositions. Furthermore, the evidence presented, it is argued, is consistent with a
minimally specified approach to the semantics of spatial prepositions.
6.2 Experiment One
6.2.1 Rationale
In previous chapters we have argued for a distinction between occurrences and senses
of a prepositional lexeme, and we have suggested that we need to find a way in which
to reliably delineate senses. Previous accounts have been criticised for their lack of
ability to do precisely that, and this was (following Crangle and Suppes, 1989) related
to the lack of focus on the relationship between language and the spatial world.
Thus far we have considered two possible methods with which to separate out senses.
The first one relies on the identity tests for ambiguity introduced in chapter one. It
was claimed that ambiguity tests are unreliable and ill-motivated, and that we should
find a better method/set of methods. The other method, proposed by Herskovits
(1986), postulated that a spatial preposition will correspond to two different senses if
some distinction is generally important to a language user. Taking each of these
methods in turn, we can consider ambiguity tests first.
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It was argued in chapter one that ambiguity tests are ill-motivated in that they take a
syntactic phenomenon, namely the fact that constituents of two different kinds cannot
be coordinated, and apply them to polysemy. The examples of the test in action,
(Zwicky and Sadock, 1975; Cruse, 1986) and working with seeming success, have
largely dealt with homonymy. Here we provide evidence that identity tests do not
work as methods of sense delineation.
6.2.2 Introduction
If we consider the use types of Herskovits (1986), which (as we have seen) are akin to
senses, one can predict that sentences involving coordination of nouns selecting two
different use types will be treated as unacceptable, whereas two nouns selecting the
same sense of the preposition should be treated as acceptable. We can consider
examples of this with two use types of in and at (Herskovits, 1986);
At Use Type: Physical entity at location
Example: The cat is at the piano(i.e., the cat is beside/near the piano).
At Use Type: Person using artifact
Example: The man is at the piano (i.e., the man is playing the piano).
In Use Type: Spatial entity in container
Example: Hie flowers are in the vase (i.e., the flowers are contained in the
interior of the vase).
In Use Type: Gap/object "embedded" in physical object
Example: The crack is in the vase (i.e., the crack is part of the vase).
If these use types are indeed separate senses, then, one would expect that the
following (zeugmas) are unacceptable;
The flowers and crack are in the vase.
The man and cat are at the piano.
This experiment was designed to test acceptability of this type of coordination, namely
zeugma. It was hypothesised that, if this kind of identity test works, then sentences
cojoining nouns selecting the same use type of the preposition should be viewed as
acceptable, whereas conjoined nouns which separate two different senses of the
preposition should be viewed as unacceptable.
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6.2.3 Subjects
Subjects were ten native English speakers. All subjects were male.
6.2.4 Materials and Method
Nine sentences were presented to each subject (within subjects design). Five of the
sentences involved coordination of nouns selecting the same sense of the preposition,
and four involved nouns selecting two different senses of the preposition. These are
displayed in table 6.1.
Table 6.1
In At
The flowers and water are in the vase. The teacher and pupil .are at the piano.
Same sense The crack and nail are in the vase. The secretary and typist are at the typewriter
The flowers and lead are in the vase.
Different sense
The crack arid flowers are in the vase.
Thecrackaridleadareinthevase.
Theman and cat are at the piano.
The woman and cat are at the typewriter.
Sentences were presented individually with a Lickert scale from 1 to 7, where 1 =
completely unacceptable, and 7 = completely acceptable. Subjects were provided
with the following written instructions;
"Please score the following sentences in terms of acceptability (on the
scales provided), where 1 — completely unacceptable and 7 =
completely acceptable".
After completion of the test, each subject was interviewed in order to test
understanding of the sentences, and to get an idea of the criteria used to judge
acceptability by each subject.
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6.2.5 Results
Mean acceptability ratings for each sentence are reported in table 6.2.
Table 6.2
Sentence Mean Rating Standard Deviation
The flowers and water are in the vase 65 Q 71
The crack and nail are in the vase 1.7 G 82
The flowers and lead are in the vase 1.6 o.9i
The crack and flowers are in the vase 1.0 0
The crack and lead are in the vase 1.2 Q 42
The teacher and pupil are at the piano 7.0 0
The secretary and typist are at the type¬
writer
67 Q 48
The man arid cat are at the piano 61 Q 51
The woman arid cat are at the typewriter 3.4 1.51
Thus the ordering of acceptability from most acceptable to least acceptable is as
follows;
(1) The teacher and pupil are at the piano (same sense)
(2) The secretary and typist are at the typewriter (same sense)
(3) The flowers and water are in the vase (same sense)
(4) The man and cat are at the piano (different sense)
(5) The woman and cat are at the typewriter (different sense)
(6) The crack and nail are in the vase (same sense)
(7) The flowers and lead are in the vase (same sense)
(8) The crack and lead are in the vase (different sense)
(9) The crack and flowers are in the vase (different sense)
The gaps between (4) and (5) and similarly between (5) and (6) represent the fact that
the top four and bottom four mean acceptability ratings are almost identical (i.e., they
cluster together), with the mean rating for sentence five in the middle.
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The ratings for (6) and (7) reflect low acceptability ratings almost identical with those
for (8) and (9). Notice also that (4) and (5) are rated higher than (6) and (7).
The acceptability rating mean scores comparing (5) and (6) are significantly different
at the p<0.01 level (two-tailed t-test, df=9, t=3.04).
Comparing the acceptability ratings of (4) and (5), there is also a significant
difference at the p<0.001 level (two-tailed t-test, df=9, t=5.45).
On questioning after completion of the task, subjects made comments which can be
grouped into two classes. Firstly, all subjects commented that the reason they gave
sentences (6), (7), (8) and (9) low ratings was because "the objects don't go
together". In other words, subjects reported giving sentences a low rating if the
figures concerned were conceptually incompatible in relation to the ground. Secondly,
sentences (4) and (5) were interpreted in three different ways by subjects. Four of the
subjects treated sentence four as selecting the same sense such that the cat and the man
are playing the piano. Four of the subjects took the interpretation that the cat and man
are positioned beside the piano, and thus selected a different same sense from the first
group. The remaining two subjects thought that the man was playing the piano with
the cat beside him.
6.2.6 Discussion
The ordering of acceptability ratings observed strongly suggests that the criteria used
by subjects to judge acceptability of the sentences concerned reflect more that mere
sense selection. In particular, acceptability judgements of in appear to be effected by
the nature of the objects which do not go together. For instance, the crack is in the
vase and the nail is in the vase correspond to the same sense (at least in Herskovits's
account), but a crack and a nail seem conceptually very different, and thus lead to low
acceptability judgements, akin to those where two different senses are selected.
There are problems choosing examples with the case of at. The problem is that the
man and cat are at the piano allows the use of the same sense. Some subjects reported
the interpretation that both the man and the cat are playing the piano, and some
reported that both were beside the piano, hence suggesting that there are two senses
for at involved here.
However, with the sentences involving in there was a different pattern. Degree of
acceptability is not a direct reflection of ambiguity. It was found that the flowers and
lead are in the vase was as unacceptable as the crack and flowers are in the vase.
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Similarly, the crack and nail are in the vase was as unacceptable as the crack and
flowers are in the vase. The evidence provided thus presents concern as to the
viability of zeugma as a successful test of sense delineation.
Another possible explanation for the finding could be that Herskovitsian use types do
not in fact represent different senses at all. This is an explanation we will pursue with
experiment two. Nevertheless, with the flowers and lead are in the vase the flowers
and lead clearly represent the same sense of in in that both are contained interior to
the vase. A low acceptability rating is still apparent in this case. Clearly, then, the
acceptability ratings cannot be explained in terms of problems solely with
Herskovitsian use types.
One last point worthy of mention reflects the graded nature of acceptability ratings.
Acceptability is not all-or-none. The findings we have yielded are similar in this
respect to other work which has found grammaticality to be a matter of degree (e.g.,
Berry, 1975; Givon, 1979; Kuno, 1987). For example, Langacker (1982) argued that
the sentences below fall on a cline of increasing felicity;
*A bicycle is wanted by me.
*?That bicycle is wanted by me.
??That bicycle is wanted by my son.
?That bicycle is very definitely wanted by my son.
That bicycle is very definitely wanted by every young boy.
One further point concerns the reasons for the acceptability judgements. In other
words one can ask if the judgements arise as a result of semantic ill-formedness (as
identity tests suggest) or pragmatic ill-formedness. As Quirk et al (1985, p. 16)
comments;
"The borderline between between grammar and semantics is unclear, and
linguists will draw the line variously...Similarly, the borderline between
grammar and pragmatics (and even more so between semantics and
pragmatics) is unclear."
Indeed the evidence of the present study suggests the irradication of the division
between semantics and pragmatics in cognitive linguistic accounts (e.g., Langacker,
1988) is a valid one.
It can be concluded that zeugma does not provide an adequate method of sense
delineation as it cannot separate out failures which may result from two different
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senses of the lexeme of interest being selected, and failures which result from
processing involving conceptual incompatibility/conflict between the objects and
functional relations concerned. (We develop this line of explanation at the end of the
present chapter). Thus we follow Cruse (1986) in the characterisation of lexical
ambiguity as those ambiguities for which there are no convincing non-lexical
explanations. We have found that an explanation residing in conceptual
incompatibility and functional relations may be more parsimonious. It follows that
one can question the validity of ambiguity tests in general as methods of sense
delineation as zeugma is considered to be one of the most reliable tests. We therefore
have to turn to the second method of sense delineation.
6.3 Experiment Two
6.3.1 Rationale
The first experiment has demonstrated that there are serious problems with the first
method of sense delineation proposed, which forces us to seek more adequate
methods. However, the results of the first experiment have themselves provided some
clues to a more effective methodology. It was noted that some of the difficulties with
ambiguity tests reside in the lack of information about the spatial relations involved
(the case of the man and cat are at the piano). This suggests that visual scenes should
perhaps be provided to pair spatial language with the spatial world, thus facilitating an
understanding of what the spatial language should refer to. We also wished to exploit
the importance of the situation in grasping a sense of a phrase. Johnson-Laird (1987,
p. 190) makes a similar point;
"Determining reference usually depends on knowledge of the situation,
knowledge of the speaker, knowledge of the conventions governing
discourse, and the ability to make inferences".
With this point in the background we can consider the second method of sense
delineation that was proposed earlier.
The second method we proposed, that of Herskovits (1986), has been given a possible
realisation in the last chapter. We suggested that there may be motivation for
providing a distinction between a sense of at, which involves a functional coincidence
relation and a sense which involves a purely geometric relation. This is in contrast to
in and on which always involve a functional component as the geometric position of
figure in relation to ground is always dependent on the container and supporting
surface (respectively) fulfilling their function. Thus we are hypothesising that there is
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motivation in terms of distinctions language users may make (functional versus non¬
functional cases) which are reflected in two senses for at, but only one sense for in
and on.
6.3.2 Introduction
The aim of the present study is to examine the attribution of locative prepositions
within sentences paired with visual scenes. The purpose is to examine the effects of
the use of one preposition on the use of subsequent prepositions. In other words, the
study is an observational one designed to tap for co-occurrence relations. At the same
time, we wish to test the hypothesis that a preposition can be said to have two senses
if there is a distinction between a functional sense and a purely geometric sense.
Specifically, the study again deals with the use of the three prepositions that have been
extensively studied by Annette Herskovits (1986). Herskovits describes and maps out
the different uses of the prepositions in, at and on.
More specifically the study concentrates on two use types for each preposition.
The following are proposed as two distinct use types for in, on and at ;
In: "Spatial entity in container" versus "gap/object 'embedded' in physical object".
With the "spatial entity in container" use type the three-dimensional reference object
has an interior, in which the located object, also three-dimensional, is fully or
partially contained. Examples of this are the flowers in the vase and the man in the
chair. With the second use type, the located object is included in the normalised
region defined by the reference object, that is, in the part of space its shape would
occupy prior to penetration. Examples of this are the nail in the chair and the crack in
the bowl.
On: "Spatial entity supported by physical object" versus "accident/object as part of
physical object".
An example of the former is the ball is on the foot and an example of the later is the
lines are on the forehead.
At: "Person using artifact" versus "spatial entity at location".
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An example of the former is the woman is at the typewriter. An example of the latter
is the has is at the church.
Another way of cataloguing the use and meaning of prepositions, as we have seen, is
in terms of functional control relations (Garrod and Sanford, 1989). In each of the
above examples, one can view one of the use types as exhibiting a stronger control
relation than with the other type. For example, one can contrast the case of the
flowers are in the vase and the crack is in the vase in terms of strength of control
relation. The former is a weaker control relation as the flowers can fall out of the vase
if the vase was tilted over 90 degrees. By contrast, the crack is not susceptible to such
manipulation.
Garrod and Sanford, as we saw in the last chapter, point to two parts of the meaning
of prepositions. One is the geometric relation highlighted by Herskovits. The other is
a stronger notion of functional control, which highlights how objects interact with
each other. We are keen to keep this distinction in mind in the present study. Indeed,
as well as using the distinctions for the purpose of the design of materials to help tap
co-occurrence relations, there is the possibility of relating actual use of the
prepositions concerned to the theoretical underpinnings of Herskovits, Garrod and
Sanford, and others. This point is worthy of discussion.
Herskovits maintains that her formulation of the encoding/decoding problems sidestep
some problems of psychological validity; it makes no reference to psychological
processes. For Herskovits, all that is required is that situations and expressions be
appropriately paired. Therefore the analysis of decoding and encoding adopted should
be viewed more as paving the way for designing algorithms that would behave like
language users, assuming such algorithms possible, rather than tapping the
psychological processes directly at this stage.
It is our view that it is impossible, nor even preferable, to separate the issues of
decoding and encoding from the psychological processes involved in the use and
understanding of locative expressions. If we take the encoding question, for example,
it is a difficult issue to assess how one would evaluate whether or not a locative
expression has been used appropriately in a particular situation. The issue of
appropriate use relates completely to the situation at hand.
We do not wish at this point to get into a discussion of the relationship between
processing and linguistic accounts of prepositions, as these have been discussed in
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chapter four. This will be picked up again at the end of the present chapter. Let us
now discuss the materials of interest.
The materials of interest here are sentences with blanks which are paired with
pictures. The blank is where a preposition can be added, although verbal modification
and longer phrases are still candidates for addition. Sentences are presented with a
picture. The effect of interest is to monitor the pairing of two simple sentences with
two simple pictures versus one complex picture (the simple pictures combined) with
the sentences presented together. This is of interest with respects to whether people
switch preposition (where possible) in the complex picture as a consequence of the
same preposition being used in two different ways (use types). An example will make
this clearer.
If we consider the pictures in figure 6.1, one can compare the fill-ins given in the
simple and complex conditions, where (a) and (b) are simple conditions and (c) is the
complex (a concatenation of the simple conditions).
Figure 6.1
»> 'W ■» H
s ©
The flowers ire the vase. yfj,. Ls the vase.
In picture (a), in can be used as a fill-in, where in is an example of the spatial entity
in container use type. In (b), use of in is also appropriate, this time as an example of
the gap/object 'embedded' in physical object use type. In (c), both use type relations
are depicted in the visual scene, but, if the use types are different senses, then one
may predict that in will not be used in both sentences. Instead one may predict that
subjects may use an alternative preposition for one of the sentences. That is, of
course, dependent on the claim that the two use types of in are different senses (a
claim which Herskovits (1986) does make; she uses identity tests to provide evidence
that use types are distinct senses).
The question for investigation can be phrased as follows ; does the use of one
preposition have any effect on the use of other prepositions? This can still be retined
further as; does the use of a preposition used with a specific use type effect the
subsequent use of the same preposition with a different use type?
The Qowcrs ax the rzx.
The crack is the vase.
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From the discussion in the previous chapter one can hypothesise that subjects will be
more likely to switch preposition in the case of at where two different use types are
involved as they represent a distinction between a geometric and a functional
component, whereas, subjects will be less likely to switch preposition with in and on
as both use types involves a functional component (and, it will be argued later, these
use types are not different senses of a lexeme, but different occurrences).
6.3.3 Materials
For in and at four sets of pictures and sentences were used. For on five sets were
used. Each set consisted of two simple pictures each with one sentence underneath,
and one complex picture (the simple pictures combined) with both sentences
underneath (of the form presented in figure 6.1 above). All materials are in appendix
1.
Two questionnaires were used consisting of simple pictures with one sentence and
complex pictures with two sentences. Corresponding complex and simple pictures and
sentences were not issued in the same questionnaire to avoid transfer of answers
(memory effects). Consequently several weeks were left before the issue of the second
questionnaire to subjects. The individual items were spaced out as far as was possible
using a stratified random sampling technique to avoid transfer between sentences
involving the same prepositions. A pilot study was conducted to assess whether such
transfers were liable to take place (5 subjects). No obvious transfers were observed
(assessed by frequency of use in relation to possibilities for use).
The order of presentation of scenes is displayed in appendix 2.
A further manipulation was the control of order of presentation of the sentences
presented with the complex pictures. This was counterbalanced for strength of
control.
6.3.4 Subjects
120 adult subjects were used. The subjects were split into two groups with one group
receiving the strong control items first, and the other receiving the weak control items
first (that is, in the complex condition). All subjects received the same simple items.
A counterbalanced design was used such that half of each group received
questionnaire one first, and half received questionnaire two first.
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6.3.5 Procedure
Subjects were given a first questionnaire with the following instructions;
"Below are pictures with either one or two incomplete sentences underneath.
What you have to do is to simply look at each picture and imagine that you
are describing the picture to someone else. Then fill in each blank so that
each sentence matches the picture. Don't spend too much time on each
picture. What is important is your immediate reaction (there are no right
answers!), just as if you were describing each scene to someone over the
telephone."
After a period of several weeks the second questionnaire was administered with the
same instructions.
6.3.6 Results
All 120 subjects fully completed both questionnaires. No subjects reported direct
awareness of the similarity in materials with the questionnaires, such that subjects did
not (unless unconsciously) remember their answers from the previous questionnaire
and copy them in the second questionnaire.
The frequencies of fill-ins using the prepositions of interest were compared between
the strong and weak groups (i.e., order of presentation of use type with the complex
pictures). No significant differences were found (2-tailed independent t-test) either
with the completions for the simple or complex items (single sentences versus paired
sentences).
As no differences were found due to order of presentation of the sentences in the
complex condition, the rest of the between subjects analysis deals with pooled data.
Overall the responses of the sentences in the simple condition were compared with the
equivalent sentences in the complex condition. With all the items, no significant
difference was found (related two-tailed t-test, t value=0.353, two-tailed, p< 0.73).
When comparing the three prepositions individually (by materials), the following
results were found ;
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(comparison of each sentence completion rates pooled in simple versus complex
condition);
On, Total (all items); t value (two-tailed) = -0.722, probability < 0.49
(nonsignificant).
On, weak ; t value (two-tailed) 0.61, probability < 0.58 (nonsignificant)
On, strong ; t value (two-tailed) 0.372, probability < 0.73 (nonsignificant)
In, Total (all items) ; t value (two-tailed) = -3.62, probability < 0.72
(nonsignificant)
In, weak ; t value (two-tailed) = 0.111, probability < 0.9185 (nonsignificant)
In, strong ; t value (two-tailed) = -0.551, probability < 0.62 (nonsignificant)
At, Total (all items) ; t value (two-tailed) = 1.888, probability < 0.1 (nonsignificant)
At, weak ; t value (two-tailed) = 13175, probability < 0.0009 (significant)
At, strong ; t value (two-tailed) = -02.224, probability < 0.1126 (nonsignificant)
The number of different types of fill-ins for each of the sentences was recorded.
Overall there were significantly (comparison of means) more different types of
responses to the sentences involving at than with in and on. This was confirmed by a
sample of independent raters who found significantly more overall possibilities for at
than in and on. However, an examination of individual materials revealed that no
significant difference was found with all of the at materials. Indeed some of the in
and on materials were observed to have fewer possibilities than some of the at
materials.
Finally, all of the subjects (100%) who used at in the complex materials in the strong
control sentence switched preposition in the weak control sentence.
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6.3.7 Discussion
It can be argued that no obvious transfers occurred across items or questionnaires.
This was controlled as far as it is possible to do so. However, some comments can be
made about the nature of the materials.
No differences were found between the subjects who were given strong items first
versus whose who were given weak items first in the complex condition. This may be
due to the fact that both sentences were presented together, and consequently subjects
may have read both sentences before completion. This may have obscured an effect
future studies should be designed to tap more carefully.
The actual pictures used can be refined further to elicit the desired use of preposition
in the simple conditions. Some of the pictures left open a large number of responses
which may have obscured effects of interest. Another option would be to fix the use
of the preposition in the first sentence initially and simply monitor response (or
reaction time/error rate) to the second sentence.
Despite the problems briefly mentioned above, the study has yielded some useful
findings. There is strong evidence to suggest that with on and in subjects stick to the
same preposition in the complex condition (across both sentences, that is) . This may
be related to the dialogue maze tasks studied by Garrod and Anderson (1987). They
found that people tend to settle on description schemas when talking about directions
in the maze games. Although the tasks described are dealing with dialogue, one can
argue that a similar process is happening with the use of prepositions in this study. If
a preposition appears to be appropriate to describe two situations it is not necessary to
switch preposition. This is much the same as subject pairs agreeing on a suitable
description schema and continuing its use. If is working well, there is no reason to
switch schema.
In contrast to in and on, however, there is a clear difference with the case of at in
which there is a highly significant switch of preposition in the weak control sentence
in the complex condition. This cannot be explained in terms of a greater selection of
alternatives (greater number) with the at pictures and sentences than with the in and
on materials. Firstly, some of the in and on materials had a comparable (or greater)
number of options than some of the at materials and still subjects stuck to the same
use of preposition with in and on and switched with at. Secondly, even if the number
of choices available was a factor, this cannot explain why the change of preposition
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always occurred with the weak control relation irrespective of order of presentation.
Indeed we believe that there is a motivated reason for this effect.
The use types chosen for at exhibit a clear difference in the control relation. The
strong control relation is a strong functional control relation highlighting interaction
between the person in each case and the respective object. Hence, saying that a man is
at the piano is tantamount to saying that he is playing the piano. This suggestion is
strengthened by the large number of subjects who actually used a verb (e.g., playing)
in this case. With the weak condition, 110 such claims can be made. Hence, it would
appear necessary to switch preposition as two clearly different uses for at are being
demonstrated.
This explanation leads us from a discussion of the use of prepositions to a discussion
of the meaning of prepositions. One could argue that the present finding is simply one
of processing, and has nothing to do with meaning, and the theories which purport to
address these issues. However, if subjects are most keen to recognise a difference
between two use types versus two other use types, or alternatively differentiate
between different types of control relation (simple geometric relations versus strong
control) and not other gradings of control relations, when should this not be reflected
in theories which deal with meaning and the lexical representation of meaning ?
Herskovits, although trying to avoid psychological issues, makes some implicit claims
about representation, and the processing and use of prepositions. The meaning of a
preposition is the ideal meaning, but the ideal meaning can be conventionally
exploited in different ways, which must be recorded in the lexicon. When it comes to
the discussion of encoding and decoding by Herskovits after having outlined the
description of uses, problems start to appear. To give an example, Herskovits talks
about selection of the appropriate use type in decoding. She gives the case of the nail
in the hoard. She states;
"after having selected the appropriate use type [(plucked from the lexicon)]
which is gap/object 'embedded' in physical object, what we know about the
use of nails, about the properties of wood, and how a nail is inserted into it,
make some interpretations of the use type very unlikely."
We propose an alteration of Herskovits's theory which can encompass the difference
in use types discussed, without relying on explicit representation in the lexicon. The
important distinction in use type with at must surely be a candidate for lexical
representation, and this is perhaps reflected in the encoding observed by subjects.
However, the distinction between many of the use types, such as between the ones
considered here for in and on are lesser candidates for explicit lexical representation
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as they can be derived from the same information about use of objects, properties,
etc, that Herskovits deems necessary for deployment anyway. This line of reasoning is
a starting point for a detailed analysis of in, on, at, over, under, above and below in
chapter eight.
What we have essentially done in this study is to argue for a pruning-down of the use
types of Herskovits based on the method of sense delineation suggested by Herskovits
herself. It was proposed that a lexeme can be said to have two distinct senses if there
is a distinction which language users regard as important. In this study we have
provided evidence for such a distinction.
6.4 Experiment Three
6.4.1 Introduction
This experiment is a replication of experiment two only with slightly improved
methodology. In particular the sentences in the complex condition were presented, not
together as in experiment one, but on different pages. Additionally, the picture was
presented on a page without a sentence underneath. The subjects were instructed not
to turn back in the questionnaire booklet. Additionally, the pictures were improved so
as to maintain identical spatial relationships between the figures (subjects of each
sentence) and the ground (object for each sentence). The same pictures (with slight
modifications) were used as the ones used in experiment two (see appendix 1).
Once again the experiment dealt with in, on and at.
6.4.2 Subjects
Subjects were 120 native English speakers.
6.4.3 Method
Exactly the same as for experiment two, with the corollary that subjects were
requested not to turn back pages in the booklet once they had filled-in a response.
6.4.4 Results
The results of this study are almost identical with those in experiment two, and
therefore are not reported here. Comparison of sentence completion rates pooled in
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simple versus complex conditions replicated those of experiment two, with the only
significant result appearing in the at weak condition.
6.4.5 Discussion
The results of this experiment merely serve to replicate those of study two, suggesting
that the materials and method used in study two were adequate.
6.5 Experiment Four
6.5.1 Rationale
This experiment takes a slightly different approach to prepositions from those thus far
described. Here we look at the effects of discourse on the attribution of a preposition
to a sentence paired with a picture which relates to the discourse. In particular, we
pick up on an example given by Garrod and Sanford (1989), which we discussed in
the last chapter, as an argument for control relations. Additionally, the example is
cited as an argument that, although the meaning of the preposition remains the same,
the mental model adopted on a visual scene will effect whether or not the sentence is
appropriate. The example is that depicted is figure 6.2 below.
To repeat the example, ordinarily one would not say that the pear is in the bowl.
However, if one was playing a game which involved manipulation of the frame such
that one had to place the pear within the circumference of the bowl then one could
meaningfully say that the pear is in the bowl as the imposition of the model on the
scene allows the functional containment relation to hold as one has to move the pear
so that it is functionally contained by the bowl.
Figure 6.2
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The purpose of this experiment is to test whether this does in fact happen. That is,
given the context of a game, do subjects deem the use of in as appropriate?
6.5.2 Method
A discourse was designed to describe the game situation, paired with the scene. We
were careful to avoid priming effects for the preposition in, so the use of a preposition
in the discourse was avoided.
6.5.3 Subjects
Subjects were ten adults. All subjects were male. All were native speakers of English.
6.5.4 Procedure
Subjects were presented with the discourse below, with the picture underneath (in
figure 6.2. The instructions were simply to read the discourse and fill in the sentence
appropriately.
Freud and Dostoevsky are playing a game. The object of the game is to
move the frame such that the pear and bowl are positioned as depicted
below. At the end of the game, Freud (the first to try) shouts : "I have
won: the pear is the bowl!"
6.5.5 Results
Of the ten subjects, three subjects completed the sentence with the preposition in. Six
of the other seven subjects completed the sentence with the preposition over. The
remaining subject used above as the completion.
6.5.6 Discussion
The results show that the use of in in the context of game does seem to be appropriate
as three of the subjects were happy to complete the sentence accordingly. It is also
clear that the subjects that completed the sentence in this way, without the
presentation of the discourse, do not view in as an appropriate candidate for the
completion of the sentence. Let us discuss this result.
Flowever, the use of in, it can be argued, could have appeared for two reasons.
Firstly, a notion of extended functional control could be operating, as Garrod and
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Sanford (1989) suggest. Alternatively, it could be that constraint satisfaction at the
level of the sentence (with the blank) constrained the choice of the preposition in
favour of in so much that this negated any information apparent in the visual scene. In
either case, one can argue that functional relations are operating. In the second case,
the objects themselves provide a model of how the pear and bowl are interacting, and
thus the information present in the picture is viewed from a different model.
Despite the alternative interpretation, we wish to suggest that this result provides
evidence that there is a dynamic control relation sense for the meaning of the
preposition in. The example of the cranedriver and foreman presented in chapter five
lends credence to this claim. Furthermore, this sense is lexically represented. In the
null context in is not appropriate as the normal criteria for control relation do not
hold. As we shall see, our account requires that one has to cross-check the
information available about figure and ground before an analysis of the
appropriateness of an expression at the semantic level can take place. Normal
satisfaction of the containment control relation specified with in suggests that
containment is a high criterial candidate for the correct use of in with the subject and
object as pear and bowl respectively. In order to elicit the preposition in, it is
necessary to focus on the control relation so that the picture is described as
representing a change of state. In the context of a game, the end result differs from
past states in that there is a control relation apparent. Hence, in this context, the use
of in is felicitous. Thus this also supports the existence of mental models as interfaces
between language and the spatial world.
Again, we will develop this explanation in chapter eight.
6.6 Experiment Five
6.6.1 Rationale
All the above experiments clearly relate to the use of language. However, our theory
suggests another type of manipulation which would provide direct evidence for our
analysis. Ferrier (1991) has conducted one study along these lines. The study involved
video recordings of visual scenes which subjects were then asked to rate, (using a
Likert scale) for the appropriateness of a preposition to the scene in question. Hence,
the study directly tackles the issue of how spatial language and the spatial world
covary. What is of interest here is that many of the scenes involved some movement
prior to the judgment. For example, let us consider one case (which was not used) to
illustrate the idea.
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It is equally felicitous in the case of a cup and a saucer to say that the cup is in the
saucer or the cup is on the saucer. Presumably one can say that both relations hold,
and therefore that they are both appropriate prepositions to use. However, following
this line of reasoning, if one was to increase the depth of the saucer, one would expect
that in would be used more as the containment relation is more accentuated. Thus, as
the depth of the saucer increases, one would expect that in will be used more and
more. However, if we introduce the notion of a control relation, the situation looks
much more complicated. If one was presented with a saucer and cup with no depth in
the saucer, and the cup and saucer were seen moving around together with the cup
glued to the saucer, then one would say more often that the cup is in the saucer. This
is open to speculation, and is something that is worth testing, as the only way to
explain the result is to draw recourse to control relations.
6.6.2 The Terrier Experiment
Ferrier (1991) investigated experimentally for the existence of control relations. The
rationale behind the study is that if control relations are vital to the use of the
prepositions (in particular, in, on and over), then the absence or presence of such
factors should affect the judgements of the relevant prepositions.
Several such factors were investigated by Ferrier;
(1) Position of the ball
(2) Presence of other balls
(3) Transitivity; presence of another bowl containing the target bowl.
(4) Continuity; target ball the same or a different colour to the other balls
(5) Dynamic versus static situations
Additionally the relationships between in, on and over were examined.
Thirty subjects (N = 30) were presented with a video tape and a five page booklet with
an instruction sheet. The visual scenes consisted of combinations of glass bowls and
ping-pong balls. Various scenes were manipulated, and subjects were asked to score
on a Lickert scale whether the ball (x) was in, on or over the bowl (y). Forty visual
scenes were used.
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The scales were presented paired with each video scene as follows;
The ball (x) is in the bowl (y) 1 2 3 4 5
The ball (x) is on the bowl (y) 1 2 3 4 5
The ball (x) is over the bowl (y) 1 2 3 4 5
where 1 = (fits the scene) not very well and 5 = (fits the scene) very well.
Ferrier's findings broadly provide evidence for functional control relations, although
there are a number of serious problems with her study. We will discuss the results
first, and then the problems.
Ferrier found that the position of ball and the presence/lack of presence of other balls
both affected in judgements. These were found to interact. For example, figure 6.3
(c) was judged to be less in that (b), which was in turn was rated less in than (a).
With contact of the target ball with other balls there was an interaction (i.e., contact
in the form of figure 6.3(d)).
Figure 6.3
(a) (b)
Continuity was found to have a significant effect on the use of in, with in being
judged significantly more appropriate in figure 6.4(a) (below) than in figure 6.4(b).
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Comparing figures 6.5(a) and (b), where the ball is touching the rim of the bowl,
judgements of on were effected by the presence or absence of other balls. Similarly,
Figure 6.5
the judgments for over in these trials seems to be effected by the absence or presence
of other balls.
Movement of the target ball in the bowl in relation to static scenes with identical
geometric positioning of figure in relation to ground was found to significantly effect
judgements of in. An interaction of dynamic/versus static factor and the position of
bail was found.
Ferrier states that the uses of oreoositions do not have definite Darameters, and that
a. » k '
certain senses can be expressed with more than one preposition. Tnere appear to be
cases where trying to establish the presence or absence of necessary control reladons
results in uncertainty over whether a certain preposition is appropriate.
Ferrier's main conclusions from the study can be summarised as follows;
(1) The functional containment relation of in is a perception of X and Y
moving together, i.e., locationai control.
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(ii) The functional support of on is perception from the force of gravity.
(iii) The functional relation of over is functionally higher in the gravitational
field and a lack of functional support being present (i.e., low ratings of on)
(iv) In does not appear to be transitive in functional cases, i.e., the immediate
functional container appears to be the important factor.
(v) Similarity acts as a weak control for in when constraints are weak.
Ferrier's results, then, appear to vindicate the claim that language relates to the world
in a principled way through mediation of mental models of that world. The criterion
of any relation is functionality. The goal for Ferrier is to find a parsimonious account
of the factors that could contribute towards a functional geometry.
We can now turn to consider a number of problems with the Ferrier study. The first
set of problems relate to the task used. Firstly, the use of Lickert scales encourages
subjects to make distinctions between uses of in, for example, that they may not make
in everyday situations. For example, considering figure 6.3 (a) and (b), (b) was
judged to be less in than (a). Under normal circumstances both uses of in may be
considered appropriate. In fact, this problem is directly analogous to one we discussed
in chapter four. Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) found that subjects
exhibited prototype effects for well-defined categories, such as odd number. This
again reflects the nature of the task, and in no way means that one represents oddness
in terms of a prototype.
The problem of using Lickert scales is exacerbated in the Ferrier study with the
limited choice of prepositions given to subjects to rate. Ferrier did not sufficiently
cover the range of alternative prepositions which could appropriately describe each
visual scene. Furthermore, the use of Lickert scales did not allow the use of verbal
modification which may be used by subjects under more normal circumstances. This
leads to the strong charge that the Ferrier study is invalid as subjects were forced to
make distinctions (in terms of judgements) in an artificial situation, given a limited
repertoire of predetermined prepositions. Furthermore, subjects were encouraged to
contrast one term with another, as the rating scales for on, in and over were presented
together for each scene.
A further problem with the Ferrier study is that, due to the limited number of scenes
used, subjects could remember similar scenes as they were not sufficiently spread
apart, and therefore they could presumably make distinctions as required.
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There are, then, some serious problems with the Terrier study, and therefore one must
be wary with respect to drawing conclusions from the results obtained as they are
probably more representative of the nature of the task than how one attributes spatial
language to the spatial world under more usual circumstances. Nevertheless, the
examination of how the spatial world and spatial language covary as embodied in the
Ferrier study provides a foundation on which to build a more adequate methodology.
We do this in experiment five, to be discussed.
6.6.3 Introduction
The present experiment is a video study similar to that used by Ferrier. However, the
methodology of the Ferrier study is altered considerably in a significant way to avoid
the flaws apparent. Specifically, the video trials were presented under the guise of a
memory experiment. Subjects were instructed to try to remember the events and
objects involved after blocks of ten trials. They were told that the experiment was
designed to test the effects of verbal description on memory for spatial scenes.
Furthermore, a sentence with a blank was presented (sometimes for the full duration
of the trial, and sometimes Hashed with a freeze-frame) on the screen with each trial.
Subjects were asked to read the sentence and fill in the blank. To control for the
memory experiment so that all subjects had the same length of description, they were
instructed to keep fill-ins brief wherever possible, without loss of information. This
method was designed to distract the subjects from artificial use of language (a serious
flaw of the Ferrier experiment). Thus subjects were free to use whatever fill-ins they
felt were most appropriate.
The study was designed to examine the claims of Garrod and Sanford (1989),
discussed in chapter five, namely that;
(1) A figure is said to be in a ground if the ground functionally contains the
figure, such that if the ground moves there is (or will be) contiguity of
movement of figure with ground.
(2) A figure is said to be on a ground if the ground functionally supports the
figure, such that if the ground moves there is (or will be) contiguity of
movement of figure with ground.
Thus we examined the effects of different types of movement on the attribution of
spatial language to spatial situations. The types of movement covered movement of
the ground at different speeds, with the figure remaining contiguous with the ground,
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movement of the figure (with the ground remaining stationary), again at different
speeds. Movement of figure was also varied in terms of systematicity, such that some
types of movement were predictable, and other were seemingly random.
The types of figures and grounds used in the study were also varied. A possible
problem with the Ferrier study not mentioned above lies in the use of ping-pong balls
as figures. The present study used ping-pong ball in bowls and jugs, but also fruit in
bowls and jugs. This enabled a comparison of the attribution of spatial language to
situations where geometric relations and/or dynamic/static relations remain constant,
where only the types of figure or ground vary.
The prepositions examined in this study, as a by-product of free use, are not
restricted. However, the scenes were constructed in order to get at use of in, on, over,
under, above and below.
It was predicted that;
(1) Contiguity of movement of figure with ground would affect attribution of in
(following the Garrod and San ford claim)
(2) There would be an effect of presence of other balls on attribution of in to a scene
(following Ferrier).
All other comparisons are exploratory, and therefore are two-tailed.
6.6.4 Subjects
Subjects were forty normal-sighted native English speakers (age range 19 - 62, mean
32.375, SD 12.52) . Thirty of the subjects were male (age range 19 - 58, mean 30.5,
SD 10.887), and ten of the subjects were female (age range 21 - 62, mean 38, SD
15.825). None of the subjects on questioning had any reading disorders or difficulties.
6.6.5 Materials
The materials consisted of video shots of combinations of bananas, oranges, apples,
ping pong balls, squash balls, and a jug and bowl. Additionally several one-off trials
were run involving rings, a finger, a crack and a floor. These were primarily intended
as distractors for subjects so that they would not lose interest in the experiment (i.e.,
unusual scenes provided novelty for the memory task, and therefore kept reliability of
response).
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There were 322 scenes in all, each lasting five seconds (with a brief gap in between
each scene). The scenes were structured into blocks of ten, with a long gap in between
so that subjects could verbally recall scenes alter each block of ten trials.
The order of scenes was randomised, so that subjects would not adopt strategies for
responding. The large number of scenes used facilitated this. The order of
presentation of scenes, and the contents of each scene are diagrammatically
represented in appendix 3.
The video scenes, dynamic and static were filmed (without sound) using a Canon V-
20 colour video camera. Unnatural dynamic scenes were constructed using a mixture
of invisible threads, nails, and joists held (like a puppeteer) behind objects. The
background to all the scenes was kept uniform in the form of a dark screen behind all
objects. This facilitated clarity of the images used.
It should be stressed that all objects used were natural, ordinary, everyday objects, of
a three-dimensional nature.
A tape recorder was used to record the responses given by subjects for each trial. A
clip-on microphone was used for this purpose.
6.6.6 Procedure
Subjects were run on an individual basis. Each subject was seated in front of a video
screen and video recorder and given a set of instruction which read as follows:
You are going to take part in an experimental study designed to examine the
effects of language task performance on memory for visual scenes. You will
be presented with a number of scenes, each lasting five seconds. After every
ten scenes you will be asked to make a simple verbal description of as many of
the ten scenes as you can remember. As the experimental group, you are also
required to complete a sentence (immediately after or during each scene) with
whatever word(s) you fee! would be most appropriate to the scene just viewed.
It is important that this is done is a natural way, and conscientiously. Please
also keep your sentence fill-ins short if possible, without sacrificing content.
Before proceeding, the experimenter also explained the instructions verbally to check
that subjects understood the task.
The clip-on microphone was then fastened to the subject's lapel, and the volume level
of the voice was checked to ensure appropriate recording quality.
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Subjects were allowed a fifteen minute break half-way through the experiment
6.6.7 Results
For the purposes of the results, responses are grouped into three categories. These
involve the preposition of interest used on its own, those involving the preposition
used with verbal modification, and those involving the use of another preposition.
Also, the reference objects were categorised into those cases where the ground was
used as the immediate reference, and those cases where the immediate reference
objects used were objects other than the ground.
For clarity of presentation, all scenes are reproduced in this section. At the end of the
section, there is a concise summary of the results.
Unless otherwise reported, the statistical analyses used employed the Chi-square test
(two-tailed). Chi-square values are only reported for significant results. The chi-
square score required for p<0.05 is 3.84 (2-tailed, df=l), and the chi-square value
required for p<0.01 is 6.64 (2-tailed, df= 1).
The use of each preposition below each scene depicts the number of subjects using the
relevant preposition for that scene.
Comparison of static ball/bowl scenes
Contact versus noncontact of figure with bowl (via other balls), with identical
geometric positioning;
Scene 150
V( f - i 7
;:.r,
TTie ball m tke bovl.
Use of in = 38
p < 0.01 (Significant)
Scene 113
The ball 13 the bovl.
Use of in = 8 Chi-square = 19.56.
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Scene 125 Scene 128
(_ M I




Z2 ball L3 ~~ ujl6 1)0 » 1.
Use of in = 21 Use of in = 3 Chi-square = 13.5
P<0.01 (Significant)






T~le ball 13 flie bovl.
Use of in = 34
Tie ball Is rjie bov!
Use of in = 0 Chi-square = 34
p<0.01 (Significant)
Static continuity versus discontinuity (geometric relations remaining constant):
Scene 132 Scene 242
/
Tbe bail a tbe bovl.
Tin: bail is tbe bovl.
Use of in = 40 Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 150 Scene 268
/




The baJU. 13 the bovl. The bail i3 the bovl
Use of in = 39
Scene 198








v f '■ : /
The bail is the bovl.
7 't 1
-T-.-v-f / \-> i. 3 I •-/C 7 _X '-/
TV"'/
The ball is the bovl.
Use of in — 38 Use of in = 37 Nonsignificant
Scene 34 Scene 144
\
VrxL
i ( ; 7
7
The bail t3 the bovl.
Use of in = 34 Use of in = 32 Nonsignificant
140










\-f i I !. )j
y.
The bail is the bovl.
Use of in = 16 Use of in = 6 Chi-square = 4.55
p<0.05 (Significant)




The ball is the bovl.
7>x- -7
v> . /
Tile bail 12 lAe bovl.
Use of in — 21 Use of in = 26 Nonsignificant
Static ball/bowl with bowl tilted:
Scenel32 Scene 239
:r .-i\s
"Hie ball u tile bovl.
The ball a ---- the bovl
Use of in = 40 Use of in = 7 Chi-square = 23.2
p<0.01 (Significant)
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Scene 132 Scene 167
Tie bail tie bovl.
Tie ball L3 tie bovl.
Use of in = 40 Use of in = 19 Chi-square = 7.47
p<0.01 (Significant)
Scene 239 Scene 262
Th.e bull '_3 Me bovl
Use of in = 7
Tie ball u lie bovl.
Use of in = 3 Nonsignificant
Comparison of Static Versus Dynamic Continuity Ball/Bowl Scenes. With Ball
Moving
Scene 132 Scene 119
Tie bail u lie bovl. Tie ball is --- tie bovl.
Use of in - 40 Use of in = 29 Nonsignificant
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Scene 150 Scene 76
✓
Tin ball is th.e bovt.




Tba ball is lib: bovl.
Use of in = 38
Scene 150
/
Tbjj ball is tlii bovl.
Tie ball ls 'lie bovl.
Use of in = 29 Nonsignificant
Scene 16
Use of in = 24 Nonsignificant
Scene 303
Tbe ball is ibe bovl.
Use of in = 38 Use of in = 21 Chi-square = 4.9
p<0.05 (Significant)




V' 1 : ■ 7
iii bull is th.e bovl.




The bail is tie bovt. j.i .'-•••• 'ji'-i
The bail is the bovl.
Use of in = 38 Use of in = 25 Nonsignificant
Scene 198 Scene 138
f " —
Vcnr:oy \
v 1 ' '7
v^-rv
}.•- 2,'yrjxr
Tie bail ls lie bovl.
Use of in = 38 Use of in = 27 Nonsignificant
Scene 198 Scene 153
i i
'
I • y J \
roe bail is —- the bovt. The ball is ---- the bovl.
Use of in = 38 Use of in = 17 Chi-square = 8.01
p<0.01 (Significant)
144
Scene 237 Scene 6
o
Tie bdll 12 rjxe bovl.
Use of in = 16
\ V-tT--;-C7
\ /*
. hwj-* ; ji".'
Use of in = 5 Chi-square = 5.76
p<0.05 (Significant)
Comparison of Static Versus Dynamic Discontinuity Ball/Bowl Scenes. With Ball
Moving
Scene 268 Scene 43
Tie bail is Lie bovl. Tie ball is He bovl.
Use of in = 39
Scene 268




T> \Xf>fx x x
Tie ball La Lie bovl
•' t ! __
iff
V'i* •- - ."'fy.. b.-l:
Tie ball is 'ie bovl
Use of in = 39 Use of in = 26 Nonsignificant
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Scene 31
Tie ball is tie bovl.
Use of in = 37
Scene 31
Tie ball is tie bovl.
Use of in = 37
Scene 144
Tie ball is "ie bovl.
Use of in = 32
Scene 194
a.-li
i ae bail is the oovi.
Use of in = 32 Nonsignificant
Scene 277
Tie ball is tie bovl.




The bail is the bovl.
Use of in = 14 Chi-square = 7.04
p<0.01 (Significant)
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Comparison of Static Versus Dynamic Continuity Ball/Bowl Scenes. With Bowl
Moving
Scene 242 Scene 241
The bail is the bovl. The bail is the bovl.
Use of in = 40
Scene 132




The bail is — be bovl. The bail is lhe bovl
Use of in = 40
Scene 132
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 180




Tb.e bail L3 fixe bovl.
Use of in = 40 Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
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Scene 150 Scene 71
/
Tie ball is lie bo-vl.




V- 1 4 /
Tie ball is lie bo-wl.




Tlli ball is ---- rjie bovl
Use of in = 34
Tbje ball is lie bovl
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 19




Tie ball '.3 'ie bo vl.
Use of in = 39 Nonsignificant
148




v; 1 : ■/
The ball La the bovl.
The bail La the bovl.
Use of in = 38
Scene 237
Use of in — 40
Scene 285
Nonsignificant
The ball u the bovl.
Use of in = 16
_rh
V- \
The bail La the bovl.
Use of in = 31 Chi-square = 4.79
p<0.05 (Significant)
Scene 23 Scene 65
is*"!
fixe ball iJ lie bovl.
Use of in — 11 Use of in = 30 Chi-square = 8.8
p<0.01 (Significant)
149




V ■ ■'<"■/ V ' ' ' JL
TT»e ball is —- tie bovl ^ ^ .... ^ bQvl
Use of in = 21 Use of in — 37 Chi-square = 4.4
p<0.05 (Significant)
Comparison of Static Versus Dynamic Discontinuity Ball/Bowl Scenes. With Bowl
Moving




"Hie ball is th* bovt. *^-e ball is the bovl.
Use of in = 39 Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 268 Scene 15
x >
\:>VC
X >, t >-! » i ■
rC(- ■ 7 _i I
Tie ball is tie bovl. i : ■ j





I i i -J






"Hie ball 15 Lbe bovl.
Use of in = 37
Scene 144
. '• _.A J.— .
V/
Tie ball is tie bovl.
Use of in — 32
Scene 53
Tie ball is tie bovl.
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 33
bowl {low
Tie ball L3 Lie bovl.
Use of in = 39 Nonsignificant
Scene 121
Tie ball is tie bovl.
Use of in = 6 Use of in = 32 Chi-square = 17.79
p<0.01 (Significant)
Miscellaneous Ball/Bowl Comparisons
Scene 132 Scene 169
"Tie ball 13 Uie bovl.
v.
_x_
rSe ball L3 lhe bovl.
Use of in = 40
Scene 132
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 69
1
Tbe ball uj tlie bovl.
Tbe ball ls lie bovl.
Use of in — 40 Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Inverted Bowl Ball Scenes With Static/Dynamic Comparisons (Ball Moving)
Scene 45 Scene 1
Tb.e ball i3 tie bovl.
b._l ~ jp-.-l
The bill 13 Ltia bovl.
Use of under = 40 Use of under = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 45 Scene 251
The ball Is tie bovl. Tie ball tie bovl
Use of under — 40 Use of under — 21 Chi-square = 5.9
p<0.05 (Significant)
Ball/Bowl Static Versus Dynamic (No Other Balls Present):
Scene 115 Scene 155
The ball L3 the bovl.
The ball lj the bovl
Use of in = 29
Use of over = 10
Use of in = 28
Use of over = 10 Nonsignificant
Scene 115 Scene 200
:rdv.
The ball is the bovl.
e
Tie ball u tie bovl.
Use of in = 29
Use of over = 10
Use of in = 5





Scene 113 Scene 22
I I
The ball L3 the bovl.
V
2*0 ""Slur : jOV.'-Jirl
j .4 {I i •: 10 '•••'••' i
Use of over = 21
Scene 113
Use of over = 32 Nonsignificant
Scene 146
;r..r V
The ball is the bovl.
Use of over = 21
The bail La the bovl.
Use of over = 31 Nonsignificant




\ --J : /
•—. i. i -/
\r r '
The ball is the bovl.




v—iv ;i _t .i
'T'f
b.-il »»*&,• a-li"=. :jfrt
The ball ih the bovl.




"Hie bail is tiie bovl.





Tie ball b tie bovl.
Use of over = 27
Scene 56
Tie ball b tie bovl.
Use of over = 27
Scene 46
*
Tie ball b ---- tie bovl.
Use of over = 37 Nonsignificant
Scene 312
#
Tie ball u tie bovl.
Use of over = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 27
Tie ball u tie bovl.
Use of over = 29 Nonsignificant
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Scene 56 Scene 219
\r-U-COV
i i I ••_/
The bail 13 — the bo^





The bail L3 the bovl.





lie ball L3 tie bovl.
Use of over = 31
X>7:-7
The bail is the bovl.
Use of over = 37 Nonsignificant
Scene 257 Scene 191
vu-L,---n
r.'i t>:
Tie ball u tie bovl.
-/
The bail ls --- the bovl.
Use of over = 31 Use of over = 37 Nonsignificant
156
Scene 257 Scene 129
$
The ball is the bovl.





The ball is the bovl.
Use of over = 35 Nonsignificant
Scene 257 Scene 135
The ball la the bovl.




I 1 v I .
The ball is the bovl.
Use of over — 38 Nonsignificant
Banana/Bowl Continuity Static Versus Dynamic. With Bowl Moving
Scene 105 Scene 48
The bajia_aa is the bovl.
/
/
The bailana is the bovl.
Use of in — 40 Use of in — 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 120
The bajiana b the bo-sT
Use of in = 40
Scene 32
The banana Is the bovl.
Use of in = 37
Scene 32
Use of in = 37
Scene 193
"V-.
The banana in the bovl.
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 226
The banana in the bovl.
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 77
The baaajia b the bovl.
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
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Scene 35 Scene 84
The banana is the bovl.
\5.-r- *"f
The banana is the bovl.
Use of in = 13 Use of in = 29 Chi-square = 6.1
p<0.05 (Significant)





The banana is the bovl.
Use of in = 2
U-v
The banana is the bovl.
Use of in = 24 Chi-square = 18.6
p<0.01 (Significant)





Tiie banana ls ch.e bovl.
5/
The banana b (he bovl
Use of in = 4 Use of in = 21 Chi-square = 11.56
p<0.01 (Significant)
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Banana/Bowl Dynamic Versus Static Comparisons With Discontinuity:
Scene 142 Scene 293
"Hie banajaa is th.e bo vl.
Use of in = 13
Tb-e banana L3 ---- tha bovl.
Use of in = 34 Chi-square = 9.3
p<0.01 (Significant)
Scene 133 Scene 68
/■ v X .' C X-
The banana Is the bovl




\ _ Y, „ j y
iO'V\ Z. J'"-LV J'J .Wrr-l
Tbe banana. is Itie bovl.
Use of in = 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 143 Scene 24
' X >
The banana is tie bovl.
Use of in = 8
!'
Use of in = 31




Banana/Bowl With Bowl Tilted:
Scene 105 Scene 74
The banana is tie bovl.
Use of in = 40
The banana in the bovt
Use of in — 7 Chi-square = 23
p<0.01 (Significant)
Scene 105
The banana m the bovl.
Scene 221
The banana in the bovl
Use of in = 40 Use of in = 9 Chi-square = 19.6
p<0.01 (Significant)
Banana/Bowl Static Dynamic Comparisons With Banana Moving (Continuity):
Scene 207 Scene 25
J
Hie banana is the bovl.
Use of over = 21
Use of in = 17
Use of over = 25
Use of in - 11 Nonsignificant
161
Scene 202 Scene 166
/
Tie bajia-oa b tie bovl.




Tie bajxajia 13 Lie bovl.




Tlie banana b tie bovl
Use of over = 25
—-V
-J-' -♦ - i-
"Hie baaajna b Uic bovl
Use of over = 31 Nonsignificant
Scene 202 Scene 102
i !
1
Tie bajmaa b Lie bovl.
Use of over = 25
"Hie banana 13 Lh.e bovl.
Use of over - 29 Nonsignificant
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Banana/Bowl Dynamic Versus Static With Bowl Inverted:
Scene 94 Scene 157
"Hie ban&jia i3 ---- the bovl.
"Hie banajia is the bovl.
Use of under = 33 Use of under = 40 Nonsignificant
Apple/Bowl With Bowl Inverted:
Scene 174 Scene 254
/TT
I <£
Tiie apple u lie iovl. TSe apple 12 liae bovl.
Use of under = 40 Use of under = 29 Nonsignificant








Tie apple b Uie bovl.
Use of under = 40 Use of under — 36 Nonsignificant
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Jug Versus Bowl Comparisons:
Scene 201 Scene 120
.. .-f
' W\

















The banana la he jag.
Use of in = 40
■- iv
\-
The banana L3 the bovl.
Use of in= 40 Nonsignificant
Scene 108 Scene 32
1
; , / 1 •
V
The banana is he jag.





Hie banajia is the bovl.
Use of in— 37 Chi-square = 5.07
p<0.05 (Significant)







The banana b he bovl.
The banana is he jag.
Use of in= 7 Use of in= 13 Nonsignificant
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Scene 292 Scene 35
I ■ ?i :
11 I
i
• /! A IJ The banana is the bovl.
The banana us the in?.
Use of in= 4 Use of in= 13 Chi-square = 4.76
p<0.05 (Significant)
Scene 279 Scene 232
7
k r-.
The apple is the ja?.
Use of in= 11
The apple b the bo~vl.
Use of in= 15 Nonsignificant
Scene 269 Scene 247
k
('
The apple is 'he jag.
Use of in= 3 Use of in= 11
)(
^ >




Scene 215 Scene 227
The apple i3 the jug.
Use of in— 4 Use of in= 9
I
"Hie orange L3 ihe bo
Nonsignificant
6.6.8 Summary of Main Results
First of all, comparing static scenes, where geometric relations remain constant, it
was found that contact of the figure via other objects (continuity preserved or
otherwise) affected the use of in. Thus the use of in is not governed by geometric
position alone. Non-continuity produced a significant reduction in the use of in when
the pile was high, or when the figure was placed in an unnatural situation, as
compared with continuity conditions. This was only true of static scenes. No
differences in use of in were found with low piles, even in the non-continuity
conditions. Movement of the figure was found to reduce the use of in, although not
significantly in every case. Contiguity of movement of figure with ground was found
to significantly increase the use of in. This was particularly true when the pile was
high, or when the figure was placed unnaturally. Tilting the container (away from
canonical orientation) has the effect of reducing the use of in.
Use of over was found to increase when the figure was swinging like a pendulum
above the container. The length of swing had no influence on this effect. Movement
of figure had no effect on the use of under when the container was inverted.
Finally, comparing static scenes involving the jug and bowl, the ground was found to
have a significant effect on the use of in. With unnatural piles, in was used
significantly more with the bowl as ground as compared with the jug as ground.
Turning to reference objects, when the pile was high or unnatural, there was a
significant increase in the use of other objects as reference objects, rather than
immediate reference to the ground. Contiguity of movement of figure and ground
removed this effect.
Verbal modification did not systematically vary with any changes in conditions.
However, it was observed that some subjects used verbal modification consistently,
and others largely stuck to one-word fill-ins.
6.6.9 Discussion
The cover of a memory experiment, it can be argued, has yielded use of language
akin to that used in everyday situations. In contrast to the Ferrier experiment, subjects
were not asked to make decisions about appropriate use of language which may be
artificial in nature. Subjects, 011 debriefing, commented that they found the task
simple, and that they did not expend conscious effort filling in the sentences paired
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with each scene. Therefore the results can be relied upon as a useful barometer of
language use.
The results in the main provide clear evidence that factors other than geometric
relations influence language use. In particular, contiguity of movement of figure with
ground was found to produce a robust effect on use of in, as did contact of figure with
other objects. This supports the functional relations analysis. If it can be demonstrated
that a container is fulfilling its function, then use of in, it was predicted, should
increase, and it did. Furthermore, movement of the figure was found to reduce the
use of in, which is the converse of this, and therefore lends further support to the
analysis.
The presence of contact of the figure via other objects is clearly an important factor.
As we saw in chapter four, Herskovits (1986) accounts for this effect with the
pragmatic principle of tolerance. A more parsimoniouis explanation is forthcoming if
we consider that a container is still controlling the location of the figure via contact
with other objects, and therefore the figure does not have to be interior to the
container.
Non-continuity was observed to only have an effect in static situations. It appears that
contiguity of movement of figure with ground overrides the discontinuity criteria. One
way to interpret this is to argue that, in absence of clear evidence that the ground is
fulfilling its function, one is influenced by other factors, one of which is
discontinuity. This finding is contrary to that of Ferrier, and is suggestive that the
continuity effects yielded by Ferrier are a by-product of an unnatural experimental
task situation.
The results also provide evidence for the importance of the specific function of the
ground. Comparing the jug to the bowl, in unnatural situations the jug has a negative
effect on the use of in. This could be explained in terms of what the container usually
contains. Jugs are associated with the containment of liquids, whereas bowls more
usually contain solids, such as fruit. Perhaps the presence of fruit in the jug therefore
can be viewed as removed from its proper function, leading to the weakening of the
evidence in static cases.
Another more plausible explanation for this finding, again relating to specific
function, in that containers can be said to have a sphere of functional influence, such
that they can control different regions of space dependent on function. This view is
schematised in Figure 6.6. However, one would expect that movement of the jug
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would lead to a significant increase in the use of in, and to an irradication of the
jug/bowl difference that appeared comparing static scenes.
Figure 6.6 Spheres of Functional Infuence Associated With Jugs and Bowls
The use of over is significantly increased when the figure is swinging above the
container. This result can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it can be argued that
over involves the notion of a path, and that the swinging motion of the figure natural
increases use of over as it directly demonstrates the existence of a path. Secondly, it
can be argued that over involves a functional component, such as functional
aboveness, and that the movement of the figure about a gravitational axis hightlights
the interaction with the ground, such that the ground is controlling the position of the
figure via the central axis. At this time, the first explanation seems most
parsimonious. However, in chapter eight, we will consider the issue of whether one
should ascribe a functional component to over at some length.
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Chapter 7
Evidence from First Language Acquisition
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide evidence from the language acquisition literature which
supports the experimental evidence of the last chapter. We demonstrate that the
pattern of acquisition of prepositions is perfectly consistent with the functional
component of lexical entries thus far posited. Furthermore, the importance of the
nature of the objects in the interpretation of an expression appears to be something the
child is acutely aware of early on.
7.2 Why Appeal to First Acquisition Literature ?
Developmental perspectives are interesting in themselves, but are not simply useful
for their own sake. They also sometimes may be the only reasonable way of
answering nondevelopmental questions. For example, we can consider Gould's (1983)
discussion of whether a zebra is a white animal with black stripes or a black one with
white stripes. As Gould points out, there are few more perennial questions; and
certainly a great many who have asked that question have not been the least bit
interested in how zebras develop. They simply want to know what sort of thing the
adult is. Yet the clearest way to tell is to consider how stripes develop from
embryological stages. When this developmental perspective is adopted, in conjunction
with some data about anomalous adult zebras, it becomes clear what they really are.
Gould also discusses how developmental considerations allow us to see "the difference
between superficial appearance and knowledge of underlying causes" (p. 372) when
applied to the puzzle of why a cross between a horse and a zebra usually has more
stripes than a zebra. Superficial comparisons would predict a smaller number; but an
understanding of how stripes are related to embryological development suggests
strong reasons for the increase.
Wallace, Klahr and Bluff (1987) also present a compelling argument maintaining the
importance of a developmental perspective with respects to providing an adequate
psychological theory in any domain. The emphasis is on the perspective of conceptual
understanding and word meaning from the point of view of existence on a continuum.
They argue that one should adopt a process-oriented account of word meaning and
conceptual understanding such that one can only define a concept in relation to how it
has developed. Thus acquisition literature provides an essential route into this problem
domain.
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7.3 The Evidence: Review of First Acquisition Literature
Much research has been conducted on the acquisition of words in many different
classes, and generally on what has been referred to as 'the mapping problem' (Clark,
1973). What one wishes to know is what information the child brings to the language
learning situation. In other words, Clark (1977) asked the question of what the child
knows a priori about the spatial relations between the objects around him.
Clark argues that the young child knows that some objects have flat supporting
surfaces while others act as containers. Bower (1974) noted that containers, in fact,
appear to exercise a special fascination over the very young child. The child also
knows something about normal orientation - which way up a chair goes, and so on.
He also knows, or is rapidly finding out at about 12 months, that one can place some
objects on top of larger ones, but not the reverse. Size also plays an important role for
containers too. For example, small objects will fit into large objects, but not the
reverse. Based on this evidence, Clark (1977) suggested that surfaces and containers
should play some part in the child's acquisition of words for different spatial relations.
The knowledge that the child has a priori is about objects, and how they interact with
each other. The nature of the objects themselves appears to constrain how they are
talked about, and this, it will be demonstrated, is in terms of functional relations.
Clark (1977) presents evidence that the first prepositions that children use
spontaneously to denote relations in space are in and on. These appear in children's
speech between 2;0 and 2;6, and generally seem to be used correctly. Clark (1973)
looked at how soon children appeared to understand these two prepositions, together
with under, in a series of comprehension tasks. Each child had to follow instructions
such as;
"Put A in/on/under B."
Children over 3;0 made very few errors, but from 1;6 to 2; 11 the children exhibited
systematic errors. First of all, even the youngest children appeared to get in right. On,
though, was often treated as if it meant in, and under was sometimes treated as if it
meant in and sometimes as if it meant on. The critical factor in accounting for these
patterns of errors was whether B was a container or whether it simply had a flat
supporting surface on it and no container-like space. Whenever B was a container, the
child placed the other object, A, inside (and thus always got in "right" automatically).
When B was not a container, the child placed A on top of the supporting surface.
Clark (1977) categorised these strategies as two ordered rules :
171
(1) If B is a container, A is inside it.
(2) If B has a horizontal surface, A is on it.
The two rules accounted for 92% of the errors made by the youngest children (1;6-
1; 11) and for 91% of the errors in the next age group up (2;0-2;5). The next oldest
group (2;6-2;l 1) made fewer than 10% errors overall, but the rules still accounted for
71% of them. Instead of considering only responses that were initially scored as
errors, however, it could be argued that Rule 1 ought to account for all the in
instructions and for half the on and under instructions (that is, wherever B was a
container) among the younger children. Rule 2 should account for the other half of the
on and under instructions (that is, wherever B has a flat surface). Overall the two
rules accounted for 89% of the data from the youngest children, while "correct"
responses accounted for only 53% of these data.
Further evidence that the children were really using general rules much like (1) and
(2) came from a second experiment with the two youngest groups of children where
each child was given a copying task (Clark, 1977). The experimenter first placed one
object in a spatial relation to another, either inside, on lop, or about an inch away.
The child was given an identical pair of objects and simply told "Do what I did." As
predicted, wherever the experimenter's configuration conformed to the rule identified
in the first experiment, the child managed it, and wherever the configuration did not
conform, the child simply applied the rules and came up with predictable errors. Since
there was no mention of the words in, on and under in this task, it is clear that the
"correct" responses from the earlier comprehension task do not necessarily reflect any
semantic knowledge. Instead they reflect the nonlinguistic or conceptual preferences
the young child has for putting objects inside containers, or, failing that option,
putting them on a supporting surface.
Clark (1977) also observed that the children in the copying task seemed to have an
awareness of orientation of objects. A child of 1;6 or 2;0 clearly knows that glasses
have their openings up. The children frequently righted the glass to its canonical
orientation whenever the experimenter changed the orientation of the glass. Once the
glass is righted, the child can simply apply rule 1 as before. Clark found that a few
2.5 year olds provided further evidence of knowing the normal spatial relations when
they objected to putting something under a crib: the reason was that one sleeps in a
crib. However, they knew by that age what under meant and would carry out the
instructions appropriately.
The work of Wilcox and Palermo (1974/5) provides some additional evidence with in
and on that youngest children have a preference for putting objects inside containers
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whenever possible, and otherwise putting them on some surface. They found the same
pattern of errors as Clark (1973) . Hence, with in and on there is evidence that the
child's a priori conceptual preferences play a critical role in his learning to map words
onto specific spatial relations (Clark, 1973).
Clark (1977) extended her earlier work to the acquisition of other spatial relations,
namely the word pairs up - down, at the top - at the bottom, over - under and above -
below. Using the same children as were used of Clark (1973), the task involved the
instructions :
(i) Put A at the top/bottom of/above/below B.
(ii) Make A go up/down/over/under B.
Clark (1977) found a steady increase in the number of correct responses with age. The
easiest of the pairs, overall, was up - down, and the relative order of acquisition was
up - down, then top - bottom, then over - under, and lastly above - below. This
mirrors the order found in Clark (1972).
There is a lot of more recent evidence that children typically learn words encoding
locative concepts such as in, on and under before they learn words for locative
concepts such as between, back and front. In a series of crosslinguistic studies,
Johnson and Slobin (1979) found this to be the case. Indeed, their work has been
replicated in an experimental study of English by Durkin (1981), as well as
observational studies of Hebrew (Dromi, 1979) and the Romance languages (Clark,
1991).
Johnson and Slobin (1979), following Clark (1972), argue that the acquisition order of
these two groups of words is predicted by the relative cognitive complexity of the
concepts involved. Additionally, some variation of order (mostly within the groups)
may result from the linguistic complexity of the means available for expressing a
particular concept in a particular language. For instance, all other things being equal,
a word will be learned later if it is morphologically complex (composed of more than
one adult morpheme), or if it is homonymous (has more than one meaning in the adult
language).
Grimm (1975) and Vorster (1984) extended the range of prepositions examined to
uses other than simply spatial ones. Grimm (1975), in a study of the spontaneous
productions of 137 German preschoolers and first-graders, found that spatial
prepositions were learned first, and that some of these found expression as temporal
prepositions and some as 'purely grammatical' prepositions (e.g., the dative marker
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zu). Vorster (1984), studying six Afrikaans-learning 3-year olds, corroborates the
results of Grimm. Spatial prepositions again were learned first, and to as a directional
preposition, followed by temporal prepositions (or temporal uses of spatial
prepositions and others indicating relations such as the instrumental and the dative.
Tomasello (1987) points to the problems in the explanation of the above acquisition
data. He particularly cites the problems with explanations which appeal to cognitive
factors, e.g., the abstract nature of the conceptual relations specified by the
grammatical prepositions. As Tomasello states (1987, p. 87);
"It is not obvious that for the child sweeping with a broom or giving
something to someone involves more complex or abstract concepts than
placing an object on a table or in a cup."
This example illustrates the difficulties involved when one tries to compare concepts
across diverse semantic categories.
Tomasello sets out to resolve some of the problems with a detailed case study of one
child's early use of English prepositions during her second year of life. This case
study attempts to investigate not only acquisition order, but also other acquisition
patterns involving omissions, misuses, and the like. Four levels of use were
distinguished;
OMISSION; relational word not expressed, but the relation is implicit in the
utterance and its non-linguistic context, e.g., Bug monkey-bars.
HOLOPHRASE; only the relational word is expressed, e.g., off, up, etc.
COMBINATION; the relational word and one of the related items are
expressed, e.g., Bug on/On monkey-bars.
PREPOSITION; the relational word and both of the related items are
expressed, e.g., Bug on monkey-bars.
The results of Tomasello's detailed study supports the existing evidence that spatial
prepositions are indeed learned first. The order of acquisition presented by Tomasello
is depicted in figure 7.1.
What we can pick up on from this data is that spatial oppositions such as above-below
are actually learned later than oppositions like over-under. This case, in particular is
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interesting as over has many more different types of usage than above. If one
considers that a simple stative use of over is one use, then one can argue that the
meaning of above is a subset of the meaning of over. This seems to fly in the face of
acquisition data. It may seem then, that the pattern of acquisition cannot simply reflect
notions of complexity. Maybe we can appeal to the idea that over is simply used more
frequently in mother-infant interactions than above. This, however, is not the case
(Tomasello, 1987), and even if it was it can't explain the error rates apparent with
early use of above.
The explanation we wish to pursue here is that prepositions involving functional
relations are those that are learned first. This goes hand-in-hand with the notion that
infants learn functional relations early on. The learning of how objects can interact
with each other is key. Hence, when the infant is faced with a relation which is more
abstract and cut off form the objects, there is more difficulty experienced. For
example, in the case of above, one object being above another object is apparent
irrespective of the nature of the objects. With the case of over, by contrast, the
understanding is dependent on the nature of the objects and how they interact with
each other. What happens is that the young infant learns first about the properties of
objects and how they interact with each other. When presented with a spatial relation,
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they assume that this refers to how the objects are most likely to interact, which is the
attribution of a functional relation to the situation. This explanation accounts for the
error findings in the studies discussed above.
The utilitarian nature of children's definitions additionally presents support for this
analysis. Krauss (1952) cites that children frequently give definitions of object in
terms of function, e.g., "a tree is to climb," a table is to sit at," etc. Related to this
point, Harrison (1972) has argued that children learn referents and uses together. For
instance, a child learns to use the word table, in situations which are functional, such
as "The table is where we eat dinner, "Daddy works at his table." Thus they learn
which verbs - "eat," "work" - "table" is used with, and such information is dependent
on functions that the object serves.
7.4 Direct Evidence: Stevens and Coventry
7.4.1 Introduction
Stevens and Coventry (in preparation) have directly tested the claim that prepositions
involving functional relations are learned first. In fact, the study by Stevens and
Coventry is in part a replication of the adult experimental (video) study we presented
in the previous chapter (experiment five). The study adopted both production sand
comprehension measures. The production study adopted a modification of the basic
'puppet-theatre' protocol used by Johnston (1984) to elicit production of the
prepositions behind and in front of, since this method proved highly successful. Two
puppets were used, one as the protagonist who would communicated with the subject
and one as an agent of change, like a 'Naughty Teddy' (McGarrigle & Donaldson,
1978) who could alter the situation without the child assuming that the change of the
situation was an important factor to which the experimenter was expecting the child to
respond.
Thirty scenes were selected from the adult video experiment described and discussed
above (section 6.6). The situations were used to produce use of either in or on,
depending on the functional elements of the situation. It was therefore decided to use
a group of children around age 3;0 as the youngest age group, since this is the age
when children appear to have mastered linguistic use of these prepositions (Clark,
1973). Another set of situations examined were used to produce use of over and
above, again depending on the functional elements in the scenes. Children of age 3;0
have not yet mastered these prepositions according to the literature reviewed above,
and it was hoped that they might overextend other prepositions for use in these
situations. The other two age groups were children around 4;0 and around 5;0; the
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oldest children should have mastered use of over and above, and the situations
investigated whether use of these prepositions could also be explained by functional
relations.
The factors that were examined for the in/on paradigm were: spatial position of target
object, contiguity of movement of target with container and continuity of target object
with other objects present in the container.
It was hypothesised for the in/on paradigm that;
(i) Spatial position to target object within the reference container would affect
preposition used; the more the target was contained within, the more in would be
used.
(ii) Contiguity of movement of target object with container would affect the
preposition used; the greater the contiguity of movement, the more in would be used.
(iii) Continuity of target object with other objects in the container would affect
preposition used in static scenes and scenes of non-contiguous movement; the more
the continuity, the more in would be used. However, in scenes with contiguity of
movement between figure and ground, continuity was predicted to have no significant
effect.
(iv) There would be no interaction of these factors witli the age of the subjects.
(v) The spatial position of the figure would affect the ground reference object used,
whether the container or other container fruit. Contiguity of movement and continuity
would have no significant effect on the ground reference object; if they did, it would
show that any significant change in preposition use might be as a result of contiguity
and continuity increasing the perceptual salience of one or other ground reference
objects, and a preposition then chosen to fit that reference object, rather than notions
of functional control changing the appropriate preposition even with the same
reference object.
(vi) Other features of the container used would affect the prepositions used; the
greater the amount of horizontal surface available as part of the container, the more
on would be used.
The factors that were examined for the over/above paradigm were spatial position of
target object and degree of movement of target object.
177
It was hypothesised for the over/above paradigm that;
(vii) If the target object was stationary, then above would be used more, whereas if
the target was moving, then over would be used more.
(viii) The youngest children, not having acquired over and above, would use on in the
former case above, and in in the latter case.
The comprehension study was divided into two parts. The first was based on Clark's
(1973) object-placement task for five prepositions: in, on, over, under, above.
It was hypothesised that:
(ix) There would be an increase in mean score with age.
(x) Mistakes across age groups would reflect the order acquisition found in previous
studies (reviewed above): in, on, under, over/above. It was hypothesised that over
would precede above, since it involves function relations.
(xi) Errors made would be attributed to the children working within the non-linguistic
schema of Clark (1973); thus they would place the target in the container when in
canonical position, and place it on the container in inverted (non-canonical) position.
The second half of the comprehension study was itself divided into two parts; the first
investigated when an object moving down into a container would be deemed to be in.
Two responses were thought possible; level at the rim, or on the base. Both are
acceptable within the functional relations theoretical perspective, but since the rim
position occurs first before the base position in the movement of the fruit downwards,
the hypothesis would predict children who understand in in terms of functional control
would choose the rim position predominantly, whereas children using the non-
linguistic schema of Clark (1973) would choose the base position.
The second part of the comprehension study was designed to investigate which of the
senses of over is most apt by asking the subject where the target object first becomes
over the reference when moving on a path. If the functional control sense is most apt,
the object will be over when it moves into the limits defined by the sides of the
reference container; if the above-across sense is most apt, it will be over when it
moves past those limits.
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The results of the Stevens and Coventry study largely confirm the hypothesis. Here
we discuss the results in sections.
7.4.2 Production Experiment Results
In/On
Increased contiguity of movement was re 11ected in greater uses of in as the preposition
to describe the relation of figure to ground objects. This factor was found to interact
with the spatial position of the figure object in relation to the ground object.
Obviously the more the figure object is inside the ground object, the more in is used.
The prediction that there would be no effect of the age of the subjects on the effect of
contiguity of movement on the preposition chosen was confirmed. The youngest
subjects however were still older than the age at which previous studies have
suggested that the use of in and on begins to emerge.
The spatial position of the figure object was found to affect the choice of reference
ground object, container or other fruit. This is an indirect effect of the fact that the
higher the figure object, the greater the number of other fruit on which it was resting;
this increased perceptual salience of the fruit will obviously result in greater use as the
referenced ground object.
An interaction was found between the spatial position of the figure object and the
effect of contiguity of movement of figure and ground on the preposition chosen; the
effect of contiguity increasing use of in was greatest the more the figure object was
within the ground bowl.
The hypotheses predicted that there would be differing effects of continuity of figure
object with other objects in the ground bowl in the three movement conditions on
prepositions chosen. No significant effect of continuity was found in the contiguity of
movement condition. No significant continuity effects however were also found in the
static and non-contiguity of movement conditions. It could be argued that continuity is
not at all a salient factor for children of this age. Alternatively, as the figure apple and
the other oranges in the non-continuity condition were functionally similar in being
fruit, although they are perceptually dissimilar, the non-continuity resulting might not
have been great enough to cause a significant effect on notion of functional control
and preposition choice. Further experiments using non-continuity condition objects
both functionally and perceptually dissimilar is necessary to decide between the two
possibilities.
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There was no effect of contiguity of movement on the reference ground object chosen
confirming the prediction of the hypothesis.
When the notion of functional control in a scene was lessened , the notion of support
seemed to replace it, with greater rise in use of on being observed, rather than use of
prepositions with less notion of functional support according to Garrod and Sanford
(1989), such as on top of.
Over/Above
Most of the subjects were unable to give a response containing a preposition; it is
difficult to discern whether this is because they have not yet acquired productive use
of these prepositions, or because other factors in the situation acquired more salience,
such as the string on which the figure apple hung, and its swinging movement in the
dynamic scenes which were commented on by the subjects in most of the responses
containing no preposition.
The latter argument was strengthened by the observation that increased movement in
the scene led to increased responses containing no preposition. It is however possible
that another factor had an effect. In the static scene where the apple hung over the
brick, there was increases use of on top of, which decreased when movement was
present; thus the children may have used on top of where they believed it appropriate
in the static scene, and given no response in the dynamic scenes because they believed
it inappropriate.
The hypothesis predicted that children would overextend productions of already
acquired prepositions like in and on into scenes where other prepositions would be
more accurate. This was demonstrated by the effect of age on prepositions chosen.
7.4.3 Comprehension Experiment Results
The prediction of the hypothesis was confirmed that mean score would increase with
age and that the pattern of mistakes across the groups would reflect the order of
acquisition in, on, under, over/above observed in most cross-cultural studies (e.g.,
Johnston and Slobin, 1979). The significant increase in mean score with age was that
between the 3;3 and 4;4 mean age groups, and reflected the acquisition of
comprehension of over and above by the latter group, and also by the 5;3 mean age
group, it was not possible to show that acquisition of over preceded that of above, as
predicted.
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However these two older groups of subjects seemed unable to produce these
prepositions in the puppet-theatre situations. Possibly comprehension of spatial
prepositions precedes production; the alternative hypothesis which is more likely is
that the production experiment protocol was more difficult for the children to focus on
preposition required to describe a scene, because of the presence of the string and the
swinging movement.
The prediction that errors would fall under the non-linguistic rules schema of Clark
(1973) was also confirmed. Thus when confronted with a canonical container, subjects
would place the figure object in the container, whereas with an inverted non-canonical
container, subjects would place the figure object on the container.
These errors show that the child is constructing a mental model which does not
reference the preposition in the linguistic instruction. The functional model to which
the child is responds is one that is constructed from the most likely relation between
the figure and the ground objects, that may have been encountered during the child's
own play with objects; that the child responds is because of the social demands of the
experimental situation.
The trend in in responses seen in the second comprehension experiment suggests a
subsumption of the model derived from the non-linguistic rules schema of Clark
(1973) by that from functional control sometime in the third year.
The over responses produced in comprehension experiment one follow a
developmental trend; the youngest group mostly either give no response, or placed the
figure in or on the ground object in accordance with the non-linguistic rules of Clark
(1973), although some subjects could place the figure above the ground or pass the
figure over the ground; the middle group all gave a response, though the proportional
pattern of responses across the non-linguistic passed and above groups remained the
same; the eldest group also gave responses, but responses in the passed group
increased significantly.
A significant proportion of the youngest group were able to give a response in this
comprehension experiment, whilst virtually none were able to do so in the over
paradigm of the production experiment. Thus possibly comprehension of these
prepositions precedes production; however it was shown that in the production
experiment there were certain methodological problems and it would be unwise
therefore to draw conclusions about the relation of comprehension to production in
these experiments.
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The eldest group showed a significant increase in use of passed response, where focus
is given to the endpoint of the path across the ground container. In comprehension
experiment two, a similar change in uses os senses of over can be seen. The youngest
group predominantly are unable to respond in the experiment as to when the figure
object becomes over the ground object; those responses given are when the figure is
over the centre of the container. The middle group however show a vast increase in
the centre response. The eldest group show a different pattern, where the passed
response increases significantly, as dores the outset response. These latter responses
both possibly are accounted for by the above-across sense of Brugman (1981, 1988),
Lakoff 1987) and Brugman and Lakoff (1988).
The sense of over that would be predicted by functional control is where the figure
object is controlled by the ground, but is spatially separated from it; this would be
reflected by the above response in experiment one and the centre response in
experiment two. This sense does seem to be the one that emerges earliest
developmentally. However, other senses of over do exist, and these seem to be occur
predominantly after theyhave emerged. The above-across sense of Brugman is one
that can be seen to emerge in these groups of subjects. Over would therefore be
polysemous as Lakoff (1987) predicted, the the functional control sense may be that
sense which is central member to which others are linked by image-transformations,
as it emerges earliest.
7.5 Conclusions: Summary of First Acquisition Literature
We have presented above a review of the first acquisition of spatial prepositions.
What we have argued is that existing first aquisition literature can be reinterpreted in
light of previous chapters where we have argued, and presented experimental evidence
in support of the argument, that functional relations are more central to the meaning
of spatial prepositions (some, not all) than geometric relations. When the literature is
viewed from this perspective, we have compelling support from the acquisition data.
The picture that emerges is that the infant is initially concerned with properties of
objects in terms of the functions that objects have, and how objects interact with each
other. Thus, the youngest children in Clark's (1972, 1977) studies always acted in
accordance with the functions of the ground object concerned; if the ground was a
container, the figure was automatically put inside the ground; if the ground was not a
container, but had a supporting surface, then the figure was placed on top of the
ground.
Furthermore, the order of acquisition supports the hypothesis that the prepositions
which are learned first are those involving functional relations, rather than those
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involving purely geometric relations. The most convincing evidence for this is that
above and below are learned later than over and under. This result cannot be
explained in terms of frequency of use, or complexity as over and under are more
complex. The most straightforward explanation is that over docs involve a functional
component, where as above does not.
The Stevens and Coventry study provides the clearest evidence for the importance of
functional relations, with a study that demonstrates a great deal of continuity between
adult and child attribution of prepositions to situations. There appears to be a valuable
parallel to be drawn between the adult and child data.
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Chapter 8
Minimal Specification in Action: A Conceptual Analysis
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we wish to demonstrate that a minimally specified account of the
semantics of spatial prepositions can work. Furthermore, from the point of view of
linguistic theory it makes more sense. We begin the chapter with a reanalysis of the
use types of Herskovits (1986), demonstrating that they can be usefully reclassified
within a minimally specified framework by extending the pragmatic principles which
already play a central role in her analysis.
We then develop minimally specified lexical entries1 incorporating the evidence
accrued in the last chapter involving primary use of functional relations, This
framework is developed within a semantic field.
8.2 Ilerskovilsiau Use Types Reclassified
8.2.1 The Case of In
Let us begin with in. We can start with the meaning postulated by Garrod and
Sanford. This is;
In: Inclusion of a geometric construct in a 1, 2 or 3-D functionally controlling space.
We have examined in chapter five what this actually means, and have suggested some
improvements, but at this time this version will suffice. What we wish to argue here is
that one lexical entry only is necessary to derive the use types, which do not have to
be lexicalised in our account. What we can do, is to take the pragmatic principles
outlined by Herskovits, and apply them to the lexical entry above. In this way,
separate lexicalisation of use types is not necessary.
We can begin with an example given by Herskovits. The expression;
the nails in the box
1 See also Schlesinger (1979, 1989) for a similar argument made for instrumental case.
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according to Herskovits (p, 87) corresponds to two different use types, one that
implies containment, the other embedding. The distinction between containment and
embedding, Herskovits argues, is supported by the use of conjunctions such as :
There is plutonium and a crack in the vase.
There are nails and a hammer in the box.
As we have seen earlier in the thesis, tests for ambiguity are ill-founded (see sections
1.4.2 and 6.2). Indeed, we have provided (section 6.2) an explanation as to why
conjunctions, such as above do not appear to be felicitous.
Let us pursue the case of nails, in this case, the nail in the board. Herskovits (p. Ill)
appeals to the knowledge of the normal properties of and interaction with the objects
to draw pragmatic inferences which further determine the normal situation type, but
do not stem from the matching use type. As she states;
"Having selected gap/object 'embedded' in physical object as the relevant use
type, we can be more specific than simply asserting that the nail is embedded
in the board; we know that the nail will typically be as in figure [8.1] (a) as
opposed to figure (b) below. What we know about the use of nails, about the
properties of wood, and how a nail is inserted into it, make situations like (b)
very unlikely. And since a normal situation type is restricted to normal
interactions of the objects related, it is restricted to the interpretation




This description of decoding brings into focus basic reasoning abilities which one
must assume underlie language processing. These are listed by Herskovits as checking
consistency, selecting a best match, and drawing inferences. However, if one is
appealing to this type of information, then surely this should be utilised early on. In
the case of the nails in the board there are two possible interpretations of the
expression. It does not follow that if there are two interpretations of the expression
(which there are), that the two different interpretations have to match two different
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lexical representations for the preposition. Acknowledging that there are two different
uses for the expression simply has to be accounted for. From our knowledge of nails
and boards we know that nails have a strong tendency to be embedded in surfaces.
Indeed that is the main function of nails; to hold objects together. This will be,
naturally one of the most important pieces of information we have stored in memory
about nails; their function. If we then turn to the object of the expression, the board,
it becomes clear that the function of a nail will be the strongest factor leading to the
interpretation of the whole expression. However, the knowledge about how nails are
normally in surfaces leads to the interpretation in (a). The point is that the
interpretation relates heavily to the function of nails. The function implies that the nail
is through the board. Hence, the introduction of the importance of 'function' enables
the interpretation (a) to be reached rather than (b) (although (b) is a possible
interpretation given a suitable context).
According to Herskovits's account there are two different interpretations of a single
use type in the case of the nail in the board. We have given an explanation as to how
an interpretation is realised. However, if there are two different interpretations of a
single use type, there must be a case for the lexicalisation of these different
interpretations if Herskovits is to remain consistent. Herskovits does not do this,
which leaves the question of why she decides not to lexicalise at this level, when she
decides to lexicalise use types, which are at a similar level. Let us pursue this point.
To continue with our theme of nails, let us examine the contrast between ;
The nails are in the board.
The nails are in the box.
With the first sentence we have two possible interpretations of the use type gap/object
'embedded' in physical object. These are (a) and (b) above. With the second sentence
we similarly have many interpretations of the use type gap/object 'embedded in
physical object. However, with the second sentence we also have the possibility of the
the use of another use type, namely, spatial entity in container. We can have all the
interpretations of the second sentence depicted in figure 8.2.
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One can ask the question of whether there is a difference between the situations
depicted above. Certainly, it is true that (c) is a less viable interpretation of the
sentence than (a) or (b). In some way we wish to capture this fact. Herskovits does
this when talking about the realisation of a use type as discussed above with recourse
to general world knowledge. However, we wish to point out that the same information
required at this point can also be used to come up with the interpretation given in (a),
a different use type, without requiring the lexicalisation of a different use type.
The main difference between the two sentences above is in the ground of the
expression. We have already discussed the information germane to nails which will
lead to more probable interpretations. In the case of the figure of the first sentence,
there is considerable empathy between the figure and ground from our knowledge of
nails and boards. If we cross-match information that may be present in the lexical
entries for the nouns involved, we easily come to the reading already intimated. The
lexical entries for the nouns may look something like the following;
Nail: Used to hold things together. Normally in fiat surfaces. Information
about shape. Representation of hammering action.
Board: Flat surface. Supporting function. Part of larger surface. Normally
made of wood.
The information above suggests that the most likely candidates for the preposition will
be in, on and through based on the knowledge we have in the entries above. The
reading of in which will be realised will be the use type as suggested. There is nothing
in the lexical entry for board to suggest the reading of spatial entity in container. A
board is not normally conceived of as being a container. If we consider the case in
Figure 8.3 below, there is a strong tendency to say that the nail is on the board rather
than the nail is in the board. From our conceptualisation of a board apparent in the
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Figure 8.3
lexical entry for board, there is no information suggesting that a board can be a
container with respects to a nail in the way that a box can. However, if we substitute
woodworm for nail the story is quite different. Woodworm can be viewed as being
contained in a board. This is not the gap/object 'embedded' in physical object use
type as Herskovits's analysis would suggest; the woodworm can move freely in the
wood, although their position is still being controlled by the movement of the board.
What is becoming apparent is that we must examine both nouns in the expression
before an interpretation is possible. Turning to the expression, the nails in the. box,
two interpretations of this expression are equally plausible. This becomes clear when
we consider what the lexical entry for box many look like;
Box: Has the function of containing other objects (normally smaller than the box).
Yet again, a functional component greatly influences the interpretation of the
expression. As the function of a box is to contain other objects, the use type, spatial
entity in container is a plausible candidate for the interpretation of the expression.
Indeed, because of knowledge we have about the function of nails and boxes we
require a context with which to decide on the interpretation appropriate in a particular
situation. In other words, given the sentence in the null context, the use type
interpretations of gap/object 'embedded' in physical object and spatial entity in
container are both equally plausible interpretations. These interpretations are derived
from the lexical entry above applied to the nouns in the expression, and the conceptual
information therein is crosschecked.
Let us now substitute the object of the above expression for another object. We can
try the noun, doll. In the lexical entry for this we will have something like the
following;
Doll: Toy, often made of plastic or cloth, with human features.
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There is no information in this entry about the function of dolls that is relevant to the
relation, in. If dolls have a function, it is to be played with. Thus, with the
expression, the doll is in the box the function of the box leads to the interpretation of
the expression such that the doll is situated interior to the box.
The picture being painted here rests very much on the lexical entry for the preposition
involving the notion of function. This is essential for the interpretation of the
expression. The introduction of 'functional relations' into the analysis, and into the
representation for the lexical entry for in, alleviates the need for separate lexicalisation
of the use types for in proposed by Herskovits (1986). As the pragmatic principles
and world knowledge required by Herskovits in her analysis have to be used to get to
the situation type, there is no reason why these principles cannot be used only earlier.
The rationale for this is that the knowledge is being used already, so here is no need
for separate lexicalisation of the use types.
We also wish to drop the use types on the grounds of our now familiar objections to
full specification. In this case, it is always possible to further split the use types into
yet more use types. If one wished to carve up the geometric world, then the level of
analysis adopted is arbitrary.
8.1.2 The Case of At
Turning to at, we propose that there are two different senses for at which need to be
lexicalised. These are;
Atl: (Static) for a point to coincide with another
At2: (Dynamic) for an object to functionally interact with another object
The differences in sense reflect the distinction between an abstract detached pieces
geometric meaning and a functional meaning involving interaction between the objects
concerned. This distinction is supported by the results of experiments two and three
reported in chapter five. The experiments followed the method of sense delineation
suggested by Herskovits herself; namely that a spatial preposition will correspond to
two different senses if there is some distinction important to a language user. The
results provided evidence in terms of switching of preposition when ATI and At2 were
both possible candidates for sentence completions in two sentences paired with
complex pictures. Thus, the distinction between Atl and Atl is supported using
criteria Herskovits accepts.
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Adopting two senses for at, one can easily reclassify the use types given by
Herskovits for at as falling under Atl or At2. These are schematised in figure 8.4.
Some of the use types are listed under both senses as they can be used in both ways
depending on the objects involved in the expressions. For example, taking the case of
Julie is at the post-office, both senses are appropriate under different conditions. Atl
is appropriate if Julie is walking down the street, and the speaker is referring to Julie's
position at that particular moment in time in relation to a path. This is the abstract,
detached pieces geometric usage. On the other hand, if one was to say that Julie is at
the post-office in response to an enquiry such as "where's Julie?", then the At2 sense
is appropriate. This sense means much more than simply specifying Julie's
whereabouts. Additionally, the sense implies that Julie is interacting with the post-
office in a functionally appropriate way. In this case, she may be buying stamps or
withdrawing some family credit.
Figure 8.4
At J extensions
Spatial entity at location
Spatial entity at generic place
Spatial entity at landmark in highlighted medium
Physical object 011 line and indexically defined crosspath




Spatial entity at location
One can however contrast ;
Julie is at the post-office.
*Julie is at the bedroom/corridor.
The difference here is perfectly consistent with a minimally specified account. The
use of at is not appropriate in the second sentence above as the objects are not
associated directly enough with a functional relation. A bedroom is conceived of a
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place which contains a bed. However, a shop, place of work, etc, are directly
associated with functional relations. A bedroom and corridor are however primarily
conceived of as containing spaces, hence the morpheme 'room'. Nevertheless, one
can conceive of a situation where one can be at the bedroom. If Julie was a carpenter
working 011 my bedroom, then I may usefully say that Julie is at the bedroom using
At2l .
Herskovits points to a remote/close-up viewpoint distinction contrasting at with on
and in with respects to the "spatial entity at location" use type. These contrasts can be
readily explained with recourse to our two senses for at. Let us take up Herskovits's
pair comparisons (p. 132);
Jonas is at/in the store.
June is at/in the supermarket.
Lou is at/on the beach.
Jimmy is at/next to the pool.
Sue is at/by the lake.
Herskovits argues that at is associated with a remote point of view, whereas in is
associated with a close-up point of view. Herskovits explains five conditions which
separate out the two expressions in each case. Let us explain these within our
alternative framework. The five observations (p. 132-133) are:
(1) At will be required if speaker and addressee are close to each other and far from
the supermarket. What counts as "far" is difficult to make precise. The ordinary
Euclidian metric does not apply. For instance, space in a city is organised by salient
boundaries: of buildings, yards, streets, etc. The applicable metric has more to do
with how many of these boundaries are crossed than with straight Euclidian distance.
Thus, if I am across the street from the supermarket, I am more likely to use at than I
am in the parking lot, although the actual distance may be the same.
(2) In will be required if speaker and addressee are close to each other in the
supermarket.
(3) At will be preferred if the speaker's knowledge of June's position is not based on
direct perception: conversely, in will be preferred if the speaker can see June, or more
generally has direct perceptual evidence of her presence in the supermarket.
1 Of course, one can say Julie is at the bedroom using At I applied to Julie walking past a series of
doors, one of which is the bedroom door.
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(4) In will be required if the speaker needs to contrast the interior with the exterior,
for instance when the addressee expects June to be just outside the supermarket.
(5) There is a tolerance for sentences with at not to be rigorously true at the time of
speaking. Thus I could well say June is at the supermarket, not knowing, and not
caring, whether she has already arrived there. No such laxity is allowed with June is
in the supermarket.
Distance from the supermarket is relevant in that information about what someone is
doing at a moment in time is most relevant when it is less obvious. In the case of (1),
a question such as "where is June?" requires as informative an answer as possible.
The use of at is therefore appropriate as it not only describes a location, but an
activity too. This is reflected in a similar answer to the question, "she's away
shopping". The fact that June is contained in the building is normally of much less
interest to the inquirer. However, if the speakers are nearer the supermarket, in may
be a more appropriate response as containment is of more relevance in that situation.
If the speakers are near the supermarket, they are more likely to know that June is on
a shopping trip as they must know her if they are conversing about her. They
therefore already have knowledge about her actions, i.e., that she is shopping. In this
situation, at may still be used for emphasis. Even if one was in the supermarket car
park (of course leading to the implication that those parked in the car park may indeed
be shopping; yet again the speakers know June, and therefore have more knowledge
about her actions). June may be well known for her spendaholic tendencies, in which
case, June is at the supermarket may be used to emphasise her shopping tendencies.
It should be mentioned that the use of in in this case can also lead to the implication
that June is shopping. However, the purpose of June's trip is much more obvious with
the use of at as At2 directly incorporates this component in the lexical entry. It can be
argued that the mention of the noun supermarket itself leads to the implication, and
not the preposition in in this case. The notion of containment, however, will strongly
suggest shopping as the person will have been there for a significant period of time.
If both conversants are in the supermarket, in will be required as it is obvious that the
referent is shopping as the conversants are too. Containment will then be the most
relevant preposition to use. The question "Where is June?" will almost certainly refer
to the whether or not June has changed location or not. The use of at in this situation
doesn't work as June could still be at the supermarket if she was pushing her shopping
trolley outside the supermarket. The car park can be conceived of as part of the
shopping excursion in a similar way, and hence being in the car park is still
interaction with the supermarket.
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(3) naturally follows from what has already been said. If one can see June, then one
will know that she is shopping/interacting with the supermarket in a functional way.
Containment is then the appropriate relation therefore to use.
Yet again, (4) has already been explained by the fact that at could have June pushing
the shopping trolley outside the supermarket building. In specifies the contrast of
interior with exterior, i.e., a change of state.
To finish this example, (5) naturally follows as June could be pushing the trolley
outside the supermarket. The functional relation suggests the whole functional
interaction with supermarket, and this doesn't all have to be contained within the
supermarket.
Turning to the "person using artifact" use type, Herskovits argues that the normal use
condition could not be inferred pragmatically; terns which fall within this use type are
not simply special cases of " spatial entity at location". For example, with Maggie is
at her desk, one could claim that, if Maggie was very close to her desk but cleaning
the floor, the sentence was not false but uncooperative: the speaker should know that
the addressee will infer that Maggie is using her desk. Herskovits makes the point that
such a pragmatic inference should be "cancellable" (following Grice, 1974): if the
sentence by itself risks misleading, but its conventional meaning admits the possibility
that Maggie is not using the desk, the speaker need only warn the addressee, but
means of an added but clause for instance:
*?Maggie is at her desk, but she is cleaning the floor.
This sentence seems contradictory. Herskovits provides other examples indicating that
functional interaction is a key factor is separating this use type from the others.
However, Herskovits does not recognise the importance of functional relations with
respects to any of the other use types. For example, to return to Julie is at the post
office, we can see that the same problems with cancelling a supposed pragmatic
inference apply here;
*?Julie is at the post office, but she is hailing a taxi.
We have already discussed the role of functional relations with "spatial entity at
location". Let us focus on the "person at institution" use type. This use type,
according to Herskovits, is related to the "spatial entity at location" use type. This is
clearest, Herskovits suggests, when one compares:
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My son is at the University
My son studies at the University.
The verb in the second sentence denotes the activity performed at the institution.
Hence, one can in fact construct parallel expressions synonymous with the ones falling
clearly into the use type "spatial entity at location".
This interpretation is hardly surprising as we see the above expressions as relating to
At2. When one says My son is at the university, the assumption is that he works there.
The addition of a verb adds specificity to this. He could be a student there, a lecturer,
or a cleaner or secretary. The normal interpretation is that the son is a student. The
addition of the verb makes it clearer what type of functional interaction takes place
there in this case. Furthermore, one can use/1/2 without the use of the determiner;
My son is at university
but this is not true with Atl;
*My son is at junction.
Thus the reduction of use types to two senses for at appears to deal with case
accountability adequately, as well as being supported by the behaviour of language
users empirically.
8.1.3 The Case of On
Our analysis of on follows the same pattern as for that of in. We can follow Garrod
and Sanford in recognising the lexical entry as;
On: For a geometric construct X to be contiguous with a line or surface Y. If Y is the
surface of an object Oy, and X is the space occupied by another object Ox, for Oy to
support Ox.
Again, this lexical entry can be used to derive the use types dependent on information
pertinent to the function of the Figure and ground in the expression. For example,
Herskovits proposes that there is a use type for on which is Physical object
transported by a large vehicle. For example, one can say the children on the bus. This
is compatible with the lexical entry postulated above. The children are being
functionally supported by the bus; the bus is providing the function of a (moving)
supporting surface to change the location of the passengers. A container also can
provide this function. Herskovits (1986) notes that one cannot say *the children on the
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car. This is because a car is viewed as a container, thus still functionally controlling
the location of the children. However, one is more likely to lose one's balance
travelling on a bus as compared with a car. Thus the analogy of a table is more
appropriate for a bus as compared with a car.
The pragmatics detailed by Herskovits affecting the use of on again can be extended
to avoid lexicalisation of the use types, much as has been done for in above. We
therefore will move on to consider our analysis.
8.2 In, On, At, Over, Under, Above, Below: The Final Analyses
Spatial prepositions may be divided into two classes; those involving a functional
component and those involving no functional component. Functional relations are
primary in our analysis, reflected in the fact that spatial prepositions involving a
functional component are learned before those that don't. In, on, over and under do
involve such a component, whereas above and below do not. Initial evidence for this
comes by way of the fact that figure/ground variations with in, on, over and under
lead to different geometric positionings of figure in relation to ground. With above
and below, by contrast, variations in figure and ground have no significant effects on
the spatial relations depicted. Thus above and below can be regarded as being abstract
geometric relations, whereas the other terms are not purely geometric in nature (that






What is important is the interpretation of the term functional here. We will begin with
in, which developmentally emerges before the others to be considered.
For in to be used appropriately a container must be fulfilling its function. The criteria
used to govern this depends on the container. Thus, in experiment Five in chapter five
it was found that the specific type of container does influence use of in when the pile
of objects is extremely high in static situations, but that contiguity of movement of
figure with ground significantly increases use of in and overrides information about
the height of the pile, and non-continuity information. The function of a container is
to control the location of objects designed for it to contain. It is sensible then, that the
interpretation of an expression involving in will therefore be dependent on knowledge
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associated with the container, and information relating to its purpose. If a container
can be shown to be fulfilling its function, then in can be deemed to be appropriate. In
this analysis constraint on location is primary, and the geometry of situations is a by¬
product of the container fulfilling its function. This approach avoids recourse to the
use of Herskovits's (1986) principle of tolerance. Within this framework, all the
situations in figure 8.5 are plausible candidates for use of in. In (c) in is appropriate
as the bowl is constraining the location of the balls which in turn are constraining the
location of the pear. Thus the bowl is functionally containing the pear via other
objects.
In experiment five, chapter five, it was demonstrated that contiguity of movement
enables one to use in where it would clearly not be a primary candidate with the same
scene used statically. Again, a purely geometric framework fails to capture this
finding.
The importance of specific function of objects provides us with an explanation for
some of the problems of case accountability cited throughtout the thesis. We can





In (a) in is not appropriate; it is at best misleading. Although it can be argued that if
the bowl was moved in (a) that the pear would move with it, the bowl is not fulfilling
its function in the way in which it was designed. Containers need to be in canonical
orientation if they have no lid for them to successfully contain objects. Thus, object
specific information about function is important. Notice that if a container has a lid,
then it can be inverted and use of in is still appropriate.
In (c) the orientation of the socket goes against gravity. The function of a socket is to
contain a lightbuib. In this case canonical orientation has no effect as the lightbulb is
screwed into the socket.
Turning to the issue of how the language and the spatial world covary, we can begin
with the encoding problem. Use of in is predicted more by contiguity of movement of
figure with ground than geometric positioning. In static scenes, other information
aside from geometric positioning effects the use of in. It would appear that we need to
make reference to mental models to explain the change in criteria used dependent on
whether the scenes are static or dynamic. Use of in is not dependent on a single
definition (as in classical accounts) being met or not, but is dependent on the mental
model constructed in relation to the spatial situation. Experiment four (in chapter five)
provided evidence for this. By mental model, we mean a temporary structure in
working memory which serves as a surrogate representation between language and the
spatial world.
With respects to case accountability, the importance of functional relations (how
objects interact with each other) becomes central. The actual geometric position of
figure in relation to ground is predicted most by the specific functional containment
properties of the ground, rather than a construct such as interior. The fact that interior
holds in many situations is part-and-parcel of functional containment.
Having examined how use of in and the world covary, one can arrive at a lexical
entry for in. The entry we offer is that of functional containment. This is a minimal
representation, and requires several operations to be performed to get at the
interpretation of an utterance. It is only after relevant functional properties of the
figure and ground have been accessed can the interpretation take place. This is in turn
affected by other information apparent, such as contiguity of movement of figure with
ground, etc. The important point here is that it is interaction between objects which is
important, and in particular interaction relating to what objects are for. Not only are
criteria relevant in relation to whether the ground is fulfilling its function, but the
function of the figure is also paramount. A nail, for example, has a specific function,
which relates to its containment properties. Thus a nail is not normally in objects in
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the same way that a ball is, for example. This explains the ambiguity is cases such as
the nail is in the box without recourse to the postulation of two different senses for in.
On is treated in a similar way to in. This time it is functional support which is of
relevance. For example, in the case of figure 8.7, in is not appropriate for use as the
table has a strong functional support characteristic. We can see that the relationship
between prepositions relates to the functions of objects. Thus we can explain the cases
previously unaccounted lor in chapter five, involving transitivity. One can say in
figure 8.8 (a) that the book is on the table (the dictionary), and in (c) that the lid is on
the table, but one cannot say in (b) that the lid is on the table. The explanation for
this can found with recourse to the functional properties of the objects involved. In (b)
Figure 8.7
the jar and lid have a strong functional interaction relation in that jars are sealed with
lids, and the function of a lid is to seal a jar. Thus the primary interaction in (b)
involving the lid is that involving the jar. In (a) and (c), although the book and lid are
being supported by the brick and books respectively, the functional properties of the
table as a supporting surface are primary. Thus cases of transitivity can be explained
in terms of object specific functional support.
We concur with Bennett (1990) on the choice of the superiority for the central sense
of over. We wish to add to this a function component, where the lexical entry for over
is functional aboveness. This entry, at the very least, can allow for a reduction in the
number of senses of over that are recognised in the Brugman and Lakoff account.
Again, functional properties relating to the function of the figure and ground can
account for geometric relations. In the case of the tablecloth over the table, the
specific function of the tablecloth is enough to indicate that contact is present without
postulating a different sense for over. This case is marked in that the use of on
(functional support) highlights the function of the table, and thus leads to a different
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interpretation. Thus, over in terms of functional aboveness is flexible with respects to
the functional properties of figure and ground. Over, therefore, has a wide




There are several salient points which have been made during the course of the thesis.
To conclude, we wish to reiterate these main points. The points made fall into two
areas. Firstly, we have suggested a methodology with which to deal with lexical
semantics. In particular, it has been argued that a close link between linguistic theory
and processing is heuristic to semantic analysis. Moreover, we have developed a set
of methods which can aid the delineation of senses. Two principles can be outlined ;
(1) For an analysis to merit two different senses of a word, the occurrences have to
have a difference which is psychologically motivated in addition to the linguistic
criteria which have been extensively discussed.
(2) Any theory proposing a set of senses for a word should test the distinctions made
empirically so that the theory has psychological validity.
All researchers in the area of prepositions have talked about psychological validity
without pursing it to any degree. Their analyses are flawed accordingly. Distinctions
made in a theory of language should ultimately represent distinctions made by the
users of language. One cannot study language independent of the users of that
language as it is the users we rely on the establish whether communication is
successful or not.
Secondly, we have suggested indirectly that lexical semantics it at a crossroads. The
"skeleton in the cupboard of cognitive science", to quote Herskovits, at the end of this
thesis, has almost certainly risen from the dead to haunt cognitive science. In
particular, we arrive at a major problem with semantic analyses, as is standardly
practised. This is, at least from a processing point of view, that it is necessary to have
information about both nouns in an expression (and here we are only dealing with the
verb, 'be') in order to come up with an interpretation of the expression. What is
more, the information has to be crosschecked before a semantic interpretation can take
place. Furthermore, from the semantic point of view, the information that is relevant
in the lexical entry for each nominal (which will be represented conceptually in a
variety of ways), can only be determined during the crosschecking unless there is
prior information available.
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The position adopted also has ramification for semantics in general. The main point
here is that the meaning of a word in context is dependent on the co-occurrence
relations that that word has with other words in context. This means that it is difficult
to get an idea about the lexical entry for a word because it is difficult to separate out
the word from the end result of the crosschecking process.
General Conclusions
We have shown that in can be appropriately used if the container is shown to be
fullfilling its function. Functional containment is to successfully contain objects
associated with individual containers. This may mean that a container can only contain
specific objects/figures as associated with a particular function. The question to be
asked is the one of how one can assess whether or not a container is fullfilling its
function. Two criteria have been examined in the thesis;
(1) If the container, as already suggested, contains the figure associated with it. For
example, if the geometric position remains the same, the object most associated with
the function of the container will be associated with 'in' more than an object which
does not have such an association with the cointainer. However, containers do share
common properties, i.e., by virtue of their physical dimensions, they are bound to
have common functions. Thus the effects of ground-function specificity may only hold
in cases where this 'common function' appears to be in doubt.
(2) If it can be demonstrated that a container is fullfilling its function as a container.
Thus, if it controls the location of the figure over time, as this is its function; to
constrain the location of the objects it contains. A container which does not fullfil this
function is not a container. Thus it can be predicted that, if the figure is shown to
remain in the same position in relation to the container over time, then the function of
the container will be vindicated, and thus the relation 'in' is appropriate.
In situations where there is not enough information available to assess whether the
container is fullfilling its function, then other information may be used to assess this.
One way would be to use various discri minabil ity criteria, such as
continuity/discontinuity effects.
Thus coordination phenomena, such as zeugma, may be explained with reference to
inference-chaining, as opposed to the semantic content of the preposition, etc.
The content for the lexical entry for 'in' will be much as Garrod and Sanford
describe; that of functional containment. However, this will not be, as Herskovits
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(1986) suggests, and as Garrod and Sanford assume, an 'ideal' meaning with use
types lexicalised. There is no need for this. Nor, as Lakoff (1987) mentions, do we
require a prototypical representation for 'in' with other senses represented
polysemously in a radial lexicon. Instead, 'in' has a minimal representation
'functional containment' which operates inference procedures for a more specific
realisation of the spatial relations involved. The key to this lies in the use of the word
'functional', which necessitates the accessing of functionally relevant information to
do with figure and ground, and importantly how they may interact with each other.
'On' may be treated the same way. That is, there is a minimal specification for its
lexical entry, namely 'functional support', and the specific spatial relations this
denotes on each occassion is dependent on the functional properties of the figure and
ground. However, not all prepositions are quite as clear cut. 'At', we have argued, is
a different case in that there are maybe two senses of 'at'. We found evidence for this
with experiement one. Other prepositions may not be quite as simple. 'Over' for
instance has been examined in some detail. Although there is an important functional
component with 'over', there is suggestion that Lakoff (1987) may be correct in his
arguments for full specification.
Other prepositions, such as 'above' do not have a functional component, and indeed
appear to be learned later. Such relations are abstract geometric relations, and do
perhaps call for the types of geometric analyses suggested by Crangle and Suppes
(1989). However, conceptually some prepositions which do not require a direct
functional component in the lexical entry still have different realisations ('situation
types') associated with the objects involved. 'Near' for example involves distances
between objects dependent on the objects. It also requires that the objects are roughly
the same size. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference with 'near' and 'in'. 'In'
involves control relations, constraints on location, control of position over time.
'Near' by contrast is a static relation, a 'detached pieces' relation which does not
involve inference about how objects causally interact with each other over time. To
put it another way, 'in' requires the force dynamics of Talmy (1988), and 'near' does
not.
Once again, it has been argued (chapter 7) that functional relation prepositions are
learned first, and abstract geometric relations are learned later. This seems to be the
case. The young child learns spatial relations through interaction with the objects.
Initially this leads the child to directly associate words with the functions of objects. It
is later that the child learns words associated with more abstract (geometric) relations
which are less (if at all) reliant on functional information.
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One final point relates to experientialism. It should be noted that the analysis
presented is perfectly compatible with Lakoff's (1987) account of experientialism.
The mistake that Lakoff and other cognitive linguists have made is to start from
spatial relations and work to other domains. In the realm of spatial language, it is




Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L., & Gleitman, H. (1983). What some concepts might
not be. Cognition 13, 263-308.
Barlow, H. B. (1972). Single units and sensation: A neuron doctrine for perceptual
psychology? Perception, 1, 371-394.
Barsalou, L. W. (1983). Ad-hoc Categories. Memory and Cognition, 11, 211-27.
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency and frequency of instantiation as
determiners of graded structure in categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology
(Learning Memory and Cognition), 11, 629-654.
Bennett, D. C. (1972). Some observations concerning the locative-directional
distinction. Semiotica, 5, 58-88.
Bennett, D. C. (1975). Spatial and temporal uses ofEnglish prepositions : an essay in
stratificational semantics. London : Longman.
Bennett, D. C. (1990). Componential analysis, prototype theory and the meaning of
English prepositions. Draft of paper in progress.
Berlin, B. & Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms: Their Universality and evolution.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Berry, M. (1975). An Introduction to Systemic Linguistics. London: Batsford.
Bierwisch, Manfred (1982). Formal and Lexical Semantics. In: Linguistische Berichte
80/82, 3-17 and also in: S. Hattori/K.Inoue (eds.) Proceedings of the. XHIth
204
International Congress of Linguists, August 29 - September, 1982, Tokyo 1983, pp.
122 - 136.
Bierwisch, Manfred (1983). Semantische und konzeptuelle Reprasentationen
lexikalischer Einheiten. In: W. Motsch/ R. Ruzicka (eds.), Untersuchungen zur
Semantik, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag (=studia granunatica XXII), 1983, pp. 61-99.
Bierwisch, Manfred (1986). On the nature of Semantic Form in Natural Language. In
F. Klix and H. Hagendorf (eds.), Memory and Cognitive Capabilities ; Mechanisms
and Performances. Amsterdam:North-Holland.
Bierwisch, Manfred (1987). Semantik der Graduierung. In: Manfred Bienvisch/Ewald
Lang (1987a), pp. 91-286.
Bierwisch, Manfred (1988). On the Grammar of Local Prepositions. In: M.
Bierwisch/W.Motsch/I. Zimmermann (eds.). Syntax, Semantik und Lexikon. Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag (=studia grammarica XXIX), 1988, pp. 1-65.
Bierwisch, Manfred/ Ewald Lang (1987a) (eds.). Grammatische und konzeptuelle
Aspekte von Dimensionsadjektiven. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag ( = studia grammatica
XXVI + XXVIi).
Bierwisch, Manfred/ Ewald Lang (1987b). Etwas langer - viel tiefer - immer weiter:
Epilog zum Dimensionsadjektivprojekt. In: Bierwisch/Lang 1987a, pp. 649-699.
Boguraev, B. & Pustejovsky, J. (1990). Lexical ambiguity and the role of knowledge
representation in lexicon design. Coling90, vol. II, 36-41.
Bower, T. (1974). Development in Infancy. W. H. Freeman.
205
Braisby, N. R. (1990). Description and Necessity: Towards a cognitive science of
word meaning. PhD Thesis. University of Edinburgh.
Bransford, J. D. and Johnson, M. K. (1973). Consideration of some problems of
comprehension. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual Information Processing. Academic
Press: New York.
Briscoe, T., Copestake, A. & Boguraev, B. (1990). Enjoy the paper: semantics via
lexicology. Coling90, vol. II, 42-47.
Brown, R. (1965). Social Psychology. New York: Free Press.
Bruce, V. and Green, P. R. (1990). Visual Perception. 2nd Edition. Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates. Hillsdale, USA.
Brugman, C. (1981). The story of 'over'. M.A. Thesis, University of California at
Berkeley. Reprinted by the Indiana University Linguistics Club.
Brugman, C. (1988). The story of 'over' : Polysemy, semantics and the structure of
the lexicon. Garland Press.
Brugman, C. and Lakoff, G. (1988). Cognitive topology and lexical networks. In G.
W. Cottrell, S. Small, and M. K. Tannenhause (Eds.), Lexical ambiguity resolution :
perspectives from psycholinguistics, neuropsychology and artificial intelligence. San
Mateo, CA : Morgan Kaufman Publishers.
Buhler, K. (1982). The Deictic Field of Language and Deictic Words. In R. J.
Jarvella & W. Klein (Eds.), Speech, Place and Action. Studies in Deixis and related
Topics. Chichester, England: Wiley.
206
Burkle, B., Nirmaier, H. & Herrmann, T. (1986). "Von dir aus...." Zur
horerbezogenen lokalcn Riferem, liericht Nr. 10, Arbeiten der Forschergruppe
"Sprechen und Sprache im sozialen Kontext," Heidelberg/Mannheim, West Germany.
Casad, E. (1982). Cora Locationals and Structured Imagery. Ph.D. diss., University
of California, San Diego.
Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language ; Its Nature, Origin and Use. New
York:Praeger (Convergence series).2
Clark, E. V. (1972). On the child's acquisition of antonyms in two semantic fields.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 750-758.
Clark, E. V. (1977). Strategies and the mapping problem in first language acquisition.
In MacNamara (ed,), Language Learning and Thought. Academic Press.
Clark, H. H. (1973). Space, time, semantics and the child. In T. E. Moore (ed.)
Cognitive development and the acquisition of language. New York: Academic Press.
Clark, H. H. (1983). Making Sense of Nonce Sense. In d'Arcais, G. B. F. and
Jarvella, R. J. (eds.), The Process of Language Understanding. Chichester: John
Wiley and Sons. 297-331.
Clark, H. H. and Gerrig, R. J. (1983). Understanding old words with new meanings.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 22, 591-608.
Clark, H. H. (1989). Words, the World and their Possibilities. Manuscript. Stanford
University.
207
Cohen, B. and Murphy, G. L. (1984). Models of Concepts. Cognitive Science, 8, 27-
58.
Colban, Erik (1987). Prepositional Phrases in Situation Schemata. In: Jens Erik
Fenstad, Per-Kristian Halvorsen, Tore Langholm, Johan van Benthem (eds.),
Situation, Language and Logic. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Comp., pp. 133-
156.
Colban, Erik and Jens Erik Fenstad (1987). Situations and Prepositional Phrases. In:
EACL 87proceedings, pp. 258-261.
Coleman, L. & Kay, P. (1981). Prototype semantics: the English verb "lie".
Language, 54, 3.
Cooper, G. S. (1968). A semantic analysis of English locative prepositions. Bolt,
Beranek & Newman Report 1587.
Cooper, Robin (1989). Structured Parameters. Manuscript.
Copestake, A., de Paiva, V., Sanfilippo, A. & Briscoe, T. (1991). Functionality of
the LKB. Draft paper, March.
Coventry, K. R. (1991). Metaphor and literal meaning. In Dan Fass, Elizabeth
hinkleman and James Martin (eds.), Proceedings of the IJCAI-91 Workshop on
Computational Approaches to Non-literal Language: Metaphor, Metonymy, Idiom,
Speech Acts and Implicature, held at the Twelfth International Joint Conference on
Artificial, held in Sydney, August, 1991. University of Colorado at Boulder,
Department of Computer Science Publication CU-CS-550-91.
208
Coventry, K. R. & Ludwig, A. (1991). The semantics of prepositions: a literature
review and proposed framework for future treatment. Centre for Cognitive Science
Research Paper EUCCS/RP-45, University of Edinburgh.
Cox, M. V. & Richardson, J. R. (1985). How do children describe spatial
relationships? Journal of Child Language, 12, 611-620.
Crangle, C. and Suppes, P. (1989). Geometric semantics for spatial prepositions.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIX, pp 399-422.
Crow, J. M. (1990). Locations now and then. In Cooper, Mukai and Perry (ed.s),
Situation Theory and its Applications, volume I. Stanford CSLI.
Cruse, D. A. (1986). Lexical semantics. Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon press,
Oxford.
De Kleer, J. and Brown, J. S. (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic
mental models. In, Mental Models (eds. Gentner and Stevens). Erlbaum Publications.
Dirven, R. (1981). Spatial Relations in English. In G. Radden & R. Dirven (Eds.),
Kasusgrammatik undFremdsprachendidaktik. Trier, West Germany:
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
Dirven, R. and Taylor, T. R. (1988). The conceptualisation of vertical space in
English: the case of Tall. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John
Benjamins Publishing Company. Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
209
Dreyfus, H. L. and Dreyfus, S. (1986). Why skills cannot be interpreted by rules. In
N. E. Sharkey (ed.) Advances in Cognitive Science. Ellis publications.
Dunbar, George (1988). The Mental Lexicon. PhD Thesis. University of Edinburgh.
Durkin, K. (1981a) Aspects of late language acquisition: school children's use and
comprehension of prepositions. First Language, 2. 47-59.
Durkin, K. (1981b). Young schoolchildren's comprehension and production of novel
prepositions. International Journal of Psycholinguistics, 8, 31-53.
Durkin, K. (1983). Children's comprehension of complex sentences containing the
preposition between. Child Study Journal, 13, 133-147.
Durkin, K., Shire, B., Nordahl, T. & Eaton, J. (1990). Spatial vocabulary in
elementary mathematics: children's responses to potential semantic conflicts.
Education Research and Perspectives, 7, No. 1, 50-65.
Ebneter, Theodor (1981). Worterbuch des Romanischen von Obervaz Lenzerheide
Valvella (Beiliefte zur Zeitschrift fur romanische Philologie, Bd. 187). Tubingen.
Ebneter, Theodor (1982). Schu'l Schwob 'ins Schwabenland'. Die lokalen und
direktionalen Adverbien und Prapositionen des Romanischen von Vaz/Obervaz. In:
Fakten und Theorien, Beitrage zur romanischen und allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft.
Festschrift Helmut Stimm, eds. Sieglinde Heinz and Ulrich Wandruszka. Tubingen:
Narr 1982:59-70.
Ebneter, Theodor (1984a). Die Adverbien und Prapositionen des Ortes und der
Richtung imRomanischen von Vaz/Obervaz. In: Zeitschrift fur Romanische Philologie
100, 3/4, 1984:387-407.
210
Ebneter, Tlieodor (1984b). Die Verbpartikel {\it aint} im Romanischen des
Bundnerlandes. In: Das Romanische in den Ostalpen. Von rage und Aufsatze der
gleichnamigen Tagung am Insritut fur Romanistik der Universitat Salzburg 1982. Ed.
D.Messner. Wien:Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
1984:289-308.
Engdahl, Elisabet (1990). Argument roles and anaphora. In Robin Cooper, Keniaki
Mukai, John Perry (eds.), Situation Theory and its Applications, Vol 1. CSLI Lecture
Notes Number 22. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Ferrier, G. (1991). An experimental study to investigate the factors that contribute to
a functional geometry of spatial prepositions. Maxi project. Department of
Psychology, University of Glasgow.
Fillmore, Charles J. (1968). The Case for Case. In Emmon Bach and Robert T.
Harms (eds.). Universals in Linguistic Theory. Aylesbury (Bucks):Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, pp. 1-88.
Fillmore, Charles J. (1971). Santa Cruz lectures on deixis, presented at the University
of California, Santa Cruz. Bloomington, Ind.: University Linguistics Club.
Mimeographed.
Fillore, C. J. (1982). Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial Deixis. In R. J.
Jarvella and W. Klein (Eds.), Speech, Place and Action, pp. 31-59. London: John
Wiley.
Flanagan, O. J. (1991). The Science of the Mind. A Bradford Book. MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. (1983). The Modularity ofMind. Mass.:MIT Press/Bradford.
211
Fodor, J. D. (1977). Semantics: theories of meaning in generative grammar. New
York: Crowell.
Forbus, K. (1983). Qualitative reasoning about space and motion. In, Mental Models
(eds. Gentner and Stevens). Erlbaum Publications.
Friedrich, P. (1969). On the meaning of Tarascan suffixes of space. Memoir 23,
Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics. Supplement to IJAI,
35(4).
Furrow, D., Murray, P. & Furrow, M. (1985/86). Spatial term use and its relation to
language function at two developmental stages. First Language, 6, 40-52.
Garrod, S. C. and Anderson, A. (1987). Saying what you mean in dialogue : a study
in conceptual and semantic coordination. Cognition 27 : 181-218.
Garrod, S. C. & Sanford, A. J. (1977). Interpreting anaphoric relations: the
integration of semantic information while reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verba! Behavior, 16, 77-90.
Garrod, S. C. and Sanford, A. J. (1989). Discourse models as interfaces between
language and the spatial world. Journal ofSemantics 6 : 147-160.
Gawron, Jean Mark (1985). A Parsimonious Semantics for Prepositions and CAUSE,
CSL 21, 1985.
Gawron, Jean Mark (1986a). Types, Contents, and Semantic Objects. Linguistics and
Philosophy 9, 1986:427-476.
212
Gawron, Jean Mark (1986b). Situations and Prepositions. Linguistics and Philosophy
9, 1986: 327-382.
Geeraerts, D. (1988). Where does prototypicality come from? In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.)
Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Gentner, D. and Gentner, D. R. (1983). Flowing waters and teeming crowds : mental
models of electricity. In, Mental Models (eds. Gentner and Stevens). Erlbaum
Publications.
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Givon, T. (1979). On Understanding Grammar. New York: cademic Press.
Gould, S. J. (1983). Hen's teeth and horse's toes: Further reflections in natural
history. New York: Norton.
Greeno, J. G. (1983). Conceptual entities. In Mental Models (eds. Gentner and
Stevens). Erlbaum Publications.
Grimm, H. (1975). On the child's acquisition of semantic structure underlying the
worldfield of prepositions. Language and Speech, 18, 97-119.
Guthrie, J. A., Guthrie, L., Wilks, Y. & Aidenejad, H. (1991). Subject-dependent
co-occurrence and word sense disambiguation. Proceedings of the 29th Annual
meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. University of California at
Berkeley. Association for Computational Linguistics.
213
Hamp, E. P., Householder, F. W. & Austerlitz, R. (eds.) (1966), Readings in
Linguistics 11. Cliieago: University of Chicago Press.
Harris, C. (1989). Connectionist explorations in cognitive linguistics. Unpublished
paper.
Harrison, B. (1972). Meaning and Structure. New York: Harper & Row.
Hawkins, B. W. (1984). The Semantics of English Spatial Prepositions. Ph.D diss.,
University of California, San Diego.
Hawkins, B. W. (1988). The natural category MEDIUM: an alternative to selection
restrictions and similar constructs. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) Topics in Cognitive
Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Hays, E. (1987). A Computational Treatment of Locative Expressions in Natural
Language. Technical Report, MS-CIS-87-31, LINC LAB 58, Dept. of Computer and
Information Science, University of Pennsylvannia.
Herrmann, T. (1987). Sprachpsychologische Beitrage zur Partnerbezogenheit des
Sprechens, Bericht Nr. 37, Arbeiten der Eorschungsgruppe Sprache und Kognition am
Lehrstuhl Psychologic 111 der Universitiat Mannheim, West Germany.
Herskovits, A. (1985). Semantics and pragmatics of spatial prepositions. Cognitive
Science, vol. 9: 341-378.
Herskovits,A. (1986). Language and Spatial Cognition. An interdisciplinary study of
the prepositions on English. Cambridge University Press.
214
Herskovits, A. (1988). Spatial expressions and the plasticity of meaning. In Rudzka-
Ostyn (ed.) Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company,
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Hjelmslev, Louis (1953). Prologetna to a Theory of Language-, translated by F. J.
Whitfield. Baltimore:Waverley Press.
Hindle, D. & Rooth, M. (1991). Structural ambiguity and lexical relations.
Proceedings of the 29th Annual meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics. University of California at Berkeley. Association for Computational
Linguistics.
Ipsen, G. (1924). Der alte Orient unde die Indogermanen. In Stand und Aufgahen der
Sprachwissenschaft: Festschrift J'ur W. Streitherg. Heidelberg: C. Winter.
Jackendoff, R. (1973). The base rules for prepositional phrases. In S. Anderson and
P. Kiparsky (Eds.), A Festschrift for Morris Halle. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston. 345-56.
Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1987). Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Jakobson, R. (1932). 'Zur Struktur des russischen Verbums', Charisteria V, Mathesio
Oblata (Prague: Cercle Linguistique de Prague), pp 74-83. Reprinted in Hamp,
Householder and Austerlitz (1966), pp 22-30.
215
Jakobson, R. (1936). 'Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kasuslelire: Gesamtbedeutungen der
russischen Kasus', Travaux du Ccrclc Linguistique de Prague, 6, pp240-88. Reprinted
inHamp, Householder and Austerlitz (1966), pp 51-89.
Janda, Laura (1984). A Semantic Analysis of the Russian Verbal Prefixes ZA-, PERE-
DO- and OT-. Ph.D diss., Universily of California, Los Angeles.
Japkowicz, N. & Wiebe, J. M. (1991). A system for translating locative prepositions
from English into French. Proceedings of the 29th Annual meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics. University of California at Berkeley. Association for
Computational Linguistics.
Johnson, J. R. (1981). On location: thinking and talking about space. Topics in
Language. Disorders, Dec, 17-31.
Johnson, J. (1984). Acquisition of locative meanings: behind and in front of. Journal
of Child Language, 11, 407-22.
Johnson, R. & Slobin, D. (1979). The development of locative expressions in
English, Italian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish. Journal of Child Language, 6, 529-46.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental Models. Towards a cognitive science of
language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1987). The Mental Representation of the Meaning of Words.
Cognition, 25, 189-211.
Kamp, H. (1981). A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation. In Groenenedijk,
Janssen and Stokhof (eds), Formal Methods in the Study ofLanguage. MCT.
216
Katz, J. J. & Fodor, J. A. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39,
170-210.
Kautz, H. A. (1985). Formalising Spatial Concepts and Spatial Language. Technical
Report, CSLI-85-35, Cebter for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford
University.
Kempson, R. M. (1977). Semantic Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Kempson, R. M. & Cormack, A. (1981). Ambiguity and quantification. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 4, 259-310.
Kintsch, W. (1974). The representation of meaning in memory. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Klein, W. (1978). Wo ist hier: Praliminarien zu einer Untersuchung der lokalen
Deixis. Linguistische Derichte 58.
Klein, W. (1982). Local Deixis in Route Directions. In R. J. Jarvella & W. Klein
(Eds.), Speech, Place and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics. Chichester,
England: Wiley.
Klein, W. (1983). Deixis and Spatial Orientation in Route Directions. In H. Pick &
L. Acredola (Eds.), Spatial Orientation: Theoty, Research and Application. New
York: Plenum.
Krauss, R. (1952). A hole is to dig. New York: Harper Row.
Kuno, S. (1987). Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse and Empathy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
217
Labov, W. (1972). The boundaries of words and their meanings. In C.-J. N. Bailey
and R. W. Shuy (Eds.), New Ways ofAnalysing Variation in English, Vol. 1. (Papers
from conference, 1972). Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1973.
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things. Chicago : Chicago University
Press.
Lang, Ewald (1987). Semantik der Dimensionsauszeichnung. In: Bierwisch/Lang
1987a, pp. 287-458.
Lang, Ewald (1990). Primary Perceptual Space and Inherent Proportion Schema: Two
Interacting Categorization Grids Underlying the Conceptualization of Spatial Objects.
Journal ofSemantics 7, 1990:121 - 141.
Lang, Ewald/Kai-Uwe Carstensen (1990). OSKAR - a Prolog Program for Modelling
Dimensional Designation and Positional Variation of Objects in Space. IWBS - Report
109, Hamburg:LILOG-R.
Langacker, R. W. (1986). Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1988). An overview of cognitive grammar. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.)
Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
218
Langacker, R. W. (1988). A view of linguistic semantics. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.)
Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Langacker, R. W. (1988). The nature of grammatical valence. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.)
Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Langacker, R. W. (1988). A Usage-based model. In Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) Topics in
Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Leech, G. N. (1969). Towards a Semantic Description ofEnglish. London: Longman.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1984). Some perceptual limitations on talking about space. In Van
Doom, A. J., Van de Grind, W. A. and J. J. Koenderink (Eds.), Limits in
Perception. VNU Science Press, Utrecht.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1986). Zur sprachlichen Abbildung des Raumes: Deiktische und
intrinsische Perspektive. In Perspektiven auf Sprache Interdisziplinare Beitrage zuni
Gedenken an Hans Hormann, ed. H. G. Bosshardt, 187-211. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Lindkvist, K. G. (1950). Studies on the Local Sense of the Prepositions IN, AT, ON,
and TO in modern English, Lund Series in English, 22. Lund and Copenhagen:
Munksgaard.
Lindner, S. (1981). A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of Verb-Particle Constructions with
Up and Out. Ph.D Diss., University of California, San Diego. University of Indiana
Linguistics Club.
219
Lindner, S. (1982). What Goes Up Doesn't Necessarily Come Down: The Ins and
Outs of Oppositcs. In Papers from the Eighteenth Regional Meeting, Chicago
Linguistics Society, pp. 305-23. Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society.
Lyon, K. & Chater, N. (1990). Localist and Globalist Approaches to Concepts. In K.
J. Gilhooly (Ed.), Lines of Thinking, Volume 1. Chichester: John Wiley.
Lyons, J. (1968). Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge University
Press.
Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics, 2 Vols. Cambridge Univ. Press.
McGarrigle, J. & Monaldson, M. (1978). Conservation accidents. Cognition, 3(4),
341-50.
Maienborn, Claudia (1988). Zur Semantik von Bewegungs- und Positionsverben.
Perspektiven der Kognitiven Linguistik. LILOG-Report 64, IBM Deutschland.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation in the Hitman Representation
of Visual Information. San Francisco: Freeman.
Maturana, H. R. (1978). Biology of language: the epistemology of reality.
Psychology and biology of language and thought: essays in honour ofEric Lenneberg,
ed. G. A. Miller and E. Lenneberg, 27-63. New York: Academic Press.
Michotte, A. (1963). The Perception of Causality. Translated from La Perception de
la Causalite (1946). London: Methuen & Co Ltd.
Miller, G. A. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and Perception. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
220
Miller, J. (1985). Semantics and Syntax : Parallels and connections. Cambridge
University Press.
Murphy, G. L. & Medin, D. L. (1985). The Role of Theories in Conceptual
Coherence. Psychological Review, 92, 289-316.
Nirenburg, S. & Raskin, V. (1987). Dealing with Space in Natural Language
Processing. In A. Kak & S-S. Chen (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1987 Workshop on
Spatial Reasoning and Multi-Sensor Fusion Units. Los Altos, California: Morgan
Kaufman.
Nunberg, G. D. (1978). The Pragmatics of Reference. PhD Thesis. Reproduced by
the Indiana University Linguistics Club.
Osherson, D. N. & Smith, E. E. (1981). On the adequacy of prototype theory as a
theory of concepts. Cognition, 9, 35-58.
Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag (1987). Information-Based Syntax and Semantics, Vol.
1. Stanford:CSLI (Lecture Notes 13).
Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag (1988). A Semantics of Obligatory Control.
Manuscript.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.iMIT Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1964). From a Logical Point of View. (2nd edition). Cambridge,
Mass.:MIT Press.
Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G. & Svartvik, J. (1985). A Comprehensive
Grammar of the English Language. Longman, London.
221
Reich, M., Rice, K. & Pressner, U. S. (1974). Acquisition of ambiguous
prepositions. Centre for Linguistic Studies, University of Toronto.
Retz-Schmidt, Gudula (1988). Various views on spatial prepositions. Al Magazine,
Summer, pp. 95-105.
Rosch, E. (1973a). Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 328-350.
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 192-233.
Rosch, E. & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances. Cognitive Psychology, 7,
573-605.
Rosch, E. (1977). Human Categorisation. In N. Warren, ed., Advances in Cross-
Cultural Psychology, Vol. 7. London : Academic Press.
Roth, E. M. & Shoben, E. J. (1983). The Effect of Context on the Structure of
Categories. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 346-378.
Rudzka-Ostyn, Brygida (1983). Cognitive Grammar and the Structure of Dutch Uit
and Polish Wy. Trier, West Germany: Linguistic Agency, University of Trier.
Saile, G. (1984). Sprache und Handlung. Braunschweig, West Germany: Vieweg.
Sandhagen, H. (1956). Studies on the temporal senses of the prepositions AT, ON, IN,
BY and FOR in Present-day English. Trelleborg: the author.
Sanford, A. J. and Garrod, S. C. (1981). Understanding Written Language. Wiley
UK.
222
Schlesinger, I. M. (1979). Cognitive and linguistic structures: the case of the
instrumental. Journal ofLinguistics 15, 307-324.
Schlesinger, I. M. (1989). Instruments as agents. Journal ofLinguistics 25, 189-210.
Schultze, R. (1987). The Perception of Space and the Function of Prepositions in
English: A Contribution to Cognitive Grammar. In W. Lorscher & R. Schulze (Eds.),
Perspectives on Language and Performance. Tubingen, West Germany: Narr.
Searle, J. R. (1979). Literal Meaning. In Expression and Meaning: Studies in the
Theory ofSpeech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Seligman, Jerry (1990). Perspectives in Situation Theory. In Cooper, Mukai and
Perry (eds.), Situation Theory and its Applications. Volume 1. CSLI Lecture Notes.
Sennholtz, K. (1985). Grundzuge der Deixis. Bochum, West Germany: Brockmeter.
Smith, E. E., Osherson, D. N., Rips, L. J. & Keane, M. (1988). Combining
Prototypes: A Selective Modification Model. Cognitive Science, 12, 485-527.
Sober, E. (1991). Teleological functionalism: Putting the function back into
functionalism. In W. G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Basil Blackwell.
Sternberg, S. (1966). High-Speed Scanning in Human Memory. Science, 153, 652-
654.
Stevens, T. & Coventry, K. R. (In Preparation). Functional Relations and the
Acquisition ofSpatial Prepositions. Manuscript.
223
Suppes, P. (1991). The principle of invariance with special reference with special
reference to perception. In Doignon, J. and j. Falmagne (lids.), Mathematical
Psychology: Current Developments. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. Pp. 35-53.
Talmy, L. (1983). How language structures space. In H. Pick & L. Acredolo (eds.),
Spatial orientation: theory research and application. New York, Plenum Press, pp.
225-320.
Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 12,
49-100.
Taylor, J. R. (1988). Contrasting prepositional categories : English and Italian. In
Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. John Benjamins Publishing
Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Tomasello, M. (1987). Learning to use prepositions: a case study. Journal of Child
Language, 14, 79-98.
Trier, J. (1934). Das sprachliche Feld. Neue Jahrhucher fur Wissenschaft und
Jungenbilden 10: 428-449.
Ullmer-Eluich, V. (1982). The Structure of Living Space Descriptions. In R. J.
Jarvella & W. Klein (Eds.), Speech, Place and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related
Topics. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Vandeloise, C. (1984). The description of space in French. PhD. Diss, University of
California, San Diego.
Van Geert, P. (1985/86). In, on, under: an essay on the modularity of infant spatial
competence. First Language, 6, 7-28.
224
Wallace, I., Klahr, D. & Bluff, K. (1987). A Self-modifying Production System
Model of Cognitive Development. In D. Klahr, P. Langley & R. Ncches (Eds.),
Production System Models ofLearning and Development. MIT Press.
Wilcox, S. & Palermo, D. (1975). 'In', 'on' and 'under' revisited. Cognition, 3, 245-
54.
Winograd, T. and Flores, F. (1985) Understanding computers and cognition.
Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Wood, F. T. (1967). English prepositional idioms. London: Macmillan.
Wunderlich, D. (1985). Raumkonzepte. Zur Semantik der lokalen Prapositionen. In
Nach-Chomskysche Linguistik. Neuere Arheiten von Berliner Linguisten, eds. T.
Ballmer and R. Posner, 340-351. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Wunderlich, D. and Herweg, M. (1988). Lokale und Direktionale. In Handhuch der
Semantik, eds. A. V. Stechow and D. Wunderlich. Konigstein, West Germany:
Athenaum. Forthcoming.
Zwicky, A. M. & Sadock, J. M. (1975). Ambiguity tests and how to fail them.In
Kimball, J, P. (ed.), Syntax and Semantic, 4, 1-36. Academic Press.
225
Appendix 1
Visual scenes used in Experiment 2
Appendix 1
Visual scenes used in Experiment X
At scenes
(1) Sentences used ; The old lady is the church
The bus is the church
Appendix 1
Visual scenes used in Experiment JL
At scenes





Visual scenes used in Experiment 2.
At scenes






Visual scenes used in Experiment 2.
At scenes
(4) Sentences used ; The woman is the typewriter








Visual scenes used in Experiment 2.
In scenes
(1) Sentences used ; The crack is the vase










Visual scenes used in Experiment 2.
In scenes
(2) Sentences used ; The ventilator is the window
(a)
The golliwog is the window
axnccrs shoi











Visual scenes used in Experiment 1
In scenes
(3) Sentences used ; The ventilator is the window










Visual scenes used in Experiment 2
In scenes
(4) Sentences used ; The nail is the chair













Visual scenes used in Experiment X
On scenes
(1) Sentences used ; The ring is the finger






Visual scenes used in Experiment X
On scenes
(2) Sentences used ; The man is the chair




Visual scenes used in Experiment 2.
On scenes
(3) Sentences used ; The lines are





Visual scenes used in Experiment X
On scenes
(4) Sentences used ; The shoe is the foot





Visual scenes used in Experiment X
On scenes
(5) Sentences used ; The crack is the wall
The teddy bear is the wall
(a)
Appendix 2
Order of Presentation of Scenes Used in Experiment 2
Appendix 2
Order of presentation of scenes used in Experiment 2
Questionnaire A
(1) At/la (11) On/3b
(2) In/lb (12) At/2c
(3) On/lc (13) In/2b
(4) On/3a (14) On/2b
(5) In/2a (15)In/3c
(6) At/3c (16) At/4b





(1) In/4b (11) In/2c
(2) At/3b (12) On/5a
(3) On/5b (13) At/2a
(4) In/3b (14) In/1c
(5) At/4c (15) At/lc
(6) On/4b (16) On/4a
(7) In/4a (17) At/3a
(8) On/3c (18) On/2c
(9) At/2b (19) In/3a
(10) On/lb (20) On/la
Appendix 3
Order of Presentation of Scenes Used in Experiment 5
scene 001
The ball in ihe bovl.
The ball i3 the bovl.
scene
The orange is the bowl
scene 4









The banana L3 the bovl
H h>
I 1 )
bill in ro.nTi'? ;lov.r jpe^'l
The ball is the bowl
scene 7
The ball is the bowl
scene 8
The apple 13 the bovl.
scene y
ii.ll mi'i'.nri'j ni»'Li»jii




Tlie annle Ls the bO"wT
scene 11




niO'.injT' nxtdivjii ;j 1 V M ll
The ban.ana is the bovv 1
s c e n e 14
The banana Is the bovl.
scene 15
bov.'l m.u '.1107 :1"'■>w - P"1
The ball is the bow!
s c e n e 1 6
L_
b .<11 mo vim? " lowsp^'l
The ball is the b0w 1
scene 1 7
The apple is the bowl
scene 1o
The apple L3 the bovl.
e n e 20
\ —i 1 )!' " ( v— !
-7 I Vf r T ■
v'. X '.O: )J
The ball is the bowl.
scene 21
The ball is the bovl
bi<_ll moving flow-ni^'iiniii





\ AJT 'u_i r-r
M l. .1 i >■
trrT
it jf.K
The ball is the bowl









The ball us the bovl.
scene 028
The banana La the bovl.
scene 29




The orange is — time bovl
scene ?1





bowl moving , slow speed
Tlie ball Is th.e bovl.
scene 034
The ball is tbie bovl
scene 35
The banana 13 the bovl
scene 3o
bowl m.o'.niy . milium :p^-d
The apple is ihe bovl.
scene 37
The banana is the bovl
scene ic<
The orange is the hovl.
scene 39
static
The ring is the finger
k'JU'lL.1 TTnvnri'j ;lov,r







The banana L3 the bovl
scene 4J
Tt
The banana Is the bovl.
scene 43
The ball is the bovl.
scene 44
The banana is the bovl
scene 45
The ball is the bovl
scene 4c
The ball is the bovl.
scene 47
The ball is — the bovl
scene 4 b
bov/i TTiiv.nn-r meiiinm
Hie banana in the bovl
scene 49
The orange 12 the bovl.
scene r'U
4 V —
T1-. ^ V- .-.11;., 1U... U ~ 1
1 llf UOli 1^ M IE U'J'Vl.
scene 51
, ^ . r -1
>CHI It1 ..'c
b.«H m rt'.nrrj m-'Lliijaj.
















Tlie banana ia the bovl
The banana is the bovl
The ball 13 the bovl.
The apple 13 the jug
The ball Is the bo-wl.
; f s! i«*
scene 59
/• \













w t jtr y jl_ { 1- -'^ ;COrTi X r
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The apple u? the jng
cene 64
The banauaa L3 the bovl
scene 065
bowl moving slow Sp*»r'l
The ball is the bovl.
scene 066
The ball Is the bovl
scene 67
The apple is the bovl.
scenp f
bowl TTl iV.HTi;7 ;luW
The banana in the bovl.
scene 69
j










I A 1 /
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The apple i3 the jug
scene 071
---->
bowl movuiy slow sp-r^cl
The ball is the bovl.
scene 072





The banana 13 the bovl
scene /4
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r'rrr
ball mOVOH? t.of
The ball ls the bovl
bowl moving :
The banana Is the bovl
"V-*
The banana is the bovl.
scene 79
The ball L3 the bovl.
scene cij
_ .









The apple is the jag
k<ll mo'.uiij milium
The ball is the bovl
cene 8->
The banana L3 the bovl
The banana L3 the bo vl
scene 85
( )
The ball is the bovl
scene iJo
The ball Is the bovl
scene 37
c
rw mo'.in? ;p-i-jd f onAii'l off finger
The ring jit the finger
scene 33
The ball L3 the bovl
scene 89




The orange Is the bovl
The ball is the bovl
scene 92'
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The orange in the bovl.
scene 094
St;UlC
The banana in the bovl.
scene 95
scene 96
The ball l3 the bovl.
b.<ll moving slov/ 'I p H M ll
The ball is the bovl
scsni? yij
•:k hlovuij . •! I floor i
The crack 13 the floor
The apple ui the jug
scene 100
j















The banana i3 the bovl
scene 103
The orange L3 the bovl
scene 104
b.'_ll m i-iyrri'J L<5t. .'rO'JJui .'Jill out Ot bov.'l
The ball ls the bovl.
scene 105
The banana ls the bovl.
scene 106
St.JlC
The banana L3 the jug.
scene 107
t.. f 10
The orange i3 the bovl.
The banana L3 the jng.
scene 109
b.'JLULv moving fASt spn^d





















static, bull rocking shghlly
The hall is the bovl.
scene 111















The banana 13 the bovl.
scene 113
The ball is the bovl
scene 1 H
bowl niu'.uw milium
The apple is the howl.
scene 115
The ball us the bovl
scene 116
i i
mis' moving a-hum ;p--d | on off fimr-r
The nng us the linger
scene 117
The ball la the bovl.
scene 118
The orange ia the bovl.
scene 119
The bail is --- the bovl
scene 120
The banana is the bovl
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bov/1 moving jkiv.'-m'i'hi'jLi :p--'l
The bail u: the bovl
scene 122





bowl movxn^ medium speed , freeze frume
The ball 12 the bo vl.
scene 124
bail mOVim^ medium Speed
The boll the bovl
scene 125
The ball in the bovl
i title
The ball 13 the bovl.
scene 127
The ball is the bovl.
£«-•£! if
The ball 13 the bo * 1.
scene 129




The banana 13 the bovl
131
////////:
The ball L3 the bovl
scene 132
static
The ball us the bovl.
scene 133




The orange L3 the bovl
scene 135
The ball Is the bovl
scene 13t>







Hie banana \3 tbe bovl
scene 1 Z'Z
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bi<Il mo'.niur slow sp^'i
The ball is the bovl


















The banana 13 the jag
The banana Is the bovl
ene 143
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The banana L3 the bovl
scene 144
:K'Mo
The ball i3 tlie bovl
scene 145
b.dl moving medium speed
The bail is the bovl.
scene 146
b.dl moving medium spee
The ball is the bovl.
3 147
zzzzzzzz
The ball L3 tbe bovl
ie 148
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bull no'/my medium speed
Tbe ball Is tlie bo vl.
>
The orange Ls the bovl.
StAlC
The ball is the bovl.
scene 151
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b.OI dropped .eiul bounces La bowl.
The ball is the bovl.
scene 152
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bmLULi Swinging, slow speed
The banana is the bovl
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The ball uj the bovl
scene Ij-4
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The ball is the bovl
scene 155
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The banana \3 the bovl.
scene 157
The banana Ls the bovl
The orange L3 the bovl
scene 159
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The ball is the bovl.
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The banana is the bovl
scene 164




The ball is the bovl
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ken.au moving medium speed
The banana in the bovl
scene 1 67
Hie ball is the bovl.
scene I 68
stLUic
The ball is the bovl.
scene 169
The ball is the bovl
scene 1/ij
The bajxajia is the jug
scene 171
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The banana 13 the bovl
scene 171'
ifir
The ball the bovl.
scene 1 73
b.iiu'jui moving : medium speed




The apple is the bovl
scene 175
The bail 13 the bovl





The ball L3 the bovl
seem? 17
The ball is the bovl.
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The apple La the jug
i'ov/l tti m'.nrrr a-jlnijll /p^^
The hall is the hovl.
scene 1 81
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The banana is the bovl
scene 1 82
The ball Is the bovl
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The bail is the bovl
scene 1 ij-4










b„Jl s v/imging-, Cn-me moving: medium speed
The ball is the bovl.
ne 186
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bill moving' medium speed





The apple 13 — the bovl.
scene 139
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The ball is the bovl.
scene 191
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The ball lit the bovl
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scene 193
The bailana L3 the bovl
scene 194
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The banana ia the bovl
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The ring is the finger
scene 197




The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 199
The bail L3 the bovl.
bull moving slow s
The ball is the bovl.
scene 199
St.JlC
The ball is the bovl.
bidl moving : slow sp«d
















The banana Ls the bovl
scene 203
The bail ls the bovl.
scene 20*4
I
The banana is the bovl
scene _'Uo
i i
The ring 13 the finger
scene 207
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The ball 13 the bovl
scene 210
The ball 13 the bovl
;M k









The banana Is the bovl
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kdl moving : slow sped




The ball is the bovl.
scene 219
The ball is the bovl.
scene 22U
bowl movim?
The apple is the bovl.
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The banana nj the bovl
scene JJJ
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The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 225
The ball 13 the bovl.
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bowl ni'j'.nw m.*'kiua ;p-:»'l
The banana is the bo vl
The orange L3 the bovl.
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The bail is the bovl.
scene 229
Kill moving milium spiid
The ball is the bovl.
ball moving fast spud
















The apple is the jag.
The apple is the botrl.
scene 2 3
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The banana is the jug
scene 2:>/
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The ball m the bovl
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The ball i3 the bovl.
scene 241
The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 242
:K<tK
The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 243
( J










The banana ls the bovl
scene 245
The apple U5 the bovl
scene 24c
OtVJigv mivnTiJ f.v-t ;ppMil, fre«Z* fr&BL«
The orange uj the bovl
cene 247
I'j'K
The orange L3 the bovl
scene 242
j
The ball is the bovl.
scene 249
The orange in the bovl.
scene 250
St.UlC
The orange in the bovl.
scene 251





The banana Is the bo vL
scene
The banana 13 the bovl
scene _,CW
The apple Is the bovl.
, ^ _ v- _ nrr
The banana ls the bovl
}i.'ti.<ri.< ttii'ivnri<7 p ^*'1
The banana L3 the bovl
scene
The ball is the bovl




The apple is the bovl
scene 260
:Mn'
The ball Is the bovl.
scene 261
nn>' moving m^lruii | ii tuis^r
The rung L3 the finger
scene 262






The orange L3 the bovl
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The ball La the bovl.
scene 267
Z
The orange La the bovl.
scene 266
The orange L3 the jug.
scene 268
The ball is the bovl.
scene 269
The apple is the jug
scene 270
scene 271
The orange ls the bovl
scene 272
The apple is the bovl
scene 27 3
Lov.'l mo'.TJW m^'Li'un
The ball L3 the bovl
b.<iL'iL.' mn\nna mi'lium rp^'l
The banana is the bovl.
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The banana L3 the bovl
scene >./o
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The ring L3 the finger
scene 277
The bail is the bovl
scene 272
The orange is the hovl
scene 279
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The banana in the bovl
see lie 233
The orange is the bovl
bowl moving ms'lium sp**!
The ball L3 the bovl
b.dl moving' medium sp>f
The ball is the bo vl
'Hie ball is the bovl
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The banana is the bovl
scene 291
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The bail ls the hovl
The banana i3 the jng
scene 293
bowl moving speed
The banana is the hovl.
bidl moving medium speed




The ball ls the bovl.
orunjj* moving : slow sp^d
The orange is the bovl.
scene 296
scene 297
The apple L3 the bovl
scene 293
The orange 13 the bovl
scene 299
The tipple L3 the bovl
Scene >00
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The orange L3 the bovl.
scene 301
The ball L3 the bovl
scene 303
The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 303
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The ball L3 the bovl
scene ;'U4
The ball Is the bovl
scene 305
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scene 307
The orange 12 the bovl
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The ball ls the bovl
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The ball 13 the bovl
scene 315
The ball L3 the bovl.
scene 316
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The hall is the bovl
scene 317
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